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Abstract
The U.S. Medicaid program is increasingly challenged by reductions in federal
entitlement spending, a faltering private sector health insurance base, escalating health
care expenditures and an aging and increasingly diverse population. Converging
pressures on state Medicaid programs have challenged state policy makers to find new
approaches to enhance program efficiency. One of these policy tools is the adoption of
Medicaid managed care programs for individuals with chronic illness and disability,
particularly important as these enrollees incur the highest health care costs. The
increasing prevalence of chronic illness combined with the growth of households in
poverty creates significant implications for Medicaid policy making. Consequently,
Medicaid policies directly influence the health and well-being of millions of Americans.
Although literature cites cost-containment as the genesis for the adoption and growth of
managed care in state Medicaid programs (Hurley and Zuckerman 2003: 217), little
research explores why the growth of Medicaid managed care varies among states.
This study uses panel regression analyses of the fifty states to examine
redistributive and developmental policy attributes associated with Medicaid managed
care and identifies policy determinants influencing the use of managed care in state
Medicaid programs. Spatial patterns of state Medicaid managed care programs for
enrollees with chronic illness and disability will be assessed using spatial autocorrelation.
This will provide a descriptive picture of the relationship among states.
Outcomes reveal the enrollment rate of state Medicaid programs and the use of
managed care for program enrollees with disability is significantly influenced by
redistributive and demographic policy indicators. Examining spatial relationships among
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states with respect to the percent of comprehensive state Medicaid managed care
programs for people with disability yields only moderate correlation. This research looks
beyond more overt policy characteristics such as state wealth, to uncover more nuanced
factors influencing the public welfare sector and the health and well-being of Medicaid
enrollees.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

By our policy decisions, we decide who we are as people
Thomas E. McCollough
The Moral Imagination and Public Life, (1991)

The U.S. Medicaid program is increasingly challenged by reductions in federal
entitlement spending, a faltering private sector health insurance base, escalating health
care expenditures and an aging and increasingly diverse population. Economic
projections expect the growth of federal mandatory budget expenditures, particularly
Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security, to absorb nearly sixty percent of the budget by
2030 (White House 2006). Considering both federal contributions and state funds, states
spend more on health care than any other program, exceeding state funding for education
(Boyd 2003: 59).
Converging pressures on state Medicaid programs have challenged state policy
makers to find new approaches to enhance program efficiency. One of these policy tools
is the enrollment of Medicaid managed care for individuals with chronic illness and
disability, particularly important as these enrollees incur the highest health care costs.
The terms ―chronic illness‖ and ―chronic conditions‖ are used interchangeably to
describe the presence of illness or symptoms over an extended period of time (Institute
for Health and Aging 1996: 9) while ―disability‖ refers to limitations in activity of daily
life (adapted from the World Health Organization, 2001). Medicaid policy making

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p. 8
directly influences the health and well-being of millions of Americans. Understanding
the forces shaping policy making more fully informs state policy choices considered and
solutions adopted.
Cost containment is often cited as the rationale driving the adoption of Medicaid
managed care. However, as a cost containment effort, wouldn‘t all states seek to develop
Medicaid managed care programs? Why do some states mandate Medicaid managed care
for high cost enrollees and others do not? More broadly, why do some states use
managed care more than others? While Wyoming and Alaska do not use Medicaid
managed care at all, Tennessee has one hundred percent enrollment in the state Medicaid
managed care program (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2006a: 4). Clearly,
states vary in the use of Medicaid managed care. Current literature examining state
social welfare policy presents inconclusive evidence regarding factors influencing state
welfare policy outcomes, particularly those associated with Medicaid.
Why does state adoption of Medicaid managed care differ so much? Are the
states using managed care to save money or to improve services for the medically needy?
Structurally designed as a federal-state partnership, Medicaid creates a financial incentive
for state participation, yet situates states as administrators of a sizable redistributive
program. This begs the question, is state adoption of Medicaid managed care influenced
by constituent need (redistributive characteristics) or economic efficiency (developmental
characteristics)?
I examine the relative influence of developmental and redistributive policy
characteristics on state adoption of Medicaid managed care. As a public welfare policy,
Medicaid redistributes resources to provide access to health care services to needy
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individuals left out of the private market at substantial economic costs. Adoption of
Medicaid managed care can enhance efficient use of available resources to sustain or
extend the commitment to the redistributive program. A focus on developmental policy
making might influence the adoption of Medicaid managed care as a cost-efficient
mechanism to minimize economic burden constraining economic growth. Medicaid
managed care provides the opportunity for states to function as ―prudent buyers‖ in the
health care market (Kettl 1993).

The Importance of Understanding State Medicaid Policy
Medicaid is an indispensable health care resource for low-income individuals with
chronic illness and disability. Extensive evidence supports the bidirectional relationship
between individuals of low-income and the prevalence of chronic illness and disability
(Allen and Croke 2000), highlighting the importance of Medicaid as the only access to
health insurance for more than forty-percent of the nation‘s non-elderly poor (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2007a: 5). While disability may lead to poverty, conditions of
poverty may be a causal influence of chronic illness and disability due to lack of access to
resources (Lustig and Strauser 2007: 195).
Escalating welfare spending (Lewin Group 2004a: 3) combined with increasing
demand, influenced by increasing unemployment and reductions in employer-based
health insurance coverage, pressure state Medicaid programs (Kaiser Family Foundation
2005a; Holahan and Garrett 2001). The increasing prevalence of chronic illness
combined with the growth of households in poverty poses significant implications for
Medicaid policy making. While seventy-five percent of Medicaid beneficiaries are
children and non-disabled adults, seventy percent of Medicaid expenditures go toward
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beneficiaries with disabilities and elderly beneficiaries(Kaiser Family Foundation 2007a:
14). At a cost of more than 283 billion dollars, encompassing 18 percent of total national
spending, reconciling cost-containment efforts with the varied health care needs of all
Medicaid enrollees is vital to both federal and state governments (National Association of
State Budget Officers 2006a: 46).

Medicaid Managed Care
This study examines policy factors influencing state adoption of Medicaid
managed care program as a means to better understand variance among the state
programs. The policy determinant literature will provide a theoretical foundation to
assess socio-economic, political system and policy diffusion characteristics associated
with state Medicaid managed care programs. Panel regression analyses of the fifty states
will be used to examine redistributive and developmental policy attributes associated
with Medicaid managed care and identify policy determinants influencing the use of
managed care in state Medicaid programs.
Managed care theoretically represents more efficient use of available health care
resources. State Medicaid policy is under pressure to increase efficiency because of
converging environmental pressures at both national and local levels, challenging state
policy-makers to reconcile escalating costs with simultaneous demand for state Medicaid
programs. In response to these environmental pressures, changes to Medicaid policy,
including the adoption of managed care, influence the lives of fifty-nine million
Americans (National Association of State Budget Officers 2006a: 46).
In this study, Medicaid managed care includes both commercial and noncommercial providers who offer a comprehensive array of health care services (Centers
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for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2006a: 55). There are numerous varieties of
prepayment arrangements used by state Medicaid programs, including managed care
coverage for in-patient hospital services, managed care specifically for mental health
services or managed care for services provided in non-acute care settings, just to name a
few. Structured as prepayment mechanisms, these varied managed care arrangements
complicate analysis of Medicaid managed care, warranting careful scrutiny of Medicaid
managed care data to ensure consistency of terms and data compilation. In principle,
managed care provides comprehensive health care services to enrollees through efficient
service management and negotiated pricing with health care providers (Shi and Singh
2004: 326; Enthoven 1993: 29). Price competition assumes participation by an adequate
number of provider plans to support negotiated pricing among competitors (Enthoven
1993: 29). I adhere to this definition by analyzing managed care plans identified as
comprehensive programs.
Although literature cites cost-containment as the genesis for the adoption and
growth of managed care in state Medicaid programs (Hurley and Zuckerman 2003: 217),
little research explores why the growth of Medicaid managed care varies among states.
Using cost as a ―catch all‖ explanation for the adoption of managed care marginalizes the
presence of other factors that may influence state variance; variance that plays out in the
lives of Medicaid enrollees. Comprehensive managed care, a crucial component of state
Medicaid programs, has been little studied in contemporary literature. In addition, to
examining policy indicators, such as state wealth and ideology, this study includes
investigation of factors associated with the need for public welfare programs, such as
state disability rates and state rates of uninsured. I will use quantitative analysis to
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discern influential factors contributing to the adoption of Medicaid managed care and the
use of comprehensive managed care strategies among states.

What Causes Differences in State Medicaid Choices?
Fiscal constraint, increasing demand and political pressures are concurrently
pressing upon state Medicaid programs. As a significant source of health insurance for
low-income individuals, state Medicaid programs are gradually gaining greater authority
from the federal government, highlighting the importance of state Medicaid policy
making (Bovbjerg, Wiener, and Housman 2003: 30-31). Escalating health care costs
challenge state budgets, and combined with the growing demand for Medicaid, as a
safety net program force state policy-makers to weigh program demand against program
costs. I include variables in this study to assess the influence of socio-economic, political
and policy diffusion forces, each exerting pressure on state Medicaid programs.

Socio-economic Conditions and Medicaid
State Medicaid choices are significant because they affect the well-being of a
growing number of impoverished Americans, many of whom are minorities. The U.S.
Census Bureau projects that California, Texas and Florida will account for nearly onehalf of the nation‘s population growth between 2000-2030, with states in the South and
West encompassing eighty-eighty percent of total national growth (United States Census
Bureau 2005). Americans of Hispanic origin and races other than African-American and
Caucasian will exhibit substantial growth in the United States, further contributing to
cultural diversity and the need for increased cultural understanding (Day 2008). While
the median income of Caucasian households increased from 2005-2006, income for all
other races remained unchanged (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2007).

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p. 13
U.S. Census Bureau figures indicate the growth of the ―severely‖ poor (those with
incomes at or below fifty percent of the federal poverty level or less than $9,900 for a
family of four ) is escalating at a rate fifty-six percent greater than other segments of
populations in poverty (McClatchy Newspapers 2007). Demographics, such as race, age,
geography and income, influence state Medicaid programs. The aging Baby-Boomers,
those born between 1946-1964, are fueling an increase in the median age of the American
population, from 35.5 years of age in 2000 to projections of 39.1 years by 2035 (Day
2008). As the population ages, increased demand will be placed on the health care
system, particularly the public welfare sector (Center for Disease Control and Prevention
2003). While Medicare provides health insurance for most adults age 65 and older,
Medicaid is used by low-income elderly to pay Medicare premiums and costs not covered
by Medicare (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004a: 1). Therefore, the aging population will
exert significant pressure on state Medicaid programs.
Although the incidence of disability increases with age, the highest prevalence of
individuals with disability are adults age eighteen to sixty-four, as they comprise the
greatest percentage of the population. The U.S. Census Bureau projects 24.25% of the
population will be under age eighteen in 2010 and 14.85% will be over 65; with 62.79%
of the population projected to be working age adults (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). Data
also indicate the percentage of working age adults with chronic illness is increasing
(Hoffman and Schwartz 2008). The number of working aged adults reporting at least one
major chronic health condition increased by 25% from 1997-2006 (W342). In addition,
Medicaid payments for program enrollees with blindness and disability have nearly
doubled from 1972 to 2004 (National Center for Health Statistics 2007). Disablement
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and associated policy problems are not ―old age‖ issues. Demographic changes in
chronic illness and disability will pressure public programs, particularly as the private
welfare sector, specifically employer sponsored health insurance plans, scale back.

Cost Pressures on State Medicaid Programs
A second reason that state Medicaid managed care programs have grown is that
such approaches can control costs. The expansion of Medicaid managed care presents an
opportunity to control costs without reducing the number of beneficiaries or eliminating
necessary services. Consequently, managed care may potentially provide more efficient
utilization of available health care resources deterring programmatic reductions.
States have been making Medicaid decisions in an unprecedented period of cost
pressures. The federal government contributes funding to each state Medicaid program.
In the past, federal Medicaid funding has allowed states to expand their Medicaid
programs in good economic times and buffer Medicaid programs in more restrictive
economic climates (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004). The competitive,
economic climate of the twenty-first century suggests current federal funding may be
insufficient to buffer state Medicaid programs, evidenced by state retrenchment in
Medicaid services and more stringent eligibility criteria (23). A decline in federal funds
forces states to bear a greater share of Medicaid expenditures. States incurring higher
Medicaid expenditures receive more federal funds, gaining revenue to be used in the
general state coffer (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004a). Consequently, curbing state
Medicaid expenditures means reduced federal funding, potentially constraining state
budgets (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 23).
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The alternative to increasing taxes to accommodate rising Medicaid rolls and
associated costs is to cut program expenditures by decreasing numbers of beneficiaries
and services provided and/or increasing financial contribution by Medicaid enrollees.
Nearly seventy-five percent of states have experienced declines in federal Medicaid
funding during 2006 and/or 2007 and all states have implemented some degree of cost
containment strategy during the same time period (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006c).
Environmental constraints, such as reductions in federal entitlement spending and the
legal obligation for balanced state budgets necessitate more efficient use of Medicaid
funds.

Political System Conditions and Medicaid
Political competition offers a third explanation for the growth of Medicaid
managed care. Partisan control significantly influences state welfare policy (Hwang and
Gray 1991: 294). A case study of Oregon policy making revealed redistributive policies
often involved partisan and ideological conflict and exhibited less legislative success
compared to growth policies (Wong 1989: 538, 543). Federal, state and local institutions
permit a contentious platform through which public policy emerges. Politics serve as the
dynamic process influencing the course and outcomes associated with the
institutionalization of state Medicaid policy.
Political scientist Thomas Dye (1990) posits a theory of competitive federalism
among state and local governments, as sub-national governments seek efficient provision
of public goods while maximizing resident welfare. Competitive federalism assumes
state and local governments possess the autonomy to exercise self-determination.
Relative to welfare policy, literature suggests states compete against one another to
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minimize welfare services in an effort to inhibit growth of the welfare rolls.
Simultaneously, states seek to develop the business sector in an effort to stimulate
economic growth, pitting neighboring states in competition for private investment.
Competition among states means state and local decisions are political in nature, and
states are not merely administrators of central government initiatives but autonomous
decision-makers, as well (Dye, 1990: 4). Ideology of state officials, therefore, plays a
substantial role in state welfare policy making.

The Diffusion of Medicaid Managed Care
A fourth influential factor, policy learning and diffusion, may be particularly
relevant in the study of the Medicaid program. Policy diffusion is the spread of ideas
(Carter and LaPlant 1997: 18; Walker 1969: 881). Policy diffusion examines the
potential influence of the policy choices of jurisdictions near a state that may influence
state policy making (Karch 2007: 40). Research demonstrates policy diffusion due to
geographic proximity is enhanced by like attributes of neighboring states compared to
distant states, characterized by similarities in economic, geographic and demographic
conditions (Mooney and Lee 1995: 605).
As a federal/state partnership, the Medicaid program provides states the latitude to
develop innovative policy solutions, allowing states to adopt and to tailor approaches
used by other states. Federalism provides a degree of autonomy for the states to exercise
power and control—to serve as policy innovators. Consequently, federalism possesses
implication for the importance of spatial relationships. ―Federalism makes geography
highly relevant because federal systems allow substantial freedom for places to chart their
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own course of policy action‖ (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003: 2). In this regard,
federalism provides a mechanism for policies to diffuse among states.

The Need to Examine Policy Determinants of Medicaid Managed Care
Research examining intrastate policy systems or socio-economic conditions may
fail to appreciate exogenous factors contributing to state policy making efforts. As the
federal government shifts greater authority for the Medicaid program to the states, the
importance of tailoring state Medicaid programs to meet the varied needs of
beneficiaries, particularly those with chronic illness and disability, holds greater
significance. Assessing the presence or absence of interstate policy diffusion may
expand consideration for policy determinants beyond socio-economic and political
system characteristics.
As federal authority over the Medicaid program recedes, states are positioned to
adapt to these national changes in unique ways. The manner in which states respond is
not dictated by the federal government, but left open-ended, to the discretion of the states.
It is not national directives fueling change at the state level, but a retrenchment by the
federal government that is forcing states to pursue alternative state Medicaid policies.

The Research Design
The objective of this study is to gain a better understanding of policy determinants
influencing the use of comprehensive managed care mechanisms in state Medicaid
programs. To do so, this study will examine socio-economic, political system and policy
diffusion factors influencing state Medicaid policy making. Expansions and contractions
in state Medicaid spending directly influences federal funding to the state (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2004a). Predetermined federal medical assistance percentages (FMAP) are
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used to compute federal funding contributions to each state. The federal medical
assistance percentage or FMAP is a mathematical formula calculated by dividing the
average, state per capita income by the average per capita income of all states to
determine federal funding for state Medicaid programs. The FMAP is included in the
statutory language of the Social Security Amendments of 1965. As noted during Senate
testimony by the late Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), the FMAP was used by the federal
government as a proxy for state wealth and need (Congressional Record-Senate 1999:
S634). ―The amount of FMAP a state gets is based upon the state's relative wealth, with
lower per capita income states receiving higher FMAPs‖ (United States Department of
Health and Human Services 2010). In this regard, FMAP rates and per capita income are
negatively related (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 3).
State wealth, then, can be an influential force in state Medicaid policy making
because Medicaid redistributes funds to states with greater need. Wealthier states have
greater resources to expend on social welfare; however, may do so using more cost
effective approaches to care (Garrett, Davidoff, and Yemane 2003: 583). Additionally,
more liberal state ideology scores would be associated with a greater propensity toward
redistributive policies (Plotnick and Winters 1985; Hwang and Gray 1991), such as those
associated with Medicaid. My study therefore examines these hypotheses:
H1: States with greater relative wealth, those with lower FMAP, will have a
higher percentage of comprehensive state Medicaid managed care programs for
individuals with disability
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H2: More politically liberal states will have a higher percentage of comprehensive
state Medicaid managed care programs for individuals with disability as a means
to support and expand state redistributive efforts via Medicaid policy.
Medicaid managed care may be an economic tool to enhance cost-efficiency of
redistributive policies and ease the financial burden on state economies to free up funds
for growth-driven developmental policy. State fiscal resources must be maximized to
support competing demands; the social welfare needs of constituents with strategies
necessary to stimulate economic growth. As states compete to stimulate economic
growth, they must allocate resources for redistributive policies with resources necessary
to drive economic growth. My study therefore examines the following hypothesis:
H3: States with higher growth rates in personal income will have a higher
percentage of comprehensive state Medicaid managed care programs for
individuals with disability
I propose policy diffusion is an important consideration in the examination of
policy determinants. In addition to socio-economic and political system variables, the
influence of neighboring states also may influence Medicaid policy making. The
diffusion of managed care in state Medicaid programs, particularly for vulnerable
populations such as individuals with disability, may be influenced by the use of this
alternative strategy by neighboring states. Descriptive statistics will be used to examine
the following hypothesis:
H4: States with Medicaid managed care programs for enrollees with disability
will demonstrate spatial associations.
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Assessing spatial associations will help to identify the presence of clustering, contiguous
states that similarly use Medicaid managed care for individuals with disability.
One factor that may inhibit the diffusion process is that managed care functions in
a price-competitive market. Price competition assumes participation by an adequate
number of provider to support negotiated pricing among competitors (Enthoven 1993:
29). As the federal government continues to relinquish control for Medicaid to the states,
more rural states may be poorly positioned to adopt more efficient health care
mechanisms, such as managed care.

Data: Selection and Measurement
This study seeks to better understand policy determinants influencing the use of
managed care in state Medicaid programs. Socio-economic variables include the federal
medical assistance percentage (FMAP), state Medicaid expenditures as a percent of total
expenditures by state and growth in personal income as an indicator of state wealth.
Political system characteristics will be measured using state ideology scores. Higher
ideology scores indicate more liberal states. More liberal state ideology scores would be
associated with a greater propensity toward redistributive policies (Plotnick and Winters
1985; Hwang and Gray 1991), such as those influencing state Medicaid programs.
A panel study using data for 2000, 2003 and 2006 of the fifty states will use
regression analysis to examine redistributive and developmental policy indicators
influencing adoption of Medicaid managed care. The dependent variable captures the
percentage of state Medicaid managed care programs providing comprehensive care for
individuals with disability. Nearly half of all U.S. adults, age twenty-five to sixty-four
with a severe disability are covered by Medicaid; or for some disabling conditions,
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Medicare1 (Steinmetz, 2006:8-9), highlighting the importance of state policy making in
the public welfare sector. The independent variables used in the above analysis are
defined and measured as follows:
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for Medicaid, by state. The
FMAP formula is calculated upon average per capita income by state relative to
the national average. Data for 2000 and 2003 are from the Department of Health
and Human Services. Data for 2006 is from the Kaiser Family Foundation,
statehealthfacts.org, 2007.
Medicaid expenditures as a percent of total expenditures by state, FY 2000, 2003
and 2006. (National Association of State Budget Officers, 2001, 2004, 2007)
Citizen ideology, by state. Data obtained from the University of Kentucky, 2006,
which computes state ideology scores by averaging the ideological position of
Congressional members by district (Berry, Ringquist, Fording & Hanson, 1998).
Growth in personal income by state, computed as the change in personal income
from 1999-2000, 2002-2003, and 2005-2006 (Bureau of Economic Analysis
2009)
Percentage of people without health insurance coverage by state. Uninsured rates
are measured by the U.S. Census Bureau using survey questions which seek
information about insurance coverage by public and private sources at any time
during the previous year. The state uninsured rate provides an indication of the
insurance gap in each state, the number of individuals left out of both the private
and public health insurance markets and the need for health insurance coverage
within each state. Data for 2000 is the two-year average for 1999-2000 (Mills
2001). Data for 2003 is the two-year average for 2002-2003 (DeNavas-Walt,
Proctor and Mills 2004). Data for 2006 is the three-year average of 2004-2006
(DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith, 2007).
Disability status of non-institutionalized population, age 18 and older, by state,
2001, 2003, 2007 (Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 2009). Also
known as the BRFSS, this survey assess state disability rates through telephone
survey. State data selected for this study is in response to the following BRFSS
question: ―Are you limited in any activities because of physical, mental, or
emotional problems?‖ State responses are weighted to account for selection bias,
including post-stratification adjustments to address bias due to non-response and
households without telephones (BRFSS FAQs).

1

Individuals with certain medical conditions, such as End Stage Renal Disease qualify
for Medicare benefits after a 24 month waiting period.
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The statistical model to examine the percentage of state Medicaid managed care
programs for adults with disability, as the dependent variable, is specified as follows:
Dependent variable = B1 + B2FMAPit(Redistributive) + B3Medicaid Expenditures it(Redistributive)
+B4Ideologyit(Redistributive) + B5Income Growthit(Developmental) + B6Percent
uninsuredit(Demographic) + B6State disability it(Demographic) + error
In this model i represents the state, t represents the year; u represents error (Gujarati,
2003: 647-648).
The adoption of managed care assumes adequate medical providers supporting
price competition, a characteristic of supply-side economics. States with higher rates of
state population living in urban areas will attract more health care providers facilitating
price competition. Rates of state urbanization provide an indication of a price competitive
market, a contextual characteristic necessary for effective use of managed care strategies.
State urbanization rates were considered for the analytical model, but omitted due to
significant correlation with the FMAP variable2.

2

A correlation matrix of the regressors in this study revealed a moderate
statistically significant negative association (alpha=.05) between the State Federal
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) and the percentage of state urbanization
(r = -0.62). In other words, states with lower FMAP contributions from the federal
government are those exhibiting higher percentages of urbanization. The FMAP is
defined within the statutory language of the 1965 Medicaid legislation. It provides a
mathematical formula to determine federal contributions to state Medicaid programs
based upon personal income. The FMAP exhibits a policy decision used to level the
playing field among states. The percent urbanization variable is computed by the U.S.
Census Bureau based upon the percentage of state residents living in urban areas. Since
this study seeks to understand policy indicators of the Medicaid program and appreciating
the degree of association between FMAP and urbanization as an indicator of collinearity,
the urbanization variable was omitted from the model. However, the importance of the
FMAP and urbanization association must be kept in mind relative to statistical outcomes.
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Secondly, spatial patterns of state Medicaid managed care programs for enrollees
with chronic illness and disability will be assessed using spatial autocorrelation. This
will provide a descriptive picture of the relationship among states. Data sources for the
panel regression variables and the state spatial data are publicly accessible.
The use of regression analyses used in this study is intended to better understand
redistributive and developmental policy decisions that can influence the adoption of
Medicaid managed care for people with disabilities and examine factors influencing state
variance in the use of Medicaid managed care, conditions virtually overlooked in the
literature. The use of managed care for vulnerable populations is steadily growing across
the country. Improved understanding of Medicaid policy making possesses implications
for policy approaches and policy solutions under consideration.

Conclusion
As health care costs and the demand for public programs continue to increase,
Medicaid issues, particularly those associated with chronic illness and disability, become
more urgent. The U.S. will be forced to confront an increasingly fragile health care
system and the public necessity for reform. Policy solutions will require new conceptual
perspectives and innovative health care strategies, including consideration for the role of
managed care in state Medicaid programs.
A better understanding of Medicaid, as a component of the health care safety net,
is needed to discover how conditions at the state level not only influence, but potentially
facilitate or deter alternative strategies for Medicaid enrollees, particularly those with
chronic conditions and disability. The need for creativity and program improvement in
an effort to meet the needs of all Medicaid enrollees is undeniable. The ability of the
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federal government to adapt to needed changes in the health care safety net is hindered by
the fragmented political system in the United States. Devolving authority for Medicaid to
the states provides an opportunity for state flexibility and creative policy solutions.
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Chapter 2
Medicaid and the Role of Institutions

An adversarial political culture is not unique to the
United States, but it is in the United States that the
political institutions—the separation of powers,
judicial review, and federalism—allow it full
expression and reinforce its central features

James Q. Wilson,
Bureaucracy, (1989)

Health care coverage in the United States is provided in a patchwork fashion via
public and private welfare sectors (Davis 2001). Public programs include Medicare and
Medicaid, while private insurance is primarily provided through employment. While
most individuals aged sixty-five and older receive health coverage through Medicare,
nearly seventy-percent of the non-elderly are covered through private, employer-based
insurance plans. However, the role of employers as the mainstay of health insurance
benefits is diminishing. Data indicates the percentage of employers offering health
insurance coverage has declined nine percent between 2000 and 2005 (Kaiser Family
Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust 2005). As a federal/state
program, how has state Medicaid policy making gained greater significance in United
States‘ health care?
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Escalating health care costs are challenging the integrity of the private welfare
sector and contributing to increasing demand on the public welfare sector, primarily
Medicaid. As a component of the health care safety net, Medicaid plays a vital role in
supporting the health care needs of the impoverished. Over the past decade, the federal
government has gradually transferred authority for Medicaid to the states. Increasing
autonomy of state programs means state policy making holds growing importance in the
lives of program enrollees.
Relinquishing control over Medicaid at the federal level contributes to greater
variation among state programs. The devolution of Medicaid administration to the states
is particularly relevant for program enrollees with chronic illness and disability who use
greater health care services. The ability of the federal government to adapt to needed
changes to address chronic conditions is hindered by the fragmented political system in
the United States. What do these changes in programmatic governance mean for
individuals with chronic illness and disability and what is the political relevance for state
Medicaid policy-makers?
Federalism determines the arena (national versus state) in which policy debate
takes place. Politics provide the mechanism by which policy issues reach the policy
agenda and policy solutions emerge. Medicaid encompasses both national and state
arenas compounding the policy-making complexities of this public welfare program. The
contentious policy-making process culminates in the selection of policy solutions leading
to policy outcomes. In terms of the Medicaid program, these outcomes—the true impact
of policy on the lives of those affected—influence the health and well-being of millions
of program enrollees.
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The Institutional Influence on U.S. Health Policy
Institutions provide the framework through which policy solutions are assessed
(Hall and Taylor 1996: 936-957). ―Institutions participate actively in politics: they shape
interests and motives, configure social and economic relationships, promote as well as
inhibit political change‖ (Orren and Skowronek 2004: 78). Political scientist Marie
Gottschalk describes two types of institutions. The first type is the formal institution.
With an organizational structure built upon rules and procedures, formal institutions
shape the type of policies that reach the legislative agenda leading to policy making
(2000: 5). The second type of institution, informal institutions, focus on ―patterns of
behavior‖ (Gottschalk 2000: 6). These behavioral patterns are influenced by belief
systems, including social values and norms. Formal institutional arrangements are
associated with ―formal constraints‖ according to North (1990), shedding light on the
means by which policy preferences are shaped and outcomes determined. Analysis of
formal institutions, however, fails to capture the nuances of the broader social context.
The role of informal institutions, appreciating cultural norms and bias, provide the
context in which formal institutions are situated.

Federalism as a Formal Institution
The complexity of U.S. policy making institutions coupled with the growing
pressures on the health care system challenge policy-makers to devise ways to achieve
health care reform. To better understand the present state of American health policy, an
understanding of political ideology and the framework through which public policy must
negotiate is necessary. U.S. governing authority is divided among institutions at the roots
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and branches; separation of powers among the legislative, judicial and executive branches
of government; and, federated power between the national government and the states.
Traditionally, institutions are accepted as mechanisms which order politics,
establishing the rules and practices of the political process. Institutions embody a sense
of stability. These rules and practices contribute to institutional frameworks which tend
to remain stable over time; resisting pressures to change within the context of an everchanging political climate (Orren and Skowronek 2004: 17-18). How do political
institutions influence Medicaid policy making? Since Medicaid is influenced by politics
at both federal and state levels, is Medicaid prone to change? Are states suitable
―laboratories‖ for innovative Medicaid policies? Institutionalist approaches to the study
of policy making consider policy as a product of three forces: institutional arrangements,
political process and historical precedents (Mettler 2002: 232). I explore the role of
ideology set within the institutional framework, both formal and informal, relative to U.S.
health policy making.
Theoretically, federalism helps us to better understand the unique characteristics
of larger, national public-policy making compared to local, state-driven policy,
particularly important in the understanding of Medicaid. Smaller decision making
bodies, resulting from devolution of power, encourage flexibility and creativity to meet
changing needs and facilitate the ability to gain consensus. Consequently, larger decision
making bodies, characterized by centralized power, enhance equality of the constituents,
facilitate participation by highly skilled professionals and exhibits more stability and
coherence. At its core, federalism draws attention to the importance of location of the
political debate (national versus state) and the characteristics associated with contentious
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policy-making in each policy arena. Federalism holds particular relevance for the
Medicaid program, which is shaped by national and state-level policy institutions.
Political scientist E.E. Schattschneider (1975) states, ―...the outcome of all
conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion…one way to restrict the scope of
conflict is to localize it, while one way to expand it is to nationalize it‖ (2, 10). Conflict
expansion is one mechanism to uproot entrenched interests, creating unbalance in the
policy structure. Retaining a narrow scope of conflict may avoid disruption to existing
policy or minimize opposition to policy change. Defining the appropriate arena for
policy debates may enhance power and support for policy outcomes. ―If national
consensus exists, national action can follow; if it does not, individual states can act by
achieving state-level consensus‖ (Anton 1997: 702). The smaller scope of conflict
associated with state policy making enhances responsiveness to both policy change and
potentially implementation of new policy due to gridlock at the federal level.

Federalism‘s Influence in Health Care
Characteristics of American federalism have changed over time. From the mid
nineteenth century through the Progressive era, jurisdictional distinction between state
and national powers was a trademark of American dual federalism (Patterson 2005: 82).
The Great Society of President Johnson illustrates blended state/federal efforts of
cooperative federalism (Patterson 2005: 90). Starting with Nixon‘s New Federalism, the
federal government‘s effort to curb social welfare spending gradually shifted greater
authority to state Medicaid programs. The Reagan presidency re-initiated the swing of
the ideological pendulum in a decidedly conservative direction. Reagan sought to
diminish the federal role in social welfare programs. Reagan undoubtedly understood the
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relationship between a strong economy and political success. Reagan issued tax cuts to
stimulate capital production, thrusting the country into an era of deficit spending, but
providing short-term economic gains (Caporaso and Levine 1992: 79-99; Skowronek
1997: 421; 428). However, retrenchment of the federal role in social welfare policy
during the Reagan years spurred state innovation and development (Nathan 2005: 1460).
The Medicaid program is a seminal example of federalism at play in U.S. health
policy. Using Medicaid as evidence, scholar Richard Nathan contends the oscillation of
power between the federal government and the states fueled development of the U.S.
public welfare sector (2005: 1459). Furthering Nathan‘s argument necessitates
consideration for two important factors. First, temporality conditions the influence of
federalism on health policy change. Federalism contributed to the defeat of national
health reform for much of the twentieth century, yet provided latitude for states to
develop innovative state health care programs. Second, the passage of the 1965
amendments to the Social Security Act were a response to failures in the private welfare
sector and not an unmitigated desire to extend the government‘s role in social welfare
policy.
Over the course of the twentieth century, federalism has both fueled and thwarted
development of the public welfare state. Federalism may limit national health reform due
to diverse state interests pressing upon the national policy process. However, failed
national reform allows states to become policy change agents, subjecting state policies to
more localized political conflict (Gordon 2003). National reform efforts of the early and
mid-twentieth century were whittled down to the ―three-layer cake‖ of Medicare (Parts A
and B) and Medicaid (Gordon 2003: 118). Federalism not only complicates national
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reform, but contributes to persistent, incremental policy making, often creating the
―…illusion of progress while making the goal of national health insurance more elusive‖
(Gordon 2003: 287). Conflict between governing structures at the roots and branches
complicates efforts to change the public welfare state, with particular importance for
Medicaid as a dual federal/state program.

Federalism as a Mechanism for Changing Health Policy
Research reveals that while the national government is better suited to address
issues of redistribution, state governments appear more sensitive to economic conditions
(Anton 1997: 701-702). Research analyzing national government expenditures found
that federal expenditures tend to support redistributive programs while state spending
leans toward developmental programs. State government appears more sensitive to
economic change and better able to detect the impact of state policy decisions (Anton
1997: 701-702). In the case of health care, state-based initiatives may influence national
reform efforts (National Governor‘s Association 2005: 5). A World Health Organization
report reiterates the challenges confronting broader health system change, yet recognizes
the potential impact of smaller, innovative change to support system-wide improvements
in health and quality of care (World Health Organization 2002: 42).
As a federal/state partnership, Medicaid must navigate through national and state
policy making processes, assuming characteristics as a redistributive program at the
national level and a developmental program at the state level. The importance of federal
funding supporting state Medicaid programs is undeniable (Gold et al. 2001; Sparer
2004). Federal Medicaid funding plays a critical role in financing access to health care
for millions of impoverished individuals. Simultaneously, state Medicaid programs serve
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as epicenters for development and implementation of innovative health care strategies for
program beneficiaries.
Federalism provides a mechanism to overcome institutional and political barriers
associated with broader health care reform efforts. The Clinton administration‘s failure
to pass a national health care plan led to a conviction of reform and the development of
state level initiatives (Oliver and Paul-Shaheen 1997). Research analyzing factors
supporting state health care reform demonstrate the presence of two broad frameworks
supporting state-level change (Oliver and Paul-Shaheen 1997). First, contextual
conditions provide the framework for factors that are more stable and institutionalized in
nature. These conditions include socioeconomic factors (levels of income, employment
and education; economic status of the state), political factors (political culture and
disparity or cohesiveness of bipartisan efforts), institutional factors (resources, historical
health reform efforts, organizational characteristics of the health policy community).
Second, dynamic factors are the more fluid elements influencing policy outcomes. These
factors include leadership, ideas and power.
While the importance of institutional factors cannot be over looked, dynamic
factors such as, leadership, ideas, and power significantly influence change (Oliver and
Paul-Shaheen 1997). Leadership provided the vehicle by which attention and
identification of resources were achieved. Ideas provided the platform for the
development of solutions and power created a climate by which resources were procured
to convert ideas into action. The ability to modify and alter power may be directly
influenced by the size of the decision making unit, an inherent characteristic of
federalism and essential to understanding Medicaid policy making (Stone 2002).

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p. 33
National policy-making takes place in a much larger, contentious policy arena compared
to state policy-making. As the federal government shifts responsibility for Medicaid
programs to the states, the states possess the latitude to tailor policies for local
constituents, contributing to greater variation in program administration among the states.
Research reveals institutional factors play a key role in broadening the scope of
conflict by including those entities and individuals more open to reform; however, policy
making authority continued to reside within a smaller network of leaders and
stakeholders, who provide stability to the health policy process in the event of policy
change (Oliver and Paul-Shaheen 1997). In this study, state health care reform did not
occur spontaneously; but, occurred as a result of constituency interests within each
political system. Constituency interests influence state leaders to pursue policy change
creating an environment that successfully nurtured reform efforts (Oliver and PaulShaheen 1997).
State innovation may be a catalyst to break through persistent barriers of national
reform, fueling health policy change from the ―bottom up.‖ A 2005 report from the
National Governors Association states,
Bold ideas are needed to address the health care system‘s most serious problems
and change the conventional thinking that meaningful reform can only be driven
from the top, through federal policy changes. Instead, similar to welfare reform,
health care system change should be demonstrated through innovation and
experimentation by states. States are small enough to tailor solutions unique to
their cultures, institutions, and health care markets, but large enough to
experiment with system-wide reforms (2005: 5).
The role of federalism in health policy may serve as a means to bridge institutional and
political divides that have been barriers to past national health care reform efforts,
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potentially supporting policy approaches that facilitate citizen involvement as empowered
participants in the political process.
Retrenchment of federal entitlement spending combined with a weakening private
welfare sector presents opportunity for innovative state reform (Alonso-Zaldivar 2005).
State level reform may serve as a means to the eventual passage of national health care
initiatives (Oberlander and Marmor 2001). This is illustrated by the pursuit of universal
health insurance coverage in Maine, Vermont and Massachusetts; efforts that have
influenced recent national health reform efforts (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010c).
Considering both institutional structure and the growing health care needs of societal
members, state policy making is challenged to use federalism as a mechanism for policy
change rather than a barrier sustaining the status quo.
State-level health care reform, as a mechanism to achieve broader reform, is not
without serious drawbacks. Devolution of power is often associated with inequity among
states. As described earlier, state Medicaid programs are sensitive to the economic
climate with demands for services escalating during economic decline. It is well
documented that states with the greatest income disparity among its residents
demonstrate higher mortality rates compared to states with less disparity (Kawachi 2005:
30; Kuttner 1996: 111-112). While states may be appropriate venues for innovation,
disparity among states becomes an unavoidable consequence of structural federalism.
Minimally modifying Medicaid, such as sharing administrative responsibility
between the federal and state governments, may lessen state disparity and reduce
administrative costs by consolidating program oversight and billing practices. Known for
low administrative costs, Medicare could serve as a model for more centralized
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administrative strategies, creating a greater resource pool for redistributive efforts (Moon
2003: 358). Yet, even incremental approaches, such as shifting isolated elements of the
Medicaid program from state-level to the national level, may be politically challenging.
Shifting responsibility to the federal government broadens the scope of conflict,
subjecting increases in federal expenditures and program oversight to a much broader
pool of policy opponents (Moon 2003: 357). While federalism contributes to state
variance, policy gridlock at the national level may implicate the states as venues for
action.

Ideology and Social Welfare Policy
Health policy reform is challenged by institutional structure, partisan politics and
intra-party cohesion (or fragmentation) (Peterson 2005: 213-214). While formal
institutions, such as federalism, provide the framework for public policy making, the role
of ideology is increasingly challenging the process. Political parties serve as an
organizing mechanism through which private interests are broadly encompassed within
the two competing party platforms (Schattschneider 1975: 41). Political parties are in a
constant state of suppression and expansion, suppressing divisive issues and sustaining or
expanding issues that drive party unity (Sundquist 1983: 307). Similarly, a party out of
power may use conflict expansion to focus the critical eye of the public on the party in
power (308). American policy making is characterized by the dominance of a two-party
system with the Republican or conservative perspective favoring limited government
intervention in favor of the private market. The Democratic or more liberal view tends to
more readily consider government intervention as a means to obtain and secure equity
among societal members.
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It is expected that partisan ideology influences state welfare policy with liberal
states providing more generous support compared to conservative states (Buchanan,
Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt 1991: 68). Research demonstrates political ideology
significantly influences state welfare policy (Hwang and Gray 1991: 294). However,
research examining contextual factors influencing state Medicaid spending finds the
economic climate and state wealth are more influential in state spending on Medicaid
than political factors (Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt 1991). Redistributive policy
has been associated with increased partisan and ideological conflict and less legislative
success compared to more growth oriented, developmental policy (Wong 1989: 538,
543).
Historically, health care legislation has been stifled by partisan debate with liberal
and conservative perspectives of welfare economics going toe-to-toe. Partisan efforts to
gain support and resources within the political arena challenge the ability to formulate
cohesive coalitions to support desired policy agendas. The contentious two party
political system in the U.S. tends to slice public policy making along predictable party
lines, creating a rather stable policy debate, minimizing vast deviations from the status
quo (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 22). Groups opposing national health reform have
created an ideological divide among policy makers, influencing the way public problems
are defined and policy solutions developed (Marmor 1973). Recent research finds that
policy advocates remain committed to an issue over time, continually assessing the policy
environment and the policy positions of opponents and taking advantage of political
space when possible (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Policy rivals jockey for position,
inhibiting the policy scale from dramatically tipping in one direction or the other (36). A

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p. 37
lack of substantial policy change provides evidence of domination by a single perspective
(47).
Throughout the course of the twentieth century, conservative opponents of
national health reform framed policy change efforts as encroachment upon individual
liberty, intrusion of the government on the private lives of citizens. Opponents framed
government-sponsored health care as an assault on individual choice and a limitation of
freedom, capitalizing on a cultural proclivity toward classical liberalism prevalent in the
U.S. Most notably—opponents of national health insurance portrayed the expansion of
national insurance coverage as a movement toward ―socialized‖ medicine, creating
dissonance between traditionally accepted American values and ideological frameworks
associated with national health reform. Partisan belief therefore is not solely an ideology,
but an actual policy making tool, influencing how the needs of societal members are
addressed.
Social welfare policy, such as Medicaid, seeks government intervention in lieu of
the private market, pitting ideological perspectives of individual responsibility against the
government role. Political ideology colors the types of policies enacted, serving as a
barometer for the waxing and waning role of government in the public sector and the
associated parties in power. Consequently, welfare programs are particularly vulnerable
to ideological conflict (Soss and Keiser 2006). Both market and political factors have
conditioned the structure and mechanisms by which Medicaid managed care has been
implemented in the states (Plein 2003: 26-27). Ideology provides the backdrop for
political debate while institutions provide the stage upon contentious policy making takes
place.
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The Role of Informal Institutions in Policy Making
As mentioned, informal institutions include the social context in which formal
institutions are constructed. In this instance, informal institutions include socio-cultural
norms that frame Medicaid policy making. Societal norms about Medicaid, as a meanstested public program, influence the political pressures exerted upon it. An examination
of policy determinants cannot be fully understood without consideration for the broader
role of informal institutions. These informal institutions help to explain the scope and
breadth of policy options that surface in the policy arena.
Policy issues arise as subjectively determined problems. The subjective lens
through which issues emerge is influenced by socially accepted beliefs. These social
norms and beliefs create the context in which more formal policy making takes place.
Policy analysis must embrace an interpretive epistemological perspective, mindful
that ―policy problems are products of subjective human judgment…‖ (Dunn 2004: 75).
Policy problems are socially constructed; therefore, the lens through which judgments are
formed and problems identified is malleable, leading to varied and changing solutions
(Dunn 2004). The policy analyst is challenged with a rather daunting task, developing an
appreciation for the problem structure as a precursor to formulation of a policy solution.
In other words, how did this problem come to be defined as a policy issue? Culturally
unique perspectives of health and disability drive the perception of policy problems and
the development and selection of policy solutions.
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The Social Context and Public Policy making:
Implications for Disability
Informal institutions are circumscribed by social and cultural perspectives. Social
policy in America idealizes autonomy, highlighting individualism over community and
holding personal achievement as the epitome of success and accomplishment. The
pursuit of autonomy is premised upon self-sufficiency and self-reliance. These social
norms are important for individuals with disability:
In a society where individual independence is valued highly, perhaps more so
than mutual dependence, possible reduction in individual mobility caused by the
interaction of disease with the patient‘s physical environment will have profound
effects on lifestyle and the pursuit of individual aims (Chamberlain, Buchanan,
and Hanks 1979: 51).
As a result, those less independent, whether an artifact of intrinsic and/or extrinsic
factors, experience reduced opportunities for choice, hindering attainment of equitable
states of welfare.

Conceptual Complexity of Health and Disability
To understand the importance of researching Medicaid policy making,
particularly policies influencing individuals with chronic illness and disability, an
appreciation for factors contributing to the perceptions of health and disability is needed.
Early perspectives of disablement viewed the process at the level of the individual. In
this regard, approaches to care and associated health policies were directed toward
treating the person. More contemporary perspectives view disablement as the interaction
between the person and the environment. Hence, approaches to care and associated
policies must no longer focus solely at the person-level, but should consider broader
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environmental factors, as well. This conceptual shift directly influences the policy
options considered and the solutions adopted.
Health is a complex, multi-variant construct influenced by the interwoven
relationship among the individual, cultural and societal forces. These exogenous forces
are not static over time, but subject to change, influenced by new knowledge and
changing societal attitudes. An appreciation for the complex perspectives shaping
perspectives of health in American society may shed light on current health care issues at
the fore. There are two prominent models guiding perspectives of health and disability in
the U.S.: the biomedical model and the social model.

The Medical Model
The traditional medical model of health care, prevalent in the industrialized
nations like the United States views health as the presence or absence of disease (Weiss
and Lonnquist 2002). If an individual is free of disease, he/she is presumed healthy. A
conceptual dichotomy is thus created—the absence of disease equates to health and the
presence of disease equates to sickness. Consequently, disease and disability are situated
as a cause and effect relationship. ―The medical model views disability as a problem of
the person, directly caused by disease, trauma or other health condition, which requires
medical care provided in the form of individual treatment by medical professionals.
Management of the disability is aimed at cure or the individual‘s adjustment or behavior
change‖ (World Health Organization 2001: 20).
Implications of the medical model for individuals with chronic illness and
disability are substantial. Dominance of the medical model marginalizes sociological and
environmental perspectives of disability that may influence health policy outcomes.
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Narrowed person-level perspectives of health, constrain alternative health care strategies
that may better support overall quality of life for individuals with chronic illness and
disability. In theory, managed care envisions more cost-effective use of health care
resources by supporting preventive approaches to preserve or improve states of health.
Health policy decisions that focus on tertiary treatment of disease, insufficiently
addresses the broader array of factors contributing to quality of life for individuals with
chronic conditions and disability.

The Social Model
Efforts by disability rights activists and the disability rights movement challenge
the long held paradigms of the medical model, framing disability as a person-level
problem. Alternatively, the social model views disability as a social issue, not a medical
condition. Social constructs of disability perceive limitations in social integration as
external to the individual, present as socially constructed barriers. ―Disability is not an
attribute of an individual, but rather a complex collection of conditions, many of which
are created by the social environment‖ (World Health Organization 2001: 20). Therefore,
a socially defined problem requires a socially defined solution. A framework of this
nature situates disability as a public policy issue, placing perspectives about human rights
as the focal point by which policies are viewed. The Union of Physically Impaired
Against Segregation (UPIAS) issued the following statement,
In our view, it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is
something imposed on top of our impairment by the way we are unnecessarily
isolated and excluded from full participation in society. Disabled people are
therefore an oppressed group in society (Bickenbach et al. 1999: 1176).
Changing perceptions about the social and environmental components of disability have
led to a broader appreciation for factors contributing to disablement. Perceptions of
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disability must look beyond the level of the individual. Social constructs of disability
lead to philosophically based perceptions of equality and quality of life with significant
consequence for public policy issues (Renwick, Brown, and Nagler 1996).

Merging the Medical and Social Models
One movement, undertaken by the World Health Organization (WHO), has been
development of the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health
(ICF). The ICF provides a conceptual model of disability situating individual impairment
within the environmental context. WHO has supported the development of the ICF
framework over the course of twenty-seven years, evolving as a tool to describe states of
health and disability. The ICF departs from the more simplistic person-level approach, to
a descriptive framework that seeks to understand ―components of health‖ as opposed to
―consequences of disease‖ (World Health Organization 2001: 4).
In this model, disability is not a dichotomous person-level or social-level
framework. Instead, the ICF describes the interaction between a person‘s health condition
and environmental and personal factors that contribute to disablement. A visual
interpretation of the interaction between components of the ICF framework is provided in
figure two below (18).
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Figure 2: Components of the ICF
Health Condition (disorder or disease)

Body Functions
And Structures

Activities

Environmental Factors

Participation

Personal Factors

The World Health Organization graciously permitted reproduction (December 2007)

The ICF integrates the medical and social models by appreciating the role of environment
as an influential factor in health and well-being. The ICF seeks to capture a more
descriptive assessment of the disability phenomena. In contrast to past disability
frameworks focusing on causality, the ICF represents a paradigm shift with the potential
to influence a spectrum of policy issues.

The Implications of Policy on Disablement
Conceptual perspectives of health influence approaches to health care. Health
care systems have not adapted to reductions in acute conditions and the increase in
chronic conditions (World Health Organization 2002: 29). Interests entrenched in feefor-service reimbursement mechanism tend to focus on acute care services, hindering
strategic development of chronic care and preventive care paradigms. A difficult cycle
develops in which costly acute care expenditures are followed by the use of high cost
institutional and government services for chronic debility. Ultimately, available
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expenditures for health promotion are limited and compound the financial costs of
chronic illness (Institute for Health and Aging 1996).
Research funding disproportionately supports clinical research with limited
support investigating the environmental aspects of disablement or the evaluation of
intervention strategies that support functional ability and social engagement (Field and
Jette 2007: 5). Resource allocation is often influenced by political pressure rather than
disease burden. Resulting inefficiencies skew resources toward high-cost intervention
strategies (advancing technology and pharmaceuticals) compared to lower-cost
interventions, such as improved training and education (World Health Organization 2002:
35-36). John Fiorillo (2003), senior consultant for the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
stated, ―The way we deal with the chronic patient and the chronic elderly patient is the
bellwether for our health care system. If the system can‘t deal with the chronically ill by
providing high-quality affordable care, the system is not going to succeed.‖
Policies for health and disability in the U.S. present a stark contrast with those of
other industrialized countries. In the U.S., inability to work due to disability is
determined irrespective of rehabilitative potential (Pope and Tarlov 1991: 251).
Correspondingly, resources tend to be skewed toward income support, often perpetuating
dependency versus rehabilitation and reintegration into the workforce (Hahn 1986: 129).
Of the $226 billion dollars spent by the federal government on disability programs in
2002, only 1.5% was designated for education, training and unemployment (Goodman
and Stapleton 2007: 68). In several European countries, disability and eligibility for
income assistance is made following assessment of rehabilitative potential and
modifications to the work site are supported through public funds. In the U.S., employers
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are offered tax incentives to enhance workplace modifications. A comparative
assessment of six countries revealed the U.S. was the only country lacking a health care
mechanism supporting reintegration into the work force (Pope and Tarlov 1991: 251).
European approaches toward disability embrace broader social and ethical considerations
contributing to socio-economic costs influencing policy outcomes (Pope and Tarlov
1991: 252).
Changes in institutional perspective may help to break down the barriers which
characterize and label groups of people. The national ―Healthy People 2010‖ initiative
establishes goals and objectives to facilitate improved health and well-being of
individuals in the United States. Two broad policy goals drive efforts to improve health
and prevent disease. The first goal is to improve quality of life and maximize years of
healthy life. The second goal is to ―eliminate health disparities‖ (United States
Department of Health and Human Services 2007). The national health goals are
particularly salient for Medicaid beneficiaries with chronic illness and disability.
Maximizing quality of life and eliminating health disparity for vulnerable societal
members in the United States possesses significant implications for federal and state
Medicaid policy. Failure to obtain health insurance in the private sector relegates lowincome individuals to seek care through the public sector, specifically the Medicaid
program, and for some individuals with disabling conditions, Medicare3.

3

Individuals with certain medical conditions, such as End Stage Renal Disease qualify for Medicare
benefits after a 24 month waiting period.
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Health Care Strategies for Chronic Illness and Disability:
Implications for Medicaid Policy
A comprehensive 1991 Institute of Medicine report, Disability in America,
highlights disablement as an interaction between the individual and the environment
(Pope and Tarlov 1991). Physical barriers, such as limited access to public transportation
and public buildings continue to plague individuals with impaired mobility (Field and
Jette 2007: 3); however, since the 1991 IOM report, progress has been made.
Technological advances as well as universal approaches to physical design have assisted
in this process (Field and Jette 2007: 2). The implication of merging the environmental
context with disablement extends beyond physical structure, encompassing policy
outcomes, such as Medicaid policy, that substantially influences daily life. Social context
influences ―the physical, social and attitudinal environment in which people live and
conduct their lives‖ (World Health Organization 2001). Hence, the role of policy on
processes of health and disablement gain added importance.
Key elements important in health care strategies for individuals with chronic
illness and disability are paraphrased below:
Preventive strategies are necessary as a means to sustain states of health, warding off
decline and secondary complications of illness
Utilization of coordinated, interdisciplinary approaches to care, extending beyond
general, acute care providers must include diagnostic specialists, long-term care,
home health care, respite care, rehabilitation services, medical equipment and
assistive technologies, among others
Timely access to acute care is needed to prevent exacerbation of health conditions
(Ireys, Thornton, and McKay 2002)
Researchers note paucity in literature relative to the assessment of managed care for
Medicaid beneficiaries with chronic illness and disability. One particular area lacking

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p. 47
research is examination of varied Medicaid beneficiary needs as a means to inform
program planning and policy (Ireys, Thornton, and McKay 2002: 37).
Findings from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation report, ―A Portrait of the
Chronically Ill In America, 2001‖ demonstrate that individuals with chronic conditions
are lacking significant information and knowledge to facilitate self-care strategies and
enhance compliance with best practices of medical intervention (Bethell, Lansky, and
Fiorillo 2001). Some chronic illness and disability is preventable with early and
appropriate health care intervention, postponing or reducing complications contributing
to disablement.
Appreciating the needs of individuals with chronic conditions is particularly
relevant for state Medicaid policy. Since Medicaid beneficiaries possess higher rates of
chronic illness and disability, interruptions in access to care due to changing financial
status or changing state policy may contribute to inadequate provision of health services
and poorer health outcomes. As the understanding of disablement and chronic illness has
changed over time, policies supporting those changes are needed.
Although Medicaid and Medicare policy has demonstrated increased support for
community and home-based care over institutionalized care (consider the ―Katie Beckett
option‖), policies may create unintended consequences, as well4. For example, Medicare
policy stipulates that durable medical equipment will be covered for use ―in-home,‖
creating disincentives for work and community independence (Field and Jette 2007: 8;

4

Acute illness in infancy left Katie Beckett ventilator-dependent. Coming from a middle-class family,
Katie could only qualify for Medicaid while living in an institutional setting. By waiving income
requirements for parents of children with disability, TEFRA supports home-based care as an alternative to
institutionalized care (Crowley and Elias 2003: 14)
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14). Policies, particularly Medicaid policy, directly influence the health of program
enrollees and consequently, their quality of life.
The importance of Medicaid policy making in the lives of program enrollees is
exemplified by the Missouri Medicaid cuts of 2005. A survey of program enrollees
following the cuts, revealed respondents planned to reduce the use of goods and services
including health care, food and utilities, or planned to seek health care services via
hospital emergency rooms. Fifty-nine percent of survey participants indicated recent
inability to pay for prescription drugs or loss of coverage for prescription medication.
Forty percent lost dental services and fifty percent could not get eye glasses (Feltman and
Hill 2006: 9). These programmatic cuts reduced or eliminated key services, including
dental and vision care, and the provision of durable medical equipment, such as walkers
which support functional levels of independence, all of which are particularly important
for individuals with chronic illness and disability.
The impact of programmatic cuts to state Medicaid programs appears particularly
salient for women and individuals with chronic illness and disability; characteristics
associated with higher rates of poverty, thereby meeting program income criteria (Lustig
and Strauser 2007; Parish and Ellison-Martin 2007). Research demonstrates that
Medicaid beneficiaries report substantial difficulty affording prescription drugs, dental
and mental health services and medical equipment (Hanson et al. 2003). While Medicaid
does provide health insurance for individuals with low-income, health care costs continue
to usurp a large portion of income for this vulnerable group.
The inclusion of optional Medicaid services such as occupational, physical and
speech therapy are determined by each state. Rehabilitation services play a key role in
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maximizing functional independence in individuals with chronic illness and disability
(Ireys, Thornton, and McKay 2002). Using 2006 data, the Kaiser Family Foundation‘s
Medicaid database indicates twenty-eight states include services for occupational therapy,
thirty-three include physical therapy and thirty–four provide services for speech, hearing
and language disorders. However, these services are often included with coverage
limitations and/or co-payment requirements (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006a). A study
examining the impact of Medicaid budget cuts in four states reveals that cuts were agency
initiated, not legislatively mandated, and often targeted optional benefits offered through
state Medicaid programs, such as rehabilitative services which may directly influence the
health and well-being of individuals with chronic illness and disability (Bailit, Burgess,
and Roddy 2004: 11).
Rehabilitation services support health beyond detection of disease. A diagnosis of
disease does not convey how a person functions with that disease. ―Diagnosis alone, for
example, cannot answer questions about health services utilization, need for care,
treatment matching or outcome evaluation‖ (Ustun et al. 2003: 566). Outcomes of
performance assessments have been correlated with predictive ability to assess mortality,
falls, institutionalization and health service utilization (Guralnik, Fried, and Salive 1996).
An appreciation for functional performance, combined with knowledge of physiological
systems and environmental factors contributing to disablement renders rehabilitative
professionals as excellent resources supporting health care strategies that promote
independence and quality of life. Therefore, Medicaid policy limiting access to
rehabilitative services possesses important implications for Medicaid beneficiaries with
chronic and disabling conditions.
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Cost-effective health care strategies for Medicaid beneficiaries with chronic
illness and disability are essential to controlling overall Medicaid costs. However, the
needs of individuals with chronic illness and disability differ substantially from other
Medicaid populations. Medicaid provides access to health care for a diverse population,
spanning from children to older adults, whose health care needs are equally as diverse.
Appreciating the varied needs of Medicaid enrollees may lead to policies supporting
more efficacious approaches to care.

Perspectives of Health and the Social Context
Perspectives of health and disability are guided by the social context, influencing
approaches to health and health care. Strategies to facilitate and support health must
move beyond narrowed confines of pathophysiology and embrace health as a complex,
multi-dimensional entity. U.S. social welfare policy is supported by ideological beliefs
idealizing autonomy, highlighting individualism over more altruistic perspectives. In a
capitalist democracy, the welfare of societal members is theoretically situated within the
private market, reducing the moral obligation to societal members as a whole. A loss of
independence, irregardless if due to person-level or environmental factors, may reduce
opportunities for choice and limit efforts toward equitable states of personal welfare. As
unlimited demands are placed upon limited public sector resources, funding choices
reflect societal priorities; balancing responsibilities between the private realm of the
individual and the public realm of societal obligation (Field and Jette 2007: 9).
Certainly, health behaviors may be viewed on an individual level as personal
choice and policy making, contributing to the formation of behaviors that influence
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health. However, broader socio-cultural factors influence those personal choices. Four
areas directly contributing to individual health choices are (Weiss and Lonnquist 2002):
1. Consumer products-the type of products that are available, such as ―heart
healthy‖ food items, and the associated availability of those healthful items
2. Product safety-such as manufacturer inclusion of airbags in automobiles
3. Socio-cultural beliefs and associated policy, for example accessibility
requirements for public buildings
4. Media messages, promoting images of independence or dependency
Thus, the social context influences not only personal choice options, but the social
acceptability of the choices made. In a broad sense, the U.S. creates a paradox by which
national efforts to improve health efforts are stymied. A focus on the individual and the
ability to exercise personal choice and judgment may inhibit strategies that positively
contribute to the greater good and well-being of societal members. Individual policy
making occurs within the backdrop of the larger socio-cultural landscape, influencing the
realm of local and national policy solutions that are considered.
Utilitarian perspectives frame societies as the sum of their parts, each person
fulfilling a role as a unitary, rational actor (Hollenbach 1989; McCollough 1991).
Perspectives of this nature are embodied in social contract theory in which rational
individuals engage socially for mutual benefit and governance through law (Nussbaum
2006: 3; Hollenbach 1989: 71). What are the implications of these socio-cultural
perspectives for individuals with disability? How is variance in physical and mental
ability among societal members reflected in public policy making? Social contract theory
assumes equality of power and resources sustaining the quest to attain dignity and social
engagement (Nussbaum 2006: 29; 36). Hence, circumstances of dependency
characterized by diminished physical and mental capacity are excluded from
consideration by social contract theorists (Nussbaum 2006: 33).

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p. 52
Political philosopher John Rawls adds a dimension of morality to perspectives of
social justice using the Veil of Ignorance. According to Rawls, to achieve distributive
justice and a universal perspective of social rule personal bias about a situation must be
removed as if wearing a ―veil of ignorance‖ (Stone 2002: 54). However, his theoretical
position assumes equality among participating societal members for whom mutual
agreement is achieved (Nussbaum 2006: 66-67). This social perspective, even those
defining morality, fail to address variation in individual condition and societal induced
inequity.
Social justice within the realm of contractarianism permits exclusion, failing to
provide social justice for all societal members (Nussbaum 2006: 78). In contrast,
communitarian perspectives highlight cooperation and compromise as a means to
reconcile pluralistic interests and support the broader social good (Hollenbach 1989: 71).
Communitarianism is characterized by fulfilling social relationships premised upon
reciprocity, fueling meaningful experience unconstrained by perspectives of equitable
contribution or gain (Nussbaum 2006: 85; 90). Hence, a truly just society is one that
embraces inclusion and cooperation, avoiding discrimination premised upon individual
gain and reconciled through welfare (Nussbaum 2006: 118). From this perspective,
access ramps are not merely artifacts of regulatory compliance, but a pursuit of social
justice on behalf of societal members.
Social justice extends beyond individual rights (Hollenbach 1989: 87). The Civil
Rights movement was more than securing equal rights associated with citizenship; it was
a means to forge relationships with others premised upon dignity and freedom. ―The
freedom and dignity of persons are achieved in communal relationships with other
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persons, not in isolation‖ (Hollenbach 1989: 87). For individuals with chronic conditions
and disability, the social context frames the development of communal relationships.
Policies that promote exclusion, such as Medicare‘s ―in-home‖ requirement for medical
equipment, directly inhibit social engagement and hence encroach upon individual
freedom and dignity. ―Quality of life not only is a state for individuals to achieve, but is
inseparable from the underlying social and economic conditions with which individual
and collective states of well-being cannot be achieved‖ (Renwick, Brown, and Nagler
1996: 131).

Conclusion
As a federal/state partnership, the Medicaid program is simultaneously subjected
to national and local environmental pressures. State Medicaid policy making and
Medicaid program planning plays an increasingly critical role in the lives of a particularly
diverse and vulnerable Medicaid population (Ireys, Thornton, and McKay 2002: 37).
The financial challenges confronting both the private and public healthcare sectors in the
United States are not simply an issue of the elderly, the poor or ethnic minorities; they
influence every member of American society.
Policy analysis demands a holistic and systematic approach to help illuminate
complexities associated with public problems. Without a comprehensive and continual
assessment of the problem structure, the solution will always miss the mark. While
perspectives of universalism support inclusion, consideration for group difference as a
means to obtain inclusion is understandable (Young 2006: 261). Group difference ought
to be the standard for inclusion, not exclusion. Policy objectives that strive to prop up
those who are different in an effort to achieve ―normalcy‖ marginalize heterogeneity for
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the sake of homogeneity. Alternative approaches might consider deconstructing existing
institutions to better appreciate varied interests (Young 2006: 261). In other words,
greater variation in the voices influencing policy choices will minimize the adoption of
policies that negatively influence segments of the population. The objectives of policymaking then shifts from redressing differences among groups to the appreciation for the
varied needs of societal members. Consequently, health policy-making for individuals
with chronic conditions and disability necessitate perspectives beyond more traditional
biomedical approaches.
The social context possesses the potential to reshape perspectives of health and
disability, creating new policy solutions to public problems. Hence, Medicaid policy that
limits or eliminates services particularly important for individuals with chronic illness
and disability fails to adequately meet the health care needs of this population that
contribute to social engagement and quality of life. Formal institutions are ultimately the
byproduct of informal socio-cultural beliefs; and while difficult to change, change is
possible (Nussbaum 2006: 410). Appreciating the reciprocal influence between formal
and informal institutions permits opportunities for changing societal attitudes to influence
public policy making.
While socio-economic conditions and formal institutions influence Medicaid
policy making, these policy decisions reflect broader socio-cultural beliefs regarding
health and disability. Societal perspectives of health and disability possesses salient
policy implications, ranging from the influence upon basic rights associated with
citizenship, ―life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,‖ to the determination of social
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welfare policy and paradigms of care. Conceptual constructs of disability shape the
approaches developed and adopted at clinical and policy levels.
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Chapter 3
Medicaid Design and Emerging Problems

…a state exists for the sake of a good life and not for the
sake of life only…
Aristotle
Richard McKeon
The Basic Works of Aristotle, (1941 )

The Origins of Medicaid
The signing of the Medicare and Medicaid legislation in 1965, culminated nearly
sixty years of political debate, characterized by struggles for and against the role of the
United States government in health care. This uncertainty, particularly in a climate of
escalating environmental pressure in the public and private welfare sector, continues to
this day. Is there a social obligation to provide health care for individuals excluded in the
private market? And, why is state Medicaid policy- gaining increasing importance? A
historical review leading to the passage of the Social Security amendments of 1965,
instituting Medicare and Medicaid, describes a journey culminating with one of the most
significant pieces of legislation to influence United States health policy.

The Path Toward 1965
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The path toward passage of 1965 Medicaid legislation is complex, characterized
by the interaction between public and private welfare states, and situated within social
norms and values. Over time, past political decisions become institutionalized,
circumscribing available policy decisions in the future. Political scientist Paul Pierson
defines this as path dependence ―…dynamic processes involving positive feedback,
which generate multiple possible outcomes on the particular sequence in which events
unfold‖ (2004: 20). An appreciation for historical sequence helps to illuminate not only
the spectrum of forces influencing the policy process, but also viable policy options
available to policy makers.
Early 20th century social welfare programs typically were developed and
implemented at the state level. The United States industrial revolution fueled the
organization of labor and new expectations of entitlement. Established in 1906, the
American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) actively lobbied for state social
welfare programs. Composed of physicians, businessmen, lawyers, professors, labor
leaders, politicians and social workers, this group represents diverse interests, yet, unified
in support for social welfare reform. By 1915, initial success attributed to the AALL
included ratification of workmen‘s compensation by thirty states, supporting health care
for workers of industrial accidents (Corning 1969). Buoyed by legislative success, the
AALL extended efforts toward the development of state health insurance programs.
Efforts to elicit state-based support were directed toward three sources: elected
officials, private interest groups and the public at large. Although early support was
garnered from notables such as Theodore Roosevelt, with consideration by the American
Medical Association (AMA), ultimately voter defeat at the polls led to the collapse of the
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AALL health care initiatives. The health care initiatives supported by the AALL in the
early twentieth century appeared antithetical with socio-cultural attitudes of liberalism
and autonomy, limiting the scope of viable public health care policies. ―By conditioning
public attitudes toward what is expected of the individual and what is the responsibility of
the government, the public philosophy can influence the way in which a nation responds
to its social and economic problems‖ (Corning 1969).
The devastation of the Great Depression catapulted the U.S. from a state of
prosperity into a state of economic chaos and uncertainty. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt‘s ―New Deal‖ epitomized an activist government, serving as a beacon of light
in a sea of uncertainty. The establishment of multiple government agencies, in an effort
to begin repair of the economic devastation resulting from the Depression, contributed to
political support for the implementation of the Social Security Act of 1935. The liberal
response to the economic turmoil appeared to open a ―window of opportunity‖ for
national health reform. However, concern that inclusion of a national health care policy
might deter legislative approval of the Social Security Act of 1935; President Roosevelt
was eventually swayed to withhold support for medical legislation (Gordon 2003).
Following F.D.R., President Truman became a champion for compulsory health
insurance and breathed new life into reform efforts. In his 1948 State of the Union
Address, Truman advocated a health care program that ―…would remove the money
barrier between illness and therapy…..[and thus] protect all our people equally…‖
(Marmor 1973). Strong and visible opposition from groups such as the American
Medical Association (AMA) and the National Association of Blue Shield Plans
constrained Truman‘s success. Although Presidents Roosevelt and Truman supported
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health policy reform, a lack of broader Congressional support and a public skeptical of
government intrusion continued to hold ―windows of opportunity‖ closed. Three other
attempts at universal health care, by Presidents Nixon and Carter in the 1970‘s and
Clinton in the 1990‘s, met a similar fate. Reform opponents framed governmentsponsored health care as an assault on individual choice and a limitation of freedom.
Through time, health care reform has become ensnared in partisan debate. The political
tug-of-war over the role of government in social welfare policy remains balanced upon an
ideological fulcrum.
Over the course of the twentieth century, public policy fueled corporate and
entrepreneurial investment in the health care industry (Starr 1992; Esping-Andersen
1990). Public policy helped to institutionalize employer-based health insurance as the
dominate source of coverage in the United States (Gordon 2003: 76-89). The Revenue
Act of 1942 permitted employers to reduce tax burden through deduction of health
insurance costs. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 provided a mechanism for employers to
contribute to benefit packages without assuming the administrative burden. Funds were
then used to purchase health insurance for workers and dependents.
The growing importance of health care benefits for employees provided additional
support for the alignment of labor with private interests (Morone and Jacobs 2005: 144147). While not particularly popular with labor interests early on, eventually the
legislation of the 1940‘s served to align labor with those of employers and insurance
companies. Employer-sponsored health insurance became a key bargaining chip as labor
unions negotiated for employee health benefits. Public policies contributed not only to
the development of the private welfare state, but framed the private welfare state as a
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viable (preferable, according to proponents of the private welfare state) alternative to
government intervention (Hacker 2002; Gottschalk 2000).
U.S. health policy has been distinctive not only in the absence of a national health
policy, but the presence of an existing and extensive private welfare state; a private
welfare state that handles many of the benefits provided by governments of other
industrialized nations (Hacker 2002: 7). However, like the private market, failures in the
private welfare state do occur. Growing gaps in private health insurance coverage fueled
the1965 amendments to the Social Security Act establishing two public health insurance
programs for specific populations in the United States.
While employer-sponsored health insurance covered working-age adults, retired
adults and the nation‘s elderly were left shouldering the burden of escalating health care
costs (Engel 2006; Starr 1982). This active and vocal constituency helped revive national
health care reform efforts. Although stalled in committee, the 1957 Forand Bill,
introduced by Rhode Island Representative Aime Forand, proposed hospital coverage for
Social Security beneficiaries (Engel 2006). Due to continued health reform opposition,
the failed Forand Bill led to a more narrowed focus, the poor elderly. Although,
incremental in nature, 1960 Kerr-Mills Act successfully expanded state welfare
programs. Introduced by Oklahoma Senator Robert Kerr and Arkansas Representative
Wilbur Mills, the Act targeted the elderly poor by instituting federal funding
contributions to state programs (Gordon 2003).
Persistent attempts to institute hospital insurance for adults age 65 and older
resulted in the introduction of the King-Anderson bill of 1962; and, the reintroduction of
the bill in 1964. With growing public support in favor of the program now known as
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Medicare, President Kennedy committed his support to making Medicare a ―cutting edge
issue.‖ By 1964, Democratic control of both the White House and Congress created an
opportunity for change.
The electoral outcome of 1964 guaranteed the passage of legislation on medical
care for the aged. Not one of the obstacles to Medicare was left standing. In the
House, the Democrats gained thirty-two new seats, giving them a more than twoto-one ratio for the first time since the heyday of the New Deal. In addition,
President Johnson‘s dramatic victory over Goldwater could be read as a popular
mandate for Medicare. (Marmor, 1973: 59).
The resulting legislation provided hospital and physician insurance, Medicare A and B,
respectively, and a federal-state program for the poor, Medicaid (Engel 2006).
Medicare (Title XVIII) is a federal program supporting the health care needs of
adults age sixty-five and older and Medicaid (Title XIX), is a federal/state partnership
providing health insurance for individuals with low-income. While the initial objective of
the Medicaid program was to support individuals receiving cash assistance, the program
has expanded over the years to include low-income individuals and individuals with
disability who are not receiving welfare assistance, but fall through the cracks of the
private welfare sector (Alliance for Health Reform 2006: 3; Kaiser Family Foundation
2007a).

The Structure of Medicaid
Unlike the universal entitlement of its sibling Medicare, Medicaid is a meanstested program, in which program eligibility is established by each state according to
income (Friedman 1995). Once qualified, all individuals who meet the state determined
Medicaid eligibility criteria are entitled to the Medicaid services offered by that state
(Rosenbaum 2002: 6350). In turn, states providing services to Medicaid eligible
beneficiaries are legally entitled to receive federal funding helping to offset program
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expenditures incurred by the states (Alliance for Health Reform 2006: 81; Wachino,
Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 5). Consequently, projecting future program
expenditures is difficult, influenced by the number of eligible beneficiaries and the
services received. At present, there are no predetermined expenditure limits; program
costs increase according to demand by eligible beneficiaries (Wachino, Schneider, and
Rousseau 2004: 5).
While Medicaid does not cover all impoverished individuals, it does support more
than forty percent of the nation‘s non-elderly poor (Kaiser Family Foundation 2007a: 5).
Beneficiaries must fall into certain categories, such as pregnant women and children,
parents of needy families and elderly and disabled individuals receiving Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), all of whom must meet specific, state determined income criteria
(6). The criteria to establish SSI benefits are quite restrictive, meaning that only those
with more severe disabling conditions qualify for benefits (Rosenbaum 2002: 637).
These individuals lack access to health insurance in the private market or would incur
such high premiums, insurance would be cost prohibitive.
Due to established income criteria necessary to qualify for state Medicaid
programs, individuals tend to cycle on and off Medicaid. As personal financial
circumstances change, so too will compliance with Medicaid eligibility (Lewin and
Altman 2000: 50). Additionally, this ―cycling‖ challenges continuity of care as
individuals may fluctuate between Medicaid coverage and periods without insurance.
Appreciating that individuals with Medicaid tend to be in poorer health compared to
individuals with private insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation 2007a: 7), periods of time
in which individuals are uninsured may have a more profound influence on health status.
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Medicaid also serves as the primary source of long-term care insurance coverage
in the United States., paying nearly fifty percent of all nursing home costs in the country
(Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 13). Medicare provides only limited longterm care coverage following acute care hospitalization (Walker 2002: 5). While the
private sector is expanding accessibility to long-term care insurance, availability is
typically associated with larger companies, full-time employment status, white-collar
workers and those living in urban areas (Pfuntner and Dietz 2004). As the population
ages, even greater strain will be placed upon Medicaid as demand for long-term care
increases and fiscal pressures continue to mount.
State participation in Medicaid is not mandated by the federal government, but is
a decision of each state. Currently, all states have Medicaid programs, although Arizona
held out until 1982 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006b: 1). Statutory requirements
mandate state Medicaid programs provide coverage for fourteen services, including inpatient care, out-patient services, physician and laboratory services. Additionally, states
may opt to provide up to thirty-four additional goods and services at state determined
levels (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2007). Optional services include
optometry exams and eyeglasses, prosthetic devices, rehabilitation services and home and
community-based services (Alliance for Health Reform 2006; Kaiser Family Foundation
2007a: 10). As states exercise greater latitude in manipulating services and cost-share for
beneficiaries, implications for health outcomes have varied widely. Policies that
successfully meet the needs of vulnerable populations, particularly those with chronic
conditions and disability, will most likely provide adequate support to other populations.
Consequently, policies that negatively have an impact on individuals in poorer health
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may be detrimental to other populations of enrollees, as well (Lewin and Altman 2000:
180).
Even with the social stigma of ―welfare‖ program compared to its sibling
Medicare, Medicaid has achieved a greater degree of flexibility and ingenuity compared
to its more stable and less flexible Medicare counterpart (Brown and Sparer 2003: 34).
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, implementing prescription drug coverage for
seniors, was the most substantial change to Medicare since passage in 1965. In
comparison, Medicaid began undergoing change shortly after inception, gradually
transforming under the influence of environmental forces.
While the private health insurance sector is rife with exclusions and carve-outs,
federal law prohibits Medicaid from excluding care to beneficiaries with certain
conditions (Rosenbaum 2002: 636). For example, Medicaid is the largest health care
financing mechanism for beneficiaries with HIV/AIDS (Inglehart 2003: 2141;
Rosenbaum 2002: 635) and pays a substantial portion of public funding for the treatment
of mental illness and substance abuse (Kaiser Family Foundation 2007a: 11). As a
chronic, disabling condition, HIV/AIDS demonstrates significant associations with
poverty (Kates 2006) and unlike private health insurance policies, Medicaid does not
exclude coverage for acute care mental health services. Undoubtedly, Medicaid plays a
critical role in the public welfare sector and in the broader U.S. health care system. As
the federal government transfers greater authority to the states, Medicaid is uniquely
positioned to serve as a catalyst for innovative approaches to health care (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2007a: 4).
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Changing Medicaid Legislation
While statutory policy is often viewed as fixed, Medicaid, particularly compared
to Medicare, appears remarkably changeable in response to fluctuating socio-economic
and political conditions. While discussion of legislative amendments and new statutes
associated with the Medicaid program follows, the present review is not exhaustive. It is
intended to illustrate two key points: the sensitivity of Medicaid policy to environmental
conditions and a shifting of authority for Medicaid from the federal government to the
states. The discussion includes only successful legislative change to Medicaid policy.
Appreciation for the potential influence of unsuccessful legislative policy, that may
indirectly spark or influence the policy agenda, must also be taken into consideration.
Passage of the1965 amendments to the Social Security Act, instituting the
Medicare and Medicaid programs provided a framework for program design and
implementation. A mere two years after passage of Medicaid, escalating program
expenditures prompted calls for reform. While the initial statute mandated Medicaid
coverage for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) populations, the Social
Security Amendments of 1967 limited eligibility to 133.3% of state AFDC criteria levels,
attempting to target the neediest populations. Additionally, concern over the number of
young adults failing military health screenings, prompted development of the Early and
Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) Medicaid benefit for children
under age twenty-one. Essentially, EPSDT encompassed a comprehensive Medicaid
health benefits package for children (Health Care Financing Review 2005-2006: 1;
Kaiser Family Foundation 2005b). Five years later, the Social Security Amendments of
1972 established the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program for aged, blind and
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disabled individuals. States were required to include these individuals in state Medicaid
programs. States were also given authority to annually adjust Medicaid spending levels
as necessary, countering initial statutory mandates requiring states sustain consistent
funding levels from year to year (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006d).
While the Democratic administration of President Johnson successfully ushered in
Medicare and Medicaid, the Republican administration of President Nixon, began to
change the complexion of the public welfare state, with gradual implications for the
Medicaid as a federal/state partnership. The Nixon presidency (1969-1974) brought
about a new era in government. Promoting ―New Federalism‖ as an effort to streamline
the federal government, Nixon instituted the first health care block grant by combining a
number of separate public health grants. Nixon also expanded state authority over use of
federal funds with reduced federal oversight (Bovbjerg, Wiener, and Housman 2003: 30).
The Reagan presidency (1981-1989) espoused government as the problem, not the
solution, to economic challenges facing the nation (Skowronek 1997: 414). Continuing
the New Federalism ideology of the Nixon years, President Reagan supported greater use
of block grants in combination with reductions in federal funding (Bovbjerg, Wiener, and
Housman 2003: 30). The Medicaid budget during Reagan‘s presidency declined by 5.9%
(Engel 2006: 181). While sixty-three percent of impoverished individuals were covered
by Medicaid in 1976, the number was reduced to slightly over fifty percent by 1984
(184). Concern over declining reach of the Medicaid program precipitated a series of
expansionary Congressional statutes, broadening eligibility particularly for children and
pregnant women in the mid to late 1980‘s.
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Medicaid legislation is not simply a story of program reduction, but often a mix of
programmatic expansions and contractions. Concern over increasing expenditures
associated with Medicare and Medicaid, prompted passage of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. OBRA ―eighty-one‖ reduced federal funding rates
to state Medicaid programs and ―…totally eliminated many federal restrictions …‖
(Schneider 1998). In other words, less funding would be provided to the states in
combination with increased state discretion to determine eligibility criteria and
reimbursement rates for some populations. OBRA eighty-one legislation no longer
mandated Medicaid hospital payments equal those of Medicare payments, but permitted
additional payment to hospitals serving a greater share of Medicaid patients
(disproportionate share hospitals—DSH)5 (Mechanic 2004).
OBRA eighty-one instituted two new Medicaid waiver programs. Federal
waivers grant states cost-neutral program experimentation to meet the health care needs
of low-income residents, eliminating many Medicaid regulatory guidelines (Lewin and
Altman 2000: 35). Waiver 1915(b) permits states to mandate enrollment of certain
populations in managed care. Waiver 1915(c) permits states to provide home and
community care services for individuals in place of institutionalized care (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2006d). These waiver programs provide states greater latitude with which to
implement state Medicaid programs.
Medicaid waivers have existed since program inception in 1965 (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2005b). Approved by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
5

Disproportionate share hospitals receive special consideration for funding due to the
larger proportion of care provided to low-income individuals compared to other hospitals.
Criteria for consideration as a disproportionate care provider and funding levels are
determined at the state level (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2007a).
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Services, these waivers often are used as a mechanism to obtain federal funding for
populations not typically included in Medicaid eligibility criteria, such as poor adults
without children. Section 1115 waivers are a common mechanism to test the use of
managed care as a cost-saving mechanism, then use program savings to expand Medicaid
coverage (Kaiser Family Foundation 2005b). The 1115 waiver program permits broader,
state mandated enrollment in Medicaid managed care (Kaiser Family Foundation 2001).
The 1115 waivers are driven by efforts to implement broad-based programmatic reform.
Compared to 1115 waivers, section 1915 waivers are narrower in nature, permitting state
exclusion from specific Medicaid requirements Waivers are specifically designed to
enhance state innovation, permitting states to tailor Medicaid services to constituency
need (Department of Health and Human Services 2001).
The Tax Equity and Financing Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 supports
opportunities for children with disabilities living at home to qualify for Medicaid benefits
without meeting Supplemental Security Income (SSI) requirements (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2006d; Engel 2006). Known as the ―Katie Beckett option,‖ a portion of
TEFRA includes support for children with disabilities in the home environment, avoiding
institutionalization. In contrast, TEFRA ―eighty-two‖ provides states authority to
implement cost-sharing for some Medicaid beneficiaries. The rationale for initiating outof-pocket payments, even nominal payments of one dollar for Medicaid enrollees, was to
deter excessive use of health care services. ―Within a year, sixteen states adopted copayments, twenty eliminated at least some optional Medicaid services, and fourteen
reduced the rolls of eligible recipients‖ (Engel 2006: 169). As a cost-containment effort,
legislative changes to the Medicaid program during the Reagan presidency reflect the
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more conservative political motives of the Oval Office as a means to curtail inflationary
economic pressures (171).
Legislation in the mid-1980‘s gradually expanded state coverage for pregnant
women and young children and permitted state Medicaid programs to pay Medicare
premiums for dual eligible beneficiaries, those older adults with low-incomes who
qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
2007b; Kaiser Family Foundation 2002). Legislation also demonstrated a gradual shift of
program authority from the federal government to the states, permitting states greater
latitude over the determination of Medicaid eligibility criteria and services provided to
enrollees in state Medicaid programs.
Dramatic reductions in Medicaid enrollees followed the welfare policy changes of
the mid-nineties. The Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax
Amendments of 1991 sought to curb the states‘ Medicaid maximization strategies6 and
cap Medicaid payment to disproportionate share hospitals (Coughlin and Zuckerman
2003: 167; Kaiser Family Foundation 2002: 176). The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of 1996 (PRWOA) repealed the linkage between welfare benefits and
eligibility for the Medicaid program (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006d). States
demonstrated up to a fifty percent decrease in Medicaid enrollees.
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 initiated a phase-out of cost-reimbursed
finance mechanisms to federally qualified health centers, reduced payments to
disproportionate share hospitals and allowed states to mandate managed care for

6

Medicaid maximization refers to state strategies used to maximize federal funding
contributions to the states. A more detailed discussion is provided in Chapter 4 of this
study.
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Medicaid enrollees without obtaining federal waivers (Public Law 105-33). However,
BBA ―ninety-seven‖ also expanded Medicaid coverage by instituting the State Children‘s
Health Insurance program (SCHIP) permitting states to cover children under state
Medicaid programs whose family income exceeds Medicaid eligibility criteria (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2006d).
As a means to curb federal spending, President Bush signed the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005 (DRA) on February 8, 2006. Passed in the House by six votes and approved
in the Senate following a tie-breaking vote by Vice President Dick Cheney, the DRA
provides states greater latitude in limiting Medicaid eligibility and services and supports
greater cost-sharing by program recipients (Artiga et al. 2006). The Deficit Reduction
Act (DRA) of 2005, intended to reduce federal spending on Medicaid, provides for a
number of changes to the program, altering processes associated with administration and
implementation.
While a substantial portion of the DRA details the means by which federal outlays
will be reduced, there are portions of the DRA that provide for increased outlays for
specific populations or programs. For example, the DRA provides increased funding for
some children with disabilities and home and community-based programs. Federal funds
will be provided to states with 2006 budget shortfalls in the SCHIP programs (State
Children‘s Health Insurance Program) and for health care to victims of Hurricane Katrina
(S.1932 2006). The DRA legislation also launched the Medicaid Integrity Program,
housed within the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Modeled after the
Medicare Integrity Program, DRA legislation provides additional federal staffing and
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financial resources supporting identification and elimination of Medicaid fraud and abuse
in state programs (Wachino and Rudowitz 2006).
Subtitle A of Title six of the DRA details the means by which reduction in the
federal portion of the Medicaid program will take place (S.1932 2006). By enhancing
state discretion in determining program benefits, permitting increased cost-share by
program recipients, lowering payments for outpatient prescription drugs and tightening
processes for asset distribution to qualify for long-term care, the Congressional Budget
Office anticipated an overall federal savings of twenty-six billion dollars by 2015
(Congressional Budget Office 2006: 2). The projected savings encompasses additional
outlays provided for special populations and programs noted above.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) hold responsibility for
oversight of DRA changes with the Secretary of Health and Human Services possessing
authority to grant or deny state specific requests for programmatic change. While some
components of the DRA require mandatory state compliance, other aspects are left to the
discretion of the states. For example, states are required to place limits on pharmacy
expenditures and to extend the ―look-back‖ period for transferring assets, as a component
of qualifying for Medicaid, to five years (S.1932 2006). Other elements, such as
increasing premiums and cost-sharing for beneficiaries are determined at the state level
(Rudowitz and Schneider 2006: 5; 15-19). Public policy, such as the DRA, provides
states more authority to modify Medicaid eligibility and services, and supports greater
cost-sharing by program recipients, substantially influencing the health of America‘s
most vulnerable population (Artiga et al. 2006).
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Medicaid is clearly a more permeable public health policy compared to its more
static counterpart, Medicare. The scope and breadth of each Medicaid policy change is
manifested in the lives of program enrollees. As states become a focal point of Medicaid
policy making, the examination of factors influencing state policy outcomes is an
important step toward understanding state variance and the repertoire of policy solutions
available to the states.

Disability and the Private Market: Implications for Medicaid Policy
Health insurance in the United States is uniquely piecemealed compared to
national insurance programs of all other industrialized nations. As noted by political
scientist Jacob Hacker (2002), these entrenched interests have been shaped by public
policy decisions through time. The health insurance industry behaves rationally, seeking
to maximize utility. From an insurance perspective, healthier individuals equate to lower
risk, enhancing profit-driven motives. The individual with disability typically presents
with higher risk and greater medical expenditures; hence, these individuals may have
greater difficulty securing affordable insurance and are at greater risk for becoming
uninsured. They become victims of market failure and ―risk segmentation,‖ financially
prohibiting purchase of private insurance or limiting choice to publicly subsidized
coverage (Blumberg and Nichols 1998). Risk segmentation means that competing plans
may disproportionately enroll either high-risk or low-risk plan members (Knutson 2007:
394).
The predominance of the U.S. private welfare state conditions health insurance as
a commodity in the private market. As such, health care is subject to assumptions
inherent in the market competition model (Rice 2003). These assumptions include:
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Perfect information
Homogeneity of goods
Freedom to enter and leave the market
Sufficient buyers and sellers
No significant externalities
Grounded in uncertainty and technocratic complexity, the health care market defies these
assumptions. It is increasingly evident this contributes to substantial market failure in
health care, that is, the inability to secure goods and services in the private market. Due
to the uncertain nature of medical needs, health insurance emerges as a solution to
ameliorate the unknown.
Health insurance buffers consumers against the true cost of care, such that
consumers are accountable for only a portion of actual costs, and creates perverse
incentives. The result is a phenomenon called moral hazard, in which lower price
facilitates increase in demand. Adverse selection also challenges the private health
insurance market. Those with the greatest expenditures or health needs will seek
insurance providing the best coverage, even at a higher cost. As premiums rise, healthier
plan participants may leave a plan in search of lower cost plans. Health care plans may
have difficulty sustaining higher costs participants with fewer lower cost participants. To
combat the issues associated with adverse selection, insurance payers resort to experience
rating, in which those with higher costs are charged higher premiums, thereby
discriminating against those most in need. Tactics such as redlining, underwriting and
optionally renewable policies are exclusionary practices placing control of costs in the
hands of the insurance industry often to the detriment of health care consumers.
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Ultimately, market failure may limit access to health insurance. The National
Council on Disability commissioned a study to investigate barriers to health insurance
and services for people with disabilities. ―They (disabled) have the poorest access to
private sector coverage, with its exclusions, limitations, and restrictive underwriting
practices‖ (National Council on Disability 1993). Approximately fifteen percent of
persons with disabilities lack insurance. Those covered under the public health insurance
system receive care in a paradigm that ―fosters dependence rather than independence and
isolation rather than integration‖ (National Council on Disability 1993). Often the type
of services covered by insurance does not coincide with the needs of people with
disabilities. For example, personal care services and assistive devices may not be
covered or covered with limited provisions.
Medicare and Medicaid cover certain services only when they are provided in
specified settings or by designated providers. These limitations mean that persons
with disabilities have little choice in how their care is provided and may be
required to enter an institution to access needed services. Without coverage for
certain services, such as personal care, individuals may require institutionalization
(Lewin-ICF 1993: xii).
As indicated, market failures in the private sector inhibit insurance coverage options for
those with higher health care risks. Publicly financed coverage and the health care
strategies associated with public health care programs may be the only viable option for
some individuals.
The U.S. health care system is an amalgamation of private and public mechanisms
created to support the health care needs societal members. The Medicaid program plays
a particularly important role in U.S. health care by supporting the most vulnerable
segment of the population. However, with a dual locus of control at both federal and
state levels, Medicaid is subject to a multitude of socio-economic and political pressures.
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As innovators in health care reform, states must develop new approaches to meet the
needs of Medicaid beneficiaries.
As the administrative authority for Medicaid shifts from the federal government
to the states, states are challenged to navigate through both public and private health care
sectors in response to constituent demand and converging environmental pressures.
Medicaid emerged as a public response to failure in the private market, forcing the
government to seek ―custom-made‖ goods and services (Kettl 1993: 15-16). While
efficiency is the paramount objective in the private market, complex issues such as equity
may be as important or more important in the public sector. Implementing innovative
health care strategies in state Medicaid programs forces states to become more prudent
purchasers of care (Hurley and Zuckerman 2003: 228). Kettl (1993) stated, ―The real
issue is not how to choose between the market or government. It is, rather, how to strike
the best balance between them—and how to manage the problems that this balance
creates…in the search for this balance, seeking the public interest is paramount‖ ( 38;
40). This approach does not advocate a ―command and control‖ framework for the
administration of Medicaid, but a ―steer and negotiate‖ approach (World Health
Organization 2008: 103) in which the public sector negotiates with the private sector on
behalf of program enrollees.
To support the role as ―smart buyer‖ the government must better define its needs;
improving specificity regarding the goods and services it is seeking in the private sector.
The government must work diligently to assess the producers in the private sector and to
monitor the goods and services that are purchased (Kettl 1993-182). States may use
contractual obligations to assure access to providers, establish quality and performance
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standards. It is believed state purchasing power combined with managed care strategies
enhances state purchasing power compared to fee-for-service purchasing mechanisms
(Hurley and Somers 2003: 81). States are increasingly developing the role of ―smart
buyer,‖ seeking new approaches to health care for Medicaid beneficiaries, including the
use of managed care.
Due to increasing enrollment and costs of federal disability programs, the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) made modernizing federal disability policy a
priority in 2003. In 2007, a forum of experts from the public, private and non-profit
sectors, convened to address this issue. Forum participants support the innovative role of
state programs, yet acknowledge the need to develop a broader mechanism, a national
system, not to homogenize efforts, but to better coordinate policies and services (General
Accounting Office 2007: 4-7). The Institute of Medicine also supports mechanisms to
coordinate disability research, better channeling strategies toward critical issues and
avoiding duplication and waste of limited resources (Field and Jette 2007: 6). Efforts to
address the future health care challenges in the United States will require a better
understanding of vulnerable populations and their health care needs, appreciating not
only acute care, but the growing role of chronic conditions and disability. With an everincreasingly contentious policy arena, innovation at the state level combined with
coordinated efforts at the federal level may combine to serve as policy change agents.

Medicaid’s Role in the Health Care Safety Net
Low-income, under and uninsured individuals in the United States seek health
care through an amalgam of providers, institutions and financing strategies composing
the health care safety net (Lewin and Altman 2000). Medicaid is an essential component
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of this network. An assessment of the United States health care safety net by the Institute
of Medicine determined that variability in state policy combined with a lack of
coordination among health care providers position the health care safety net as a fragile
and fragmented mechanism of care for individuals outside the employer-based health
insurance system (Lewin and Altman 2000).
Literature demonstrates that managed care may constrain available resources
necessary for uncompensated care (Davidhoff et al. 2000). Uncompensated care includes
care for which a provider does not expect payment or does not expect to collect on the
amount due; in other words, the sum of charity care plus ―bad debt‖ (Congressional
Budget Office 2006). Research indicates that non-profit hospitals scaled back on
uncompensated care in response to expansions in Medicaid managed care. This is
believed to be due to reduced payment rates for service to Medicaid managed care
enrollees (Davidhoff et al. 2000: 264). While states employ Medicaid managed care to
use resources for program beneficiaries more effectively, fewer resources are available to
safety net providers for uncompensated care of the uninsured. Consequently, Medicaid
policy decisions are similar to throwing a pebble in a pond; the effects ripple far beyond
program beneficiaries, themselves, influencing broader health care systems and economic
factors within a state.

The Emergence of Managed Care
It was not until the Great Depression, when threats to the financial stability of
medical providers due to non-payment, fueled support for health insurance programs.
During much of the twentieth century, the private health insurance industry helped shape
reimbursement mechanisms for health care. Grounded in a fee-for-service payment
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mechanism, reimbursement strategies rewarded the use of medical services. The more xrays provided to a patient, the more reimbursement received by the medical provider.
Fee-for-service payment mechanisms are commonly considered ―indemnity plans‖ (Rice
2003: 152). Technically, indemnity plans are fixed payments to a beneficiary per
medical service received. The beneficiary then pays the medical provider. As medical
providers accepted the role of private health insurance programs, they helped shape the
structure of indemnity programs. Indemnity providers establish fixed payments for care.
Therefore as health care costs increase, the consumer, not the provider, bears the brunt of
escalating costs (Starr 1982: 291-292).
True indemnity plans place the policy holder in the center of financial risk. To
avoid this risk, service plan arrangements escalated in popularity. Service plans provide
payment directly to the medical provider with the beneficiary responsible for deductibles
and co-payments (Shi and Singh 2004: 196). However, ―indemnity‖ has developed more
of a colloquial meaning, distinguishing fee-for-service from managed care payment
mechanisms (Rice 2003: 152). Although less precise, this more common understanding
of indemnity versus managed care is used in this study. Ultimately, indemnity or fee-forservice payment systems distance consumers from the costs of health care and render
medical providers as gate-keepers for services, factors which have contributed to the
escalating costs of care (Starr 1992).
Employment-based health care insurance and the associated tax benefits helped to
entrench fee-for-service mechanisms in the United States. Revisions to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 omitted funds paid by employers for employee health insurance
from inclusion as taxable income (Mushkin 1955; Hacker 2002). Furthermore,
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employers were permitted to deduct costs associated with provision of employee health
coverage (Agrawal and Veit 2002: 14). The growth of private insurance through
employment based coverage provided care for the middle-class while continuing to
support the physicians control over treatment (Starr 1982).
The adoption of Medicare in 1965 provided health insurance for Social Security
retirees while sustaining fee-for-service reimbursement mechanisms. Additionally,
professional dominance by physicians inhibited health care competition, controlling both
the demand and supply for health care services (Agrawal and Veit 2002: 14). The growth
of third-party payment mechanisms, particularly employer sponsored health insurance,
buffers both health care provider and health care consumer from the true costs of care
(15).
Managed care is an economic strategy merging the American propensity for
market-based policy solutions with access to a predominantly market-based health
insurance industry (Enthoven 1993: 25). The idea of prepaid health care plans preceded
the emergence of managed care. Early prepayment plans such as Ross Loos and Kaiser
Permanente in California, started in 1929 and the 1930‘s, respectively, providing health
services to select groups and individuals. These plans survived despite strong opposition
from the medical professional community (Enthoven 1993: 27) who perceived managed
care as a threat to the integrity of medical policy making (Mechanic 2004: 79).
Professional organizations, such as the American Medical Association, considered
prepayment groups ―socialized medicine‖ (Starr 1982). These prepaid group practices
demonstrated reductions in health care costs due to reduced acute care expenditures
(hospital costs), but provided levels of care equal to or exceeding that of fee-for-service
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strategies. Prepayment group practice demonstrated increased use of preventive care
with a positive influence on health care outcomes (Mechanic 2004: 79). In addition to
group prepayment plans in California, early innovators also included the District of
Columbia, Washington and New York (Enthoven 1993; Mechanic 2004).
Escalating health care costs during the 1970s fueled President Nixon‘s push for
health care reform. While reimbursement strategies supported intervention for acute
care, efforts to support preventive care were marginalized. ―The traditional system,
(President) Nixon said, ‗operates episodically‘ on an ‗illogical incentive‘ encouraging
doctors and hospitals to benefit from illness rather than health‖ (Starr 1982: 396).
The Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act of 1973 served to legitimize
prepayment mechanisms in health care (Mitka 1998). As a cost-containment strategy by
the Nixon administration, the HMO Act of 1973 required employers with more than
twenty-five employees at the federal minimum wage requirement to include a federally
qualified HMO as a benefit option, if requested by a local health maintenance provider.
Federally qualified HMOs agreed to provide a minimum benefits package, open
enrollment and community rating.
While the Nixon administration was unable to implement substantial change in
the health care system, individuals in the private sector developed a new strategy to
infuse competition in the health care sector. Paul Ellwood, a pediatric neurologist and
Alain Enthoven, a health economist, envisioned a health care system in which the
government would oversee competition among private health plans to insure large groups
of the population. Competition among plans would help to reduce health care costs.
Known as the ―Jackson Hole Group‖ the plan formulated by Ellwood and Enthoven was
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known as managed care. The objective of this new approach was not only to contain
health care costs, but to then use the savings to cover the uninsured. Managed care was
formulated as a mechanism to pursue universal health care by inducing competition
among private health care actors and to embrace more cost-effective preventive health
care strategies (Kilborn 1998).
The conceptual model of managed care envisioned by early pioneers, such as
Ellwood and Enthoven, differs from the profit-driven managed care organizations
garnering attention in the 1990‘s (Mechanic 2004). Employers limited choice of health
care plan options from the more prevalent fee-for-service plans to managed care plans;
professional groups reported reduced autonomy; and, media reports focused on the denial
of services to plan members. Late twentieth century efforts to reduce costs marginalized
the importance of quality of care (Agrawal and Veit 2002: 37). However, public outcry
questioning quality of care and reductions in provider choice associated with managed
care plans fueled new changes in the managed care industry. Medical providers learned
to negotiate with managed care plans and public opinion forced managed care companies
to shift attention toward quality of care (Mechanic 2004: 81). Likewise, managed care
forced medical providers to justify need for services, reducing unnecessary care, and
further develop mechanisms for services outside of the acute care setting, helping to
reduce health care expenditures (Agrawal and Veit 2002: 41). The managed care
paradigm has gradually influenced approaches to health care across the United States.

The Growth of Medicaid Managed Care
As pressures mount on state Medicaid programs, managed care is being used as a
cost-containment tool. The expansion of Medicaid managed care has fueled concern over
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the appropriateness of managed care for all Medicaid populations, particularly those with
special needs (Hurley and Zuckerman 2003: 223). State Medicaid policies define the
services allowed, services excluded and co-payment fees, disproportionately affecting
state Medicaid enrollees with chronic illness and disability who are the highest users of
health care services. Consequently, more efficacious approaches to care for state
Medicaid enrollees with chronic illness and disability contributes to overall program
efficiency.
Use of managed care approaches to care did not substantially expand in state
Medicaid programs until the mid-nineteen nineties. Arizona was a pioneer in the use of
Medicaid managed care. Although Arizona did not implement a state Medicaid program
until 1982, the state used managed care as the foundation for the newly adopted state
Medicaid program (Highsmith and Somers 2000: 388). In the same year, Michigan
began using primary care case management (PCCM) in the state Medicaid program.
Primary care case management pays additional fees to physicians to coordinate and
monitor care for plan members, even though health services are still provided through the
fee-for-service payment mechanism. In other words, the physician receives payment to
act as the gatekeeper for services, but services are reimbursed as rendered (388).
Federal legislation, particularly during the mid-nineteen eighties, played a
substantial role in expanding state authority over state Medicaid programs, yet also
expanded mandated populations for inclusion in state programs, such as pregnant women
and young children. Increasing health care expenditures combined with federal
legislation expanding eligibility, fueled Medicaid‘s growing consumption of state budgets
(Highsmith and Somers 2000: 389). Federal legislation in the early nineteen nineties,
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tightening payments to DSH providers, placed additional constraint on state budgets.
Consequently, growing numbers of managed care organizations contracting with state
Medicaid programs enhanced available supply to the states (389). States turned to
managed care approaches as a means to curb escalating health care costs.
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 lifted the waiver requirement needed to
mandate enrollment in state Medicaid managed care programs, excluding children with
special needs, Native Americans and Medicare beneficiaries (Silberman et al. 2002: 259).
This means policy making authority for the implementation of Medicaid managed care
now rested solely with the states; approval at the federal level was no longer necessary
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2001). While it would be expected greater state autonomy
over state Medicaid managed care programs would enhance growth, expansion was
tempered in the late nineteen nineties by withdrawal of managed care organizations from
state Medicaid programs. In 1997, nearly twice as many commercial managed care plans
exited state Medicaid programs compared to 1996 (Felt-Lisk 1999). Although some
states experienced a loss of commercial plans serving Medicaid enrollees; the number of
commercial plans entering state Medicaid managed care markets was slightly higher than
the number of plans exiting Medicaid markets, resulting in a slight net gain of
commercial plans participating in state Medicaid managed care programs. Shifting
authority for Medicaid to the states speaks to the importance of state policy making and
the influence of factors such as, state purchasing power, program reimbursement rates
and state administrative requirements that influence private sector participation in state
Medicaid programs (ibid).
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Medicaid competes with the private sector for health care services. Dwindling
profits, influenced by increasing administrative and health care costs fueled the exit of
commercial managed care organizations from state Medicaid programs. Escalating
health care costs driving up private sector health insurance premiums, also pressure
Medicaid to increase provider payments, as well (Smith and Ellis 2001: 5). As health
care premiums rise in the private sector, pressure on commercial organizations
participating in Medicaid managed care increase, as well. Managed care organizations
withdrawing from Medicaid programs noted inadequate state payment rates as a
significant factor (Highsmith and Somers 2000: 390). Varied health care costs across the
country combined with diverse health care needs of Medicaid populations challenge state
Medicaid programs to tailor payment rates that appreciate contextual variance.
While Medicaid managed care is more prevalent in urban areas, research indicates
comprehensive Medicaid managed care can be implemented in rural areas across the
country (Felt-Lisk et al. 1999). Although greater strategic planning is required to account
for fewer providers, less experience with managed care and travel needs of plan
members, research revealed full-risk Medicaid managed care was implemented in ninetyfour percent of areas with less than seven residents per square mile in the sample studied
(Felt-Lisk et al. 1999: 241). Implementation of Medicaid managed care in rural areas
incurs greater costs due to the considerations mentioned above. Although cost-savings
have been noted, savings may be less in rural areas (Felt-Lisk et al. 1999: 245). Medicaid
managed care remains a viable option for state policy-makers as escalating pressures
converge upon state Medicaid programs.
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Conclusion
Efforts early in the twentieth century to institute universal health insurance
programs were met with staunch resistance from medical providers, fearing
encroachment on their control in the supply and delivery of health care services (Starr
1982). Backed into a financial corner by the Depression, medical providers, physicians
and hospitals considered third party payment as a means to buffer self-interests from
broader economic fluctuations. In more recent times, public financing of health care has
served as a catalyst for corporate and entrepreneurial investment in the health care
industry (Starr 1992). Massive growth in the health care industry fostered the ability of
special interest groups to mobilize substantial resources to influence the political system.
The U.S. health care industry is characterized by a complex web of private sector
stakeholders, driven by capitalistic motives, and public sector programs, developed to
support those excluded from the private market. Dr. Philip R. Lee, a former assistant
secretary for health and scientific affairs of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare in a 1967 National Advisory Commission on Health Manpower Report,
―Medical care in the United States is more a collection of bits and pieces (with
overlapping, duplication, great gaps, high costs, and wasted effort), than an integrated
system in which needs and efforts are closely related‖ (Alford 1975: 231). Due to
failures in the private market, government programs, such as Medicaid, provides medical
access to care for those excluded in the market.
Using managed care as a ―one size fits all‖ approach to health care will not meet
the needs of all Medicaid beneficiaries. The diversity of Medicaid beneficiaries alone,
contributes to differential outcomes of policy decisions within and among states. The
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examination of state Medicaid policy and the use of managed care speak to the
importance of state policy making that may lead to or deter alternative health care
strategies for the nation‘s most vulnerable population. Converging pressures in health
care will force all states to confront an increasingly fragile health care system and the
public necessity for reform.
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Chapter 4
Use of Managed Care to Address Medicaid’s
Emerging Problems

Health care resembles an already over-sized teenager who
keeps popping the financial seams on his clothing, is
already the largest kid in the class, and gives every sign of
continuing to grow until there isn’t any space left in the
room for anyone else
Henry J. Aaron
Conference on Health Care Challenges
Facing the Nation,(2004)

The federal/state Medicaid program is very susceptible to national and state
policy cross-pressures. Concurrently, challenging economic cycles contribute to
escalating demand for Medicaid, a significant component of the health care safety net. At
the same time, a constrained economic climate leaves Medicaid vulnerable to federal and
state funding cuts. Changes to state Medicaid policy in response to environmental
conditions are significant because they affect the well-being of a growing number of
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impoverished Americans. Why is Medicaid vulnerable to changing socio-economic
conditions? And, how do conditions at the federal level influence state Medicaid policy
making relative to conditions at the state level? What do these changes mean for
beneficiaries with chronic illness and disability? Converging environmental pressures
challenge state policy-makers to sustain program integrity for constituents needing a
health care safety net, particularly during times of economic constraint.
The very frailties of the private health care market in the United States,
characterized by escalating expenditures, declining access and coverage, necessitate more
flexible state Medicaid policy. State Medicaid programs must balance increasing demand
with escalating expenditures. To cope with increasing program costs and refrain from
increasing taxes, states reduce the numbers of beneficiaries and services provided and/or
increase the financial contribution by Medicaid enrollees. Instituting greater cost-share
on low-income individuals, however, may contribute to adverse outcomes, particularly
for a population exhibiting poorer health status as a whole (Wright et al. 2005). Shortterm financial savings by state Medicaid programs may occur at the expense of Medicaid
beneficiaries, compromising health and contributing to overall increases in acute care
expenditures (Ku and Wachino 2005).
By definition, managed care provides comprehensive care through negotiated
pricing. Conceptually, managed care possesses the potential to better address the needs
of individuals with chronic illness through the inclusion and coordination of a broad
range of services and providers (Institute for Health and Aging 1996: 13). Introducing
managed care in the Medicaid program offers the promise of providing ―mainstream‖
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access to providers and services available to privately insured individuals and Medicare
beneficiaries while controlling health care costs (Gusmano et al. 2002).
More cost-effective health care directed toward the high costs of chronic illness
and disability appear particularly appealing to constrained state budgets. However, a
diverse Medicaid population means a blanket approach to managed care may not be
appropriate for all Medicaid populations. The expansion of Medicaid managed care
presents an opportunity to control costs without reducing the number of beneficiaries and
sacrificing necessary services. Managed care theoretically provides more efficient
utilization of available health care resources, potentially minimizing reductions in
programmatic reach and services.
Changes in Medicaid policy exhibit a disproportionately greater affect on
beneficiaries with chronic illness and disability due to greater service utilization (Ireys,
Thornton, and McKay 2002: 39). While Medicaid provides health care for a population
of low-income individuals, the needs among eligible groups vary substantially. Medicaid
managed care policies that better support the needs of individuals with chronic illness and
disability are likely to support the needs of other beneficiaries, as well.

The Cost of Medicaid
Containing Medicaid Costs at the Federal Level
In 2009, federal outlays for Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security accounted for
approximately 45% of federal spending, an increase of 20% since 1975 (Congressional
Budget Office 2009). In 2004, health care spending alone absorbed sixteen percent of the
gross domestic product (GDP) (Smith et al. 2006), the highest of any industrialized
nation, yet the U.S. ranks thirty-seventh of the 191 member states on World Health
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Organization (WHO) health indicators (World Health Organization 2000). In 2005,
Medicaid accounted for eighteen percent of national health care expenditures (National
Association of State Budget Officers 2006: 46).
A growing number of uninsured adults and escalating health care costs will
increasingly challenge national and state government. The Chairman of the Federal
Reserve, Ben Bernanke, stated ―Reform of our unsustainable entitlement programs
should be a priority. The imperative to undertake reform earlier rather than later is great‖
(Aversa 2006). In addition to Medicaid reductions resulting from the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005, presidential initiative via the federal budget continues to extend fiscal belttightening for the Medicaid program. ―More than four-fifths of the Medicaid saving
proposals in the [Bush] Administration‘s new budget [fiscal year 2007] would reduce
federal Medicaid expenditures by shifting costs directly from the federal government to
the states‖ (Schneider, Ku, and Solomon 2006: 1).
As the federal authority over the Medicaid program, the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services proposed new rulings in an effort to curb Medicaid spending. Under
the auspices of the U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary, the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services would eliminate Medicaid payment for the school transportation
of students with significant medical need, shifting costs to schools and families, as
schools comply with federal law requiring transportation of these students to educational
institutions (Vock 2008). Although the ruling was rescinded in 2009 (Federal Register
2009), this example demonstrates Medicaid‘s vulnerability to a multitude of
environmental and institutional pressures.
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As Medicaid has expanded through the years, concern has risen over the potential
for public programs to crowd out private insurance. President George Bush‘s veto of the
renewal and expansion of the State Children‘s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) on
October 3, 2007 was influenced by those very concerns. Research analyzing expanded
public health insurance in four states during the 1990‘s indicated crowding out was not a
factor for public program expansion for individuals with incomes below 100% of the
federal poverty level (FPL) (Kronick and Gilmer 2002). Crowding out was detected for
individuals with incomes between 100% and 200% of the FPL; however, the extent of
crowding out is undetermined (235). As the private welfare sector gradually contracts
opportunities for employer-sponsored health insurance; the importance of identifying and
filling health insurance gaps via the public welfare sector gains further importance.
Efforts to reduce federal entitlement spending often focus on Medicaid because of
its cost and growth rate. As a health care program, state Medicaid programs provide a
menu of health care services to all individuals meeting eligibility criteria. Policy
solutions that suggest capping federal Medicaid funding would change the identity of the
program. Placing a cap on federal Medicaid funding to the states would create two
scenarios—over or under funding. State Medicaid programs cannot limit the number of
beneficiaries—those who meet eligibility guidelines must receive benefits. Therefore,
program costs are difficult to predict. Instituting caps on federal funding means the
federal government would end up paying too much or too little to state Medicaid
programs. While over funding may not be deleterious to beneficiaries, under funding
may lead to the omission of needed services for qualified beneficiaries (Wachino,
Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 5). There are portions of the Medicaid program, such as
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the State Children‘s Health Insurance program (SCHIP) and payments to hospitals
serving greater numbers of poor, known as disproportionate share hospitals (DSH), in
which federal funds are now capped; however, implementing Medicaid in its entirety as a
capped program, such as through block grants, would drastically alter program integrity
as we know it today (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 7).

Containing Costs at the State Level
Jointly supported by federal and state funds, Medicaid is subject to costcontainment efforts in both political arenas. Nearly seventy-five percent of states have
experienced declines in the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) during 2006
and/or 2007 and all states have implemented some degree of cost containment strategy
during the same period (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006c). When combined with federal
contributions, Medicaid is the single greatest expenditure for state budgets (Boyd 2003:
59) forcing states to reconcile reduced federal revenue either through cuts in Medicaid or
other programs or by increasing taxes. Research indicates states agencies commit
inadequate resources to gauge the impact of budget cuts on state Medicaid care programs,
particularly managed care programs (Bailit, Burgess, and Roddy 2004: 12)
Reductions in the federal medical assistance percentage rates (FMAP), declining
Medicaid enrollment and state cost containment policies have helped to slow escalating
Medicaid expenditures in recent years. Peaking at an annual growth rate of 12.4% in
2002, rates progressively declined to 2.8% in 2006 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006c).
More recently, program growth averaged 7.9% in fiscal year 2009, more than twice the
predicted rate and the highest rate in six years (Kaiser Family Foundation 2010b).
Although the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) pumped federal
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funds to state Medicaid programs, state funding for Medicaid remained difficult due to
remarkable state budget shortfalls (ibid).
An escalation in state Medicaid spending is believed to be influenced, in part, by
Medicare legislation passed in 2003 (Kent 2006). The Medicare Modernization Act
(MMA) of 2003 instituted a funding mechanism known as the ―clawback.‖ Low-income
elderly individuals who qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid are typically referred to
as ―dual eligibles.‖ Implementation of the MMA shifted prescription drug spending for
dual eligibles from state Medicaid programs to the federal Medicare program. To help
fund the MMA, the federal government requires states to make monthly payments to the
federal government to offset the federal government‘s coverage of prescription
medication for individuals dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid. State payments to
the federal government do not include any federal match funds. Five states, including
California, Texas, Kentucky, New Jersey and Missouri, have filed a lawsuit against the
federal government citing the ―clawback‖ will cost states more money than would have
been spent for dual eligible drug coverage through state Medicaid programs. These states
argue the ―clawback‖ rates used to calculate state payments are based upon data collected
prior to implementation of state cost containment mechanisms (Kent 2006). In other
words, state payments to the federal government are calculated at an inflated rate.
State Medicaid expenditures vary by location and by Medicaid beneficiary group.
In 2004, the average spending per Medicaid beneficiary range from $2535 in California
to $7662 in Maine (Kaiser Family Foundation 2007a). Costs for an adult Medicaid
enrollee without a disability are fifteen percent of those for adult enrollees with a
disability (14). Costs for Medicaid enrollees with disability are higher than for any other
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population covered in the program, including dual eligible elderly enrollees (14).
However, adjustment of Medicaid expenditures to account for the poorer health status of
Medicaid enrollees demonstrates Medicaid is more cost-effective compared to private
insurers (13) with substantially lower administrative costs (Kaiser Family Foundation
2005a). Medicaid‘s per capita growth rate is nearly half that of private sector insurance
premiums (ibid).
Medicaid is an instrumental funding source for health care safety net providers.
Medicaid serves as the largest funding source for community health centers and finances
more than forty percent of long-term care expenditures in the United States (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2007a: 3-4). As gaps in the U.S. health care system become more
visible, Medicaid is often used to plug the holes. However, Medicaid is plagued by
incongruity between an escalating and diverse demand and limited resources (Weil 2003:
15). As escalating health care costs challenge state budgets, state policy-makers must
grapple with a growing demand for Medicaid and associated program expenditures.
Challenges confronting state Medicaid programs potentially affect millions of residents in
every state, as political officials attempt to reconcile the many demands for limited public
resources.

State Budgets and the Role of Federal Funding
Federal Medicaid funding directly influences state economies (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2004a; Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004). Predetermined federal
medical assistance percentages (FMAP) are used to compute federal funding
contributions to each state. The FMAP is a mathematical formula calculated by dividing
the average state per capita income by the national average to determine federal funding
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for each state‘s Medicaid program (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 3). FMAP
rates are higher for low income states compared to high income states. FMAP creates
incentives for states to commit resources to health care; consequently, reductions in state
Medicaid spending reduces federal funding to the states (Kaiser Family Foundation
2005a).
At the time of program inception, the federal Medicaid match (FMAP) was
designed to be no more than 83% of state Medicaid expenditures and no less than 50%.
Average FMAP for fiscal year 2008 for the fifty states is 59.63% (Department of Health
and Human Services 2007). While there are no states receiving the maximum FMAP
contribution, there are thirteen states at the fifty percent FMAP level; states that would
actually receive lower rates of federal funding without the statutory minimum (Wachino,
Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 4). Initial program guidelines required states to include
specific groups in the federal assistance program, specifically recipients of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and low-income individuals with blindness
and disability (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006b). However, the federal match is applied
to all state expenditures associated with mandatory and optional Medicaid beneficiaries
and services included in state programs (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 4).

Maximizing Federal Funding
States have developed mechanisms to increase federal funding for health care
without contributing additional state funds, a process referred to as ―Medicaid
maximization,‖ a practice which the federal government has tried to curb over the years
(Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: iii). States have maximized federal revenues
by securing funds from medical providers, thereby inflating state Medicaid commitment
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as a means to increase federal funding, then returning the funds back to the providers.
Federal contributions are based upon state Medicaid spending, not revenues (Coughlin
and Zuckerman 2003: 153). Therefore, intergovernmental transfers (IGTs) or donations
from providers boost state spending, elevating match funds from the federal government.
Researchers Coughlin and Zuckerman (2003) provide an excellent example, paraphrased
as follows: Say a health care provider loans ten million dollars to the state. The state
then pays the provider twelve million dollars in Medicaid payments. If the state‘s FMAP
is fifty percent, the state will receive six million from the federal government. The
provider made a loan amount of ten million dollars, but received twelve million dollars in
state Medicaid payment, a net gain of two million dollars. The state added two million
dollars of its own money to the loan amount to make Medicaid payments to the provider,
but gained six million dollars from the federal government, a net gain of four million
dollars. All federal match funds go toward the general state coffer, to be used as
determined by the state (153). A diagram of the Medicaid maximization process is
presented in figure 1, below.
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Figure 1. Example of Medicaid Maximization

A.

$10 million dollar
loan to state
State

Medical
provider

B.

$12 million dollars paid to
medical provider
Medical provider

State pays medical
provider for health
care services to
Medicaid enrollees

(Net gain of $2 million
dollars)

C.
The federal
government provides
a 50% match to state
for Medicaid
expenditures

Federal government pays
state $6 million dollars
State
(Net gain of $4
million dollars)
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A similar mechanism utilizing a Medicaid regulatory loophole known as the
upper payment limit (UPL), permitted states to reimburse providers at an elevated rate,
then upon receipt of federal match funds, require providers to return a portion of the
reimbursed funds back to the state (Department of Health and Human Services 2001).
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 permitted states to make payments to hospitals
serving greater numbers of low-income patients (DSH or disproportionate share
hospitals) at rates exceeding payment for Medicare patients. As a means to elevate
federal funding, states unilaterally determined distribution of DSH payments, with some
states diverting funds for needs other than health care (Coughlin and Zuckerman 2003:
154). Although legal at the time, these financing mechanisms substantially increased
federal expenditures generating general revenue for states to be used at state discretion.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates 7.4 billion dollars or five percent of
federal Medicaid spending were paid through UPL financing mechanisms in 2002
(Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 24-25) and DSH payments alone, significantly
contributed toward sky-rocketing Medicaid expenditures in the early 1990‘s (Coughlin
and Zuckerman 2003: 154). Research estimates that DSH and UPL payments to the
states increased federal funding by an average of 3% above established FMAP rates
(Coughlin, Bruen, and King 2004: 252). The additional federal payments are applied to
state revenue, not earmarked to health programs; therefore, the quality of state Medicaid
programs could be potentially unchanged in light of the increased federal Medicaid funds
received (Coughlin and Zuckerman 2003: 165).
Funded through general tax revenue, the federal government has a vested interest
in the oversight and integrity of the Medicaid program (Wachino, Schneider, and
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Rousseau 2004: 10). Likewise, federal funding has significant implications for state
budgets. The shared Medicaid funding strategy has a profound effect on both federal
and state budgets, creating a rather contentious federal/state partnership with millions of
Medicaid beneficiaries caught in the midst of the battle.
Clearly, the challenges just described, demonstrate the complexity of the
Medicaid financing mechanism. While the FMAP rates can exacerbate state disparity,
use of Medicaid maximization strategies can complicate the situation even further. State
Medicaid programs garner more federal funding than any other state program (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2004a: 3). Combining both federal contributions and state funds,
states spend more on health care than any other program, exceeding state funding for
education (Boyd 2003: 59). State Medicaid programs have a relatively greater economic
impact on state economies due the federal match funds than any other state program.
Consequently, the use of state revenues to pay Medicaid providers directly renders state
health sectors particularly sensitive to changes in state and federal funding policy, with
immediate impact in the health care industry (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004a: 3).
Federal funds are an inextricable component of the Medicaid program. However,
in the context of an ever changing economic climate, the federal/state Medicaid
partnership may be slow responding to environmental pressures (Wachino, Schneider,
and Rousseau 2004: 21). Federal match contributions are fixed at an annual rate, based
upon state income levels averaged over the prior three years (Prah 2005). The proportion
of state budgets committed to Medicaid facilitates program expansion during economic
growth, yet renders the program vulnerable to cuts as states seek to balance budgets
during challenging economic climates. From this perspective, federal funding is
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conditioned by state Medicaid programs. When states increase Medicaid funding, federal
funding increases; when states reduce Medicaid funding, federal dollars decrease
compounding state economic woes. Medicaid tends to be more sensitive to the
fluctuating economic climate compared to its Medicare counterpart (Wachino, Schneider,
and Rousseau 2004: 21-23).

Economic Consequences of the FMAP
Reducing federal Medicaid funding directly influences state programs. The 2005
FMAP in Missouri, for example, was 61.2% (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004:
8). This computes to $1.57 in federal funding per $1 in state funding. Consequently,
states carefully weigh efforts to restrain Medicaid costs which elicit reductions in federal
funding. The current economic climate may mean federal Medicaid funding is
insufficient to meet demand (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 23). The
implication of reduced federal funding extends beyond the Medicaid beneficiaries,
themselves. State cuts in Medicaid expenditures also means diminished federal matching
funds going toward state budgets (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 23).
The 2005 Medicaid cuts in Missouri were projected to contribute to the loss of
nearly 9500 jobs and a loss of nearly $700 million dollars in economic activity (Ferber
2005: 1). Expansions and contractions in state Medicaid spending directly influence
federal funding to the state (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004a). Cutbacks in state
Medicaid funding may exacerbate the growing numbers of uninsured, further straining
resources of local safety net providers. As numbers of the ―severely‖ poor escalate in the
U.S. (McClatchy Newspapers 2007), states will be forced to reconcile reductions in
federal funding while confronting increasing demand.
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Some have questioned the sensitivity of FMAP to varied rates of state poverty and
state tax burden (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 28). As states continue
efforts to contain Medicaid costs, the FMAP may no longer provide a fiscal buffer for
states during economic downturns. As Medicaid funding mechanisms change over time
in response to a changing economic climate, reductions in entitlement spending are
occurring in tandem with declining private sector health insurance, placing state
Medicaid programs in the center of a tightening financial vise.
While FMAP does redistribute money among states, the effect does not eliminate
disparity in state spending due to variance in state wealth (Holahan 2003: 130-131).
Variations in state spending have a resultant influence on the scope and breadth of
services and beneficiaries covered in each state (Holahan and Pohl 2003: 206). Each
state participating in Medicaid is required to provide services to mandatory populations
such as pregnant women, parents and children in families below certain income levels
and low-income elderly and disabled, and provide fourteen basic health care services.
While most states have included some degree of optional services and populations,
research demonstrates that a majority of states have not significantly expanded Medicaid
programs beyond that required by federal guidelines (Holahan and Pohl 2003: 211).
States that have made the biggest strides in expanding Medicaid programs tend to be
wealthier states, states with higher average per capita income, and those whose
populations are better educated (Holahan and Pohl 2003: 206-207). While the FMAP
contributions deter reductions in state funding of public health programs, the federal
match does not adequately compensate for variance in state fiscal resources, leading to
inconsistency in services and populations served among state Medicaid programs.
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It is important to consider the effect of FMAP as states try to curb Medicaid
expenditures (Boyd 2003: 67). Assume a state has a FMAP rate of seventy-five percent.
This means a state spending twenty-five cents on Medicaid yields a federal government
contribution of seventy-five cents towards that state‘s Medicaid expenditures. Therefore,
to save one dollar in state Medicaid spending, the state actually has to trim the state
Medicaid program back by four dollars, to compensate for the money lost from the
federal match. As noted above, state efforts to curb Medicaid spending tends to
exacerbate state fiscal challenges by reducing federal match funds (Wachino, Schneider,
and Rousseau 2004: 23). To some extent, the current Medicaid funding mechanism can
deter more cost-effective approaches in state Medicaid programs and render state
Medicaid programs vulnerable to changes in federal entitlement spending. As the federal
government faces an escalating federal deficit, resultant policy decisions will continue to
challenge the integrity of state Medicaid programs.
Research reveals that Medicaid does possess a supportive constituency, actively
influencing state Medicaid policy outcomes (Brown and Sparer 2003; Hoadley,
Cunningham, and McHugh 2004). However, that constituency may be less effective as
state economic constraints increase (Hoadley, Cunningham, and McHugh 2004: 154).
Economic forces and conditions demonstrate a significantly greater impact on state
Medicaid spending compared to political factors, such as state index of liberal ideology
and party competition (Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt 1991: 68-71). Ultimately, a
constrained economic climate forces states to enact seemingly less noxious policy
changes to state Medicaid programs, such as scaling back services or reducing provider
reimbursement, to preserve program enrollment. These reductions that may be restored
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without legislative approval as economic conditions improve. These changes, however,
potentially compromise quality and access to care (Hoadley, Cunningham, and McHugh
2004: 153). Literature demonstrates particular sensitivity of state Medicaid program to
economic conditions. Consequently, during a constrained economic climate, Medicaid
must compete for limited financial resources with other public programs on both federal
and state levels.
Federal Medicaid funding is the largest source of revenue to the states. However,
states are increasingly gaining discretion over design and administration of state
Medicaid programs (Kaiser Family Foundation 2005a). Reductions in federal funding
means states must contribute additional resources or reduce Medicaid beneficiaries and
services (ibid). ―As the debate over Medicaid‘s future continues, care should be taken
that any modifications to its financing structure do not jeopardize the many benefits it
brings to low-income Americans, states, and the nation‘s health care system‖ (Wachino,
Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: iii). States more dependent on federal funding and
revenue from the health care industry are disproportionately affected by reductions in
federal funds (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004a: 4). Medicaid policy decisions made at
the federal and state level directly influence the integrity of the nation‘s health are safety
net.

Socio-economic Pressures on State Medicaid Programs
An unprecedented convergence of environmental pressure is fueling substantial
change in state Medicaid policy. Research reveals that all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have implemented strategies to contain growth and limit expenditures of the
Medicaid program (Smith et al. 2004). These changes include cost controls on
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pharmaceuticals, holding or reducing payment rates, implementing or raising beneficiary
co-payments, imposing or expanding eligibility restrictions and/or limiting benefits
(Smith et. al., 2004: 20-31). Missouri Medicaid cuts enacted in January 2005 cut more
than 100,000 people from the program within the first year (Feltman and Hill 2006: 5)
and eliminated services, including rehabilitation, audiology and optical services, among
others (Missouri Department of Health and Human Services 2005). Recent reports
indicate the uninsured rate in Missouri approached sixteen percent in 2006; three times
the national average (Franck 2007: A1); an increase that coincides with the Medicaid cuts
enacted in 2005 (McBride 2007).
Literature demonstrates that reductions in state Medicaid spending contributes to
increased expenditures for uncompensated (Mann and Artiga 2004: 15). In 2003, Oregon
obtained a federal waiver with proposed expansion of the Medicaid program called the
Oregon Health Plan (OHP). New premiums and co-payments were applied to all
enrollees, including previously exempt populations, such as the homeless and those
without any income. Following changes to the OHP, nearly one-half of participants
ended up leaving the program. The primary reason cited by those who left centered on
the inability to afford the premiums and co-pays. Those leaving the program for financial
reasons also indicated the need to postpone or avoid seeking care, cutting back on
medications and demonstrated an increased use of hospital emergency care. While the
Oregon Medicaid program instituted cost-sharing as a means to finance program
expansion, the policy changes forced many eligible individuals to forgo participation
(Wright et al. 2005).
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Analysis of the 2003 changes to the Oregon Medicaid program revealed that
efforts to reduce Medicaid expenditures by reducing services and increasing cost share
actually reduced the number of beneficiaries in the program and contributed to increased
emergency room visits by the uninsured (Mann and Artiga 2004: 15). Appreciating
voters‘ distain for tax increases, states have increasingly relied on programmatic change
to reduce Medicaid expenditures. Some of these programmatic changes occur to the
detriment of enrollee‘s health care needs.
Data indicates cost-sharing may adversely affect access and health care of lowincome individuals (Wright et al. 2005). Short-term financial savings may occur at the
expense of Medicaid beneficiaries, compromising health and contributing to overall
increases in health care expenditures. Increasing financial cost sharing on behalf of
beneficiaries has a direct correlation with utilization and access to care.
The rationale for using ‗cost consciousness‘ to drive down health costs may not
work with people living in poverty, Rowland [Executive Director of the Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured] said. Families living on 16,000
likely would just forego medicine or a doctor‘s visit instead of paying a premium,
she said (Vock 2006).
The complexity associated with individualized state Medicaid programs necessitates
critical examination of potential outcomes associated with policy change, particularly
relevant for individuals with greater health care utilization, those with chronic illness and
disability (Field and Jette 2007: 277).
Literature indicates greater cost-sharing for individuals with low-income does not
improve the ability to discriminate between necessary and unnecessary services; but
yields a reduction in both, potentially deleterious for individuals with chronic illness and
disability. A meta-analysis indicates that fourteen of eighteen studies confirmed higher
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cost-sharing had a ―negative effect on appropriate utilization of health services…‖
(Neuman and Rice 2003: 3-4). The cost-sharing mechanisms exhibit a regressive effect
for individuals with low-income, meaning the co-payments are disproportionately greater
for those with less income. Consequently, the financial effect on Medicaid enrollees,
individuals already impoverished are more severe.
Studies in the U.S. and Canada have demonstrated that increasing cost-share for
low-income individuals contributes to initial reductions in expenditures due to decreases
in service utilization; however, resultant adverse effects on health contribute to the use of
more intensive (and expensive) services in the long run (Ku and Wachino 2005). Copayments of $1 to $3 dollars for prescription medication resulted in inability to purchase
medications and related hospitalizations and emergency room visits (ibid: 6). Due to
increased service utilization, Medicaid beneficiaries with disability and chronic
conditions disproportionately bear this burden (Ku and Broaddus 2005: 4).
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010 will expand
state Medicaid programs. This expansion is expected to reduce the number of uninsured
resulting in reduced costs for uncompensated care. It is expected that nearly 95% of
expansion costs will be funded by the federal government easing the financial burden on
the states (Holahan and Headen 2010). The increased responsibility of state Medicaid
programs to serve a larger proportion of the U.S. population means the services provided
by those programs, the use of cost-sharing and the reimbursement rates to providers gain
added importance. Future federal funding levels will be crucial to sustain the integrity of
state Medicaid programs.
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As public policy, the Medicaid program is subject to cross-pressures of changing
demography, the market economy and the political environment. Increasing beneficiary
contribution, tighter eligibility criteria and reductions in services may be inevitable
outcomes of contracting social welfare programs (Smith et al., 2004). U.S. policy makers
are challenged to better understand how these pressures and associated policy decisions
influence America‘s vulnerable populations.

Demographic Pressures
Although working-aged Americans rely heavily on employer-based health
insurance, accessibility to coverage varies substantially across employment sectors.
While eighty-five percent of professional and managerial occupations have access to
employee health insurance, only forty-six percent of individuals in the service sector and
twenty-four percent of part-time employees have access to employer-sponsored health
insurance (United States Department of Labor 2007: 12). Additionally, access rates and
actual participation rates yield different outcomes. Participation rates for the employment
sectors noted above are sixty-seven percent for professional and management
occupations, twenty-eight percent for service sector occupations and twelve percent for
part-time employees (United States Department of Labor 2007: 12). Although employers
may offer employment-based health insurance, high employee contributions or increasing
deductibles may limit employee participation (Reinhardt 2005). The growth of quality
jobs which offer private health insurance is directly linked to strength of the economy.
More prosperous economic times tends to increase numbers of people gaining private
health insurance, while constrained economic growth contributes to reductions in
employee coverage (Burbank-Schmitt 2006: 1).
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Overall, employment-based health insurance is gradually retrenching (Kaiser
Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust 2005). Recent data
indicates the declining number of employer-sponsored health insurance programs in
combination with relatively stagnant Medicaid enrollment contributed to an overall
increase in the number of uninsured in the U. S. (Holahan and Cook 2006: 1). Data
indicate forty-seven million people in the United States are without health insurance
(DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2007: 18), primarily occurring in family units with
an employed individual (Holahan and Cook 2006). While the uninsured rate for nonHispanic Whites did not significantly change from 2005-2006, the rate for Black and
Hispanic populations did significantly increase, contributing to the overall increase in the
uninsured population (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2007: 19). Consequently, the
rates of uninsured and unemployed individuals are important considerations for state
Medicaid policy making. The growing number of adults aged eighteen to sixty-four
needing a health care safety net is occurring at a time of unprecedented financial
constraint. Environmental challenges pressuring the private welfare sector highlight the
critical role of the public welfare sector.
Private health insurance policies are characterized by policy limits and exclusions,
often pricing private insurance beyond the means of many individuals with disability. A
2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, demonstrated that a mere point two percent of
the disabled adult participants had individually purchased health insurance (Field and
Jette 2007: 228). The National Council on Disability commissioned a study to
investigate barriers to health insurance and services for people with disabilities. ―They
(disabled) have the poorest access to private sector coverage, with its exclusions,
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limitations, and restrictive underwriting practices‖ (Lewin-ICF 1993: x). Exclusion in
the private market increases reliance on the public welfare sector.
Literature demonstrates that individuals without health insurance have poorer
health outcomes. As individuals are cut from the Medicaid program; the potential risk
for adverse health outcomes increases. ―The Institute of Medicine estimates that at least
18,000 Americans die prematurely each year solely because they lack health coverage‖
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2004b). Cancer patients without insurance are diagnosed
later and demonstrate higher mortality rates. The American Cancer Society devoted an
entire year of advertising resources to the issue of the uninsured, a risk factor that may
exceed tobacco as a contributor to cancer causing illness (Sack 2007).
Extensive evidence supports the relationship between chronic illness and
disability and individuals of low-income (Allen and Croke 2000). As indicated earlier,
this relationship is bidirectional; poverty influences disability by limiting access to health
care resources while the costs of disability may contribute to poverty (Lustig and Strauser
2007: 195). Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities incur expenditures twelve percent
higher than elderly beneficiaries and eighty-five percent higher than non-disabled adult
beneficiaries. Although composing less than fifteen percent of the Medicaid population,
beneficiaries with disabilities incur forty percent of total Medicaid spending (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2007a). The prevalence of having three or more chronic conditions is
more than three times greater for individuals with disability compared to non-disabled
adults (Kronick et al. 2007: 12). Consequently, individuals with disability and three or
more chronic conditions dependent on Medicaid for health insurance, account for nearly
seventy percent of the acute care expenditures in the Medicaid program (Kronick et al.
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2007: 23). Beneficiaries with the highest health care utilization are individuals with
disability and multiple chronic conditions.
Literature indicates that Medicare and Medicaid provide health insurance for
nearly fifty percent of U.S. adults age twenty-five to sixty-four years old with disability
(Steinmetz, 2006:8-9). Medicaid serves as the only means to health insurance for more
than forty-percent of the nation‘s non-elderly poor (Kaiser Family Foundation 2007a: 5).
The proportion of Medicaid beneficiaries with disability is escalating, growing by more
than fifty-percent from 1973-1998 (Sulewski, Gilmore, and Foley 2006: 158). Of all
individuals living with a disability, women comprise the largest group of disabled
persons living in poverty (Parish and Ellison-Martin 2007: 109), requiring that Medicaid
policies appreciate the health care needs of this growing constituency. Additionally,
greater levels of functional limitation are associated with a greater reliance on public
health insurance programs (Field and Jette 2007: 228). While chronic conditions are the
leading cause of disability and death in the United States, chronic illness ―…is largely
absent from the national health policy agenda‖ (Inglehart 2002: 7). Clearly, both state
disability and poverty rates contribute to the demand for state Medicaid programs as a
social safety net.

Economic Pressures
States are faced with a dual hardship—reductions in federal support for Medicaid
accompanied by a faltering private sector health insurance base. States are challenged to
develop policy solutions that are politically viable. Political opposition to increasing
taxes constrains policy choices amenable to voter preferences and in the case of
Medicaid, tends to leave the program more susceptible to reductions, than its sibling,
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Medicare. While Social Security retirement and Medicare are considered the ―third rail‖
in American politics, meaning that an elected official‘s support for program cuts may
result in a backlash at the polls, the Medicaid program supports a less influential and
cohesive constituency. Cutting federal support for the Medicaid program negatively
influences state economic status and potentially contributes to increasing the number of
uninsured individuals in our country. A decline in federal funds forces states to confront
a greater share of Medicaid expenditures. Ultimately, with tightly constrained state
budgets, over fifty million Medicaid beneficiaries may be shouldering much of the
burden.
The economic environment inversely influences enrollment in state Medicaid
programs. A growing economy slows state Medicaid spending growth due to a slowed
growth in program enrollment, while a slowing economy increases program enrollment
and associated costs. Medicaid enrollment in 2007 exhibited a .5% decline, partly due to
proof of citizenship requirement for eligible Medicaid beneficiaries implemented with the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. Conditions worsened near the end of 2009 with
remarkable declines in state revenue and escalating numbers of Medicaid enrollees.
Nearly all states had enacted cuts in Medicaid programs (Smith et al. 2009) Clearly, state
Medicaid programs are sensitive to the economic climate. Predications about state
Medicaid programs are subject to economic realities of the present day.
The pressure of tightening market forces on social welfare programs is not
isolated to particular geographic regions of the country, but has become a national
phenomenon. The economic climate directly influences the integrity of the health care
safety net. For example, the troubled housing market, which started declining in 2007,
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generates lower sales tax of homes and challenges states to offset declines in revenue
through reductions in state spending (Prah 2007). In light of the greatest state revenue
declines in history, nearly all states confronted substantial budget shortfalls in 2009
(McNichol, Oliff, and Johnson 2010). While primary, secondary and higher education
combined, accounted for 31.4% percent of 2007 state spending, Medicaid alone
accounted for twenty-two percent (Prah 2007). Volatility in the economy, including
current escalations in home foreclosures, is reducing state income at a time when
increased unemployment rates are increasing demand for Medicaid. During fiscal
constraint, states are confronted with the need to simultaneously support competing
demands. As the two most expensive programs, health care and education challenge state
policy makers to make difficult funding choices.
Political Scientist Charles Barrilleaux and public policy analyst Mark Miller
(1988) examine the influence of market forces on Medicaid policy making. The
researchers reveal that the supply of medical providers plays a significant role in demand
for services and the state commitment to Medicaid spending. A 1% increase in providers
resulted in a greater than 1% increase in demand for services (1099). While increased
supply of providers positively influences demand, greater numbers of providers
contribute to decreased state Medicaid spending. The inverse relationship between
providers and demand with spending is due to the attraction of physicians to wealthier
areas. Although demand increases, the overall proportion of state wealth spent on
Medicaid is less than poorer states. The authors explain that diverse provider groups may
exert less cohesive pressure in the policy process, failing to favorably influence policy
making supporting their interests (1099-1100). More recent research contends that while

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p.113
Medicaid serves a diverse population, the program has unexpectedly garnered a growing
constituency (Brown and Sparer 2003). Although varied in beneficiary demographics,
Medicaid‘s outreach to vulnerable populations, financial support of safety net providers
and influence on state economies may contribute to growing political clout ( 41-42).

Environmental Pressure and State Medicaid Managed Care Programs
Escalating health care expenditures have catapulted health care programs such as
Medicaid to the forefront of state level policy agendas. Analysis of Medicaid managed
care represents a state-driven policy approach striving to effectively utilize resources to
meet demand. The expansion of Medicaid managed care presents an opportunity to
enhance efficient utilization of resources helping state Medicaid programs meet
increasing demand for the health care safety net.
State Medicaid managed care tends to fall into two categories: risk-based plans
and primary care case management plans. In risk based plans, also known as prepayment
or capitation, a managed care organization is paid a negotiated rate per enrollee in
exchange for the provision of health care services. In primary care case management
plans (PCCM), fee-for-service payments are made to a medical provider for care of the
enrollee. In addition, the provider is compensated a fee per member to serve as
coordinator of care for that individual (Lewin and Altman 2000: 32). Traditional fee-forservice financing mechanisms, prevalent in Medicaid, inhibit incentives to seek
alternative intervention strategies. Resources tend to be invested in tertiary care; the
treatment of health conditions post onset. Theoretically, managed care models strive to
keep individuals healthy by incorporating preventive care strategies in an effort to reduce
or deter more intensive and expensive tertiary care intervention. From this vantage point,
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managed care is ideally situated to support and sustain health as a means to achieve more
cost-effective approaches to care.
Medicaid managed care is used to some degree in forty-eight states in the U.S.,
excluding Wyoming and Alaska (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2006: 4).
For example, in 2003 15.5% of all Missouri Medicaid dollars were paid through
capitation (prepayment mechanisms). Arizona was the last state to implement a state
Medicaid program in 1982, yet in FY2003 spent more Medicaid dollars through managed
care payment mechanisms than any other state, nearly eighty-five percent (Lewin Group
2006: 4). Five other states spending more than thirty percent of Medicaid dollars using
prepayment mechanisms include Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon and
Hawaii (4). Medicaid managed care has been found to reduce program costs, particularly
as states develop managed care strategies over time (Lewin Group 2004a).
Traditionally, Medicaid fee-for-service reimbursement rates have been held below
rates for other public and private health plans, gradually contracting the number of
providers rendering care to Medicaid beneficiaries. While some states, like
Massachusetts, implemented more substantial reform, essentially subsidizing universal
health insurance for state residents, financial and political constraints may inhibit
adoption of similar plans by other states. A more incremental approach may be needed.
As the use of managed care in state Medicaid programs continues to grow, the use of
purchasing strategies through prepayment or case management theoretically presents an
opportunity to control Medicaid costs without reducing beneficiaries or sacrificing
necessary services.
If managed care is done right, however, it could offer a much better array of
services than the fee-for-service system, especially for people with disabilities and
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chronic illness. The potential of managed care to provide flexibility of services,
investment in prevention, coordination of care, and a more active role for
consumers could mean much more to people whose daily lives may be profoundly
affected by the nature of the health care they receive (Kronick and Dreyfus 1997:
2).
Variance in health care needs associated with the diverse Medicaid population means that
reimbursement mechanisms must adequately account for the influence of chronic illness
and disability to adequately support equity and quality of care.
Historically, managed care has attracted healthier enrollees due to lower out-ofpocket costs. As a cost-efficiency mechanism, increasing use of managed care for the
varied populations in state Medicaid programs demands greater attention to more
equitable reimbursement strategies (Kronick and Dreyfus 1997: 1; 15). Risk adjustment
premised upon demographics, such as age and gender, without regard to health status will
not adequately support health care strategies that maximize quality of life or costefficiency (Kronick and Dreyfus 1997: 2). From this perspective, health-based risk
adjustment encourages intervention strategies promoting efficient, quality care for plan
members across the spectrum of need, paying higher reimbursement rates for individuals
with more complex needs compared to healthier plan members.
States are challenged by the need to tailor payment rates that span across a
spectrum of diagnoses and ability. While managed care is premised upon price
negotiation for comprehensive care, the public sector has experienced difficulty aligning
payment with the health care needs of beneficiaries. Often, the government has overpaid
for healthier individuals and underpaid for those with more complex health care needs. A
better understanding of the diverse needs of beneficiaries may guide development of
more appropriate reimbursement mechanisms. A more static state prepayment structure
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may inhibit inclusion of individuals with chronic illness and disability whose needs are
more complex and costly (United States General Accounting Office 1996: 6).
Managed care may potentially provide a more comprehensive, cost-effective
strategy of care for individuals with chronic conditions and disability compared to
traditional fee-for-service reimbursement mechanisms (Kronick et al. 2007: 3). Research
demonstrates an additional thirty percent of Medicaid costs associated with Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
beneficiaries may be conducive to capitation (Lewin Group 2006: 10). The SSI
population, with a substantial prevalence of chronic conditions and primary provider
costs, appear particularly appropriate for managed care. Assessing 2003 TANF
expenditures in Missouri demonstrates that slightly over a half a million dollars of current
fee-for-service expenditures could be appropriate for capitation; and, over three-quarter
of a million dollars in SSI expenditures (12-14). States must learn to be prudent
purchasers of health care services, tailoring reimbursement rates across a spectrum of
beneficiary need.
In 2008, the average enrollment in comprehensive Medicaid managed care
programs relative to Medicaid enrollment among all states is slightly under 45% (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2010a). These are state programs that establish prepayment plans
with medical providers to provide comprehensive services to Medicaid enrollees. Table 1
provides the percent of Medicaid enrollment in comprehensive managed care plans by
state in 2008 (ibid) (Appendix A).
Figure 3 illustrates the change in state enrollment in comprehensive Medicaid
managed care programs over time. The maps demonstrate the gradual adoption of

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p.117
comprehensive Medicaid managed care, particularly evident among neighboring states in
the Northeast and middle Atlantic regions of the United States.
Figure 3. The Adoption of Comprehensive Medicaid Managed Care over Time
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Conclusion
Converging environmental pressures are challenging state policy decision-makers
and driving changes to public programs such as Medicaid. The significance of public
policy in the health of impoverished individuals is undeniable. As the only industrialized
nation without some form of universal health insurance, vulnerable populations in the
United States, such as the poor, uninsured and underinsured, are gradually being
squeezed from both public and private markets.
States are employing cost-control mechanisms, including changes in Medicaid
eligibility criteria and services covered, in response to socio-economic pressures. Pursuit
of alternative health care strategies such as managed care, particularly for Medicaid
beneficiaries with chronic conditions and disability whose health care needs drive a
substantial portion of Medicaid expenditures, will be essential as environmental pressures
converge on state Medicaid programs (Kronick et al. 2007: 36). A health care payment
system that does not adjust for variance in health care needs leads to risk segmentation.
State Medicaid payment systems may create perverse incentives for managed care plans
to avoid high-cost enrollees, such as individuals with chronic illness, disproportionately
attracting healthier plan members and exacerbating inequity for individuals with greater
health needs. Similarly, adjusting payment according to risk, allows states to better use
resources without contributing to escalating expenditures, particularly important in an
environment of escalating socio-economic pressure.
Medicaid plays a crucial role in filling gaps associated with the private welfare
market, yet, without some alteration in the existing financing structure of the Medicaid
program, gaps in the public welfare sector will only escalate. Federal Medicaid
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contributions via FMAP are slow to respond to changes in the economic climate and fail
to reconcile variance among the states. Fee-for-service financing strategies inhibit the
use of more comprehensive and preventive health care strategies possible in managed
care approaches. However, managed care financing strategies that do not appreciate the
differential health needs among program enrollees will result in insufficient support for
individuals with chronic conditions and disability. Efforts to better coordinate Medicaid
services that maximize quality of life and improve cost-efficiency will directly influence
future program expansions and contractions. These changes necessitate change in health
care systems and the policies that guide them and a close examination of different
managed care strategies across the states.
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Chapter 5
Variations in Medicaid Managed Care across the States

The failure to address the economic repercussions
of chronic conditions by revising health policies
and health services endangers the economic
prosperity of all nations.
World Health Organization, (2002)

Policy change requires pressures both internal and external to the political system
to break through thresholds of existing obstacles to major policy change (Baumgartner et
al. 2009: 11). While it is essential to understand the conditions that contribute to the
stasis of health policy, it is equally important to understand mechanisms contributing to
policy change. As an institutional structure, federalism permits developmental and
innovative policy making at local levels. State Medicaid programs are increasingly
gaining latitude from the federal government permitting state-level determination for the
structure and implementation of state programs. As states gain greater autonomy in the
implementation of Medicaid, the potential for programmatic variation increases.
Federalism structurally organizes political power between and among
geographically defined units (Rubin and Feeley 2008: 170). In the U.S., the states are not
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simply administrators of federal policy, but independent policy making agents (Dye
1990: 4). From this perspective, federalism implies relevance for the relationships among
neighboring states, as states possess the latitude to determine policy paths. Do states
learn about Medicaid policies from each other? Geographical relationships among states
are therefore important considerations when examining state-level variance. Separating
powers between the federal government and the states implicates the states as
autonomous policy-makers, possessing the ability to self-determine state policy.
Consideration for the role of geographic relationships in state policy-making may
enhance understanding of factors influencing state adoption of Medicaid managed care.

Explaining Variation in State Medicaid Programs
A historical absence of national health care reform spurred innovative initiatives
by state governments to confront a health care system plagued by increasing costs and
escalating numbers of uninsured. Sharing power between the federal and state
government contributes to variability in the resources available and the Medicaid policies
implemented by each state. Research examining the influence of economic, political and
institutional factors on state welfare policy found state wealth significantly predicted state
social welfare spending with wealthier states spending more on social welfare programs
than poor states (Lewin Group 2004a: 22). It appears federal spending, such as federal
contributions provided to state Medicaid programs, tends to exacerbate disparity among
states. The research noted that wealthier states receive higher per capita federal
contributions due to higher welfare spending compared to poor states; however, federal
funds comprise a greater proportion of resources available for social welfare in the poor
states. In other words, while richer states have higher per capita social welfare
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expenditures, poorer states have a greater dependency on federal assistance compared to
wealthier states. ―States with higher per capita incomes have not only a greater ability to
pay for services but, typically, fewer low-income people to serve‖ (Holahan 2003: 130).
In fact, higher state incomes produce greater increases in state spending compared to
spending associated with federal and state funds combined. This means federal funding
contributions to state Medicaid programs (known as FMAP) do not sufficiently reconcile
spending variances among states.
The portion of state spending on Medicaid varies substantially. In 2005,
Wyoming spent 7.7% of its total expenditures on Medicaid while Tennessee spent 35.7%.
On average, states spent 22.9% of total state expenditures on Medicaid (National
Association of State Budget Officers 2006a: 50). The economic climate significantly
influences state Medicaid spending. A constrained economic climate reduces resources
for the Medicaid program and occurs simultaneously with increasing demand. This is the
countercyclical nature of Medicaid spending (Boyd 2003: 67), in the sense that spending
increases during economic downturns.
State Medicaid programs markedly influence state economies. An analysis of the
economic impact of Medicaid in Missouri reveals that each one million dollars spent on
Medicaid generates $3.1 million dollars in business activity and forty-two jobs (Ferber
2004: 6-7). In addition, a decline in state economy increases demand for Medicaid.
Researchers estimate that a one percent increase in unemployment, from 4.5% to 5.5%
percent, would increase overall Medicaid enrollment by 1.5 million people, producing a
subsequent increase in federal and state spending approaching three billion dollars
(Holahan and Garrett 2001: 2-3).

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p.123
The proportion of population covered by state Medicaid programs varies across
the country and is influenced by the private welfare state, the proportion of state residents
with employer-sponsored health insurance. Research exploring factors contributing to
state variation of employer-sponsored health insurance reveal rates of minority
population, unionization, size of firms and type of labor force (full-time compared to
part-time) substantially explain variation in state rates of employer-sponsored health
insurance (Shen and Zuckerman 2003). As expected, states with lower rates of
employer-sponsored health insurance tend to have higher rates of uninsured.
Characteristics of a state‘s workforce affect the types of firms attracted to the state,
influencing rates of employer-sponsored insurance (248). States with a higher-skilled
workforce tend to attract firms providing health insurance benefits. States with a less
skilled work force are associated with fewer employment-based insurance opportunities
coupled with limited resources available to support public programs, such as Medicaid
(Shen and Zuckerman 2003: 250). Consequently, states are challenged to promote
economic growth while simultaneously developing public programs to confront the
growing health insurance gaps of its constituents. States pursue developmental policy to
enhance economic growth, yet engage in redistributive policy to support constituent
needs, even at a negative economic cost (Peterson 1981).
Public policy, such as Medicaid, provides the mechanism by which states attempt
to ameliorate health insurance failures of the private welfare sector (Holahan 2003: 122).
For the general population, rates of employer-sponsored insurance are better predictors of
state uninsurance rates than rates of population covered by public health programs.
However, for low-income populations, rates of employer-sponsored health insurance and
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rates of public health insurance coverage are important for predicting uninsurance rates
(Holahan 2003: 126-128). Hence, state Medicaid programs must be cognizant of both the
private and public insurance base and the potential influence on demand for state
Medicaid programs.
While states with greater numbers of Medicaid enrollees may be an indicator of
greater demand for the health care safety net, analyzing Medicaid enrollment rates must
be approached with caution. Medicaid provides financial support for health care
services; it does not guarantee access to care. In fact, low Medicaid reimbursement rates
may constrain access to care. In 2003, Medicaid reimbursement was sixty-nine percent
of the Medicare reimbursement rate and even less compared to private insurance
(Cunningham and May 2006). Research indicates the number of physicians not
accepting new Medicaid patients increased from 19.4% in 1996-1997 to 21.0% in 20042005. This means greater numbers of program enrollees receive care from fewer
providers (ibid).
The Center for Studying Health System Change reveals that over twenty percent
of physicians surveyed, reported not accepting new Medicaid patients in 2004-2005, a
rate five to six times higher compared to individuals with private insurance and Medicare,
respectively (Cunningham and May 2006). Existing Medicaid reimbursement rates have
been held below rates for other public and private health plans, gradually contracting the
number of providers rendering care to Medicaid beneficiaries. As states modify
Medicaid policy, altering services provided and eligibility criteria, appreciation for policy
outcomes that may actually exacerbate the number of uninsured and underinsured
individuals in need of a health care safety net must be considered.
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Managed care has experienced varied degrees of success in Medicare and
Medicaid; however, state purchasing power may be used to enhance participation. For
example, Minnesota requires all Minnesota health plans to participate in Medicaid
managed care to obtain HMO licensure (Holahan, Rangarajan, and Schirmer 1999: 9). In
addition, Minnesota tailors negotiated managed care rates to secure access for high risk
beneficiaries, countering adverse selection and holding companies accountable for
efficiency and quality of care (Holahan, Rangarajan, and Schirmer 1999: ii). Assessment
of HealthChoices, Pennsylvania‘s Medicaid managed care program reveals substantial
cost savings, low administrative fees and the provision of services exceeding those
rendered under a fee-for-service approach. The successful implementation of the
HealthChoices program has contributed to sustaining integrity of service and reach to
beneficiaries while other states have implemented Medicaid reductions (Lewin Group
2005: ii).
The Pennsylvania HealthChoices program demonstrates improved case
management and disease management approaches and enhanced sensitivity of special
needs compared to more traditional fee-for-service strategies. Research comparing the
comprehensive HealthChoices managed care program with fee-for-service and primary
care case management services to Medicaid beneficiaries in Pennsylvania revealed the
comprehensive managed care program excelled in cost-effectiveness and quality of care,
including the ability to better address the health of individuals with special needs (Lewin
Group 2005). Health care expenditures in the HealthChoices program demonstrate an
average annual increase that is 3% lower than the fee-for-service Medicaid beneficiaries.
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Low provider payment has plagued Medicaid since inception. Health care
providers may elect to participate in state Medicaid programs, thereby influencing access
to care. Lower fees, particularly with regard to commercial insurers and Medicare,
contribute to reduced access due to limited providers. Provider payments have actually
increased under the Pennsylvania HealthChoices program compared to the traditional feefor-service reimbursement mechanism (Lewin Group 2005). In addition, Pennsylvania
established access standards for managed care providers. For example, urban
HealthChoices enrollees must have at least two primary care providers accessible within
thirty-minutes; or, one hour for rural enrollees (ibid). A study of pediatric mental health
services revealed that Pennsylvania counties with a HealthChoices program demonstrated
increased rates of outpatient services compared to fee-for-service. Overall, outpatient
mental health services are provided at higher rates for children in urban areas compared
to rural areas; however, service provision remains higher for HealthChoices enrollees
compared to fee-for-service clients even in rural areas (Robertson and Husenits 2007) .
Fee-for-service is a mechanism for the reimbursement of health care services. As
such, strategies to monitor the quality of those services, to hold providers accountable for
health outcomes, never sufficiently developed. As a managed care system,
HealthChoices is obligated by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the
State of Pennsylvania to track health outcomes, establish standards of care, and
implement independent and consumer driven quality assessment mechanisms (Lewin
Group 2005). Although primary care case management is considered a form of managed
care, quality standards are remarkably less developed compared to comprehensive
managed care programs (ibid). Mechanisms such as the Consumer Assessment of Health
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Care Providers and Systems (CAHPS) a public-private partnership with the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ).

Managed care programs, such as HealthChoices, conduct annual consumer

surveys, comparing outcomes among participating managed care programs. The 2009
report provides outcomes associated with service provision and consumer satisfaction for
each region of the state participating in the HealthChoices program (Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare 2009).
A comparison of Wisconsin Medicaid beneficiaries to fee-for-service
beneficiaries indicated improved performance on quality measures for the managed care
group (Lewin Group 2004b: 12). States have demonstrated innovative approaches to
support the varied needs of program beneficiaries. Research of Medicaid managed care
in four states exhibited varied outcomes influenced by the type of individuals served by
Medicaid, geographic disparity contrasting rural versus urban areas and the types of
managed care programs included in state Medicaid programs (Coughlin and Long 2004).
The researchers discovered that implementation of managed care for Medicaid
beneficiaries enrolled through TANF, yielded little improvement in access and utilization
patterns. For beneficiaries with disability, managed care demonstrated improved access
for rural enrollees, but not for urban enrollees (82-83). Continued research is needed to
assess the expansion of Medicaid managed care as a mechanism to sustain program
integrity in an environment of growing state fiscal constraint.

Policy Diffusion among States
Political ideology and institutions implicates the importance of geography in the
policy making process. Geographic patterns of ―red states‖ and ―blue states‖ are a
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prominent media tool demonstrating ideological relationships among the states. As noted
earlier, federalism holds particular relevance for geography, as states develop policies
independently of the federal government. The geographic influence on policy making
has been demonstrated in economic terms, such as the influence manufacturing plant
closings or closing of military bases. However, the influence of geography factors
influencing Medicaid policy making is underdeveloped. As states gain greater authority
to tailor the Medicaid program, a better understanding of spatial relationships among
states may shed light on influential factors contributing to state Medicaid policy making.
The adoption of managed care by state Medicaid programs varies substantially.
Health care costs are typically identified as the culprit driving state programs to adopt
managed care. Yet, while health care costs consistently increase across the United States,
substantial variance in the use of managed care in state Medicaid programs exists.
Escalating health care expenditures alone, cannot explain the variance in the adoption of
managed care in state Medicaid programs. Policy diffusion literature is aimed at
understanding the conditions supporting the adoption of new policy (Walker 1969: 881).
Policy diffusion is not simply emulation of existing policy or policy adoption driven by
competition among states. It is a learning process, a critique of existing policy that
informs policy making in a new context (Mooney 2001: 120).
Research demonstrates a significant relationship between state wealth and state
spending on social welfare programs (Lewin Group 2004a). Similarly, seminal work in
policy diffusion contends the adoption of new policy by states is influenced by the
availability of slack resources (Walker 1969). Interestingly, more recent investigation
finds little evidence that state wealth, political ideology or the policies of contiguous
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states significantly predict policy adoption by states (Karch 2007: 44). Outcomes of this
research reveal national policy was a statistically powerful predictor of innovative policy
adoption by the states (44). This research suggests that vertical diffusion (top down or
bottom up) may be more influential in state policy making compared to horizontal
diffusion (the adoption of state policy influenced by existing policies in other states)
(Karch 2007: 41). A better understanding of potential factors influencing policy making
is needed.
There are two conceptual mechanisms by which horizontal diffusion occurs.
First, policies spread laterally (horizontally) among agents who are in competition with
one another. For example, one state may modify local tax code relative to a neighboring
state in an effort to attract business and industry. Economist Charles Tiebout (1956),
frames government policy making as competitive in nature with constituents behaving as
rational actors, actively pursuing residency based upon preferences of available public
goods (418). Scholars have argued that state welfare policies are influenced by the
policies of other states, such that states will resist setting welfare benefits too high,
avoiding an influx of impoverished individuals to the state (Peterson and Rom 1989:
725). An alternative perspective contends policies may spread among agents as a result
of policy learning. Federalism provides states authority to develop local policy, a means
by which states may learn from the experiences of one another. States may pursue
policies that have proven successful in other states or purposefully avoid policies that
appeared as failures. As the federal government has increasingly relinquished control of
the Medicaid program to the states, the role of spatial relationships gains added
importance.
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Research analyzing the geospatial characteristics of Title IV of the 1935 Social
Security Act, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, demonstrated that neighboring
states influence state welfare policy making more than state poverty rates, Democratic
control of state institutions, per capita income, or ethnic composition of welfare enrollees
(Rom, Peterson, and Scheve 1998: 36). From this vantage point, states with more
generous welfare benefits may become ―welfare magnets‖ attracting impoverished
individuals in pursuit of better benefits (Peterson and Rom 1989: 725). States then
behave as rational actors, establishing welfare policy in response to its neighbors,
deterring escalation in demand (Rom, Peterson, and Scheve 1998: 36). Thus a ―race to
the bottom‖ would ensue. States would lower welfare benefits to avoid the economic
strain of attracting constituents who might escalate welfare demand.
More recent literature challenges perspectives of welfare migration. Political
scientist Thomas Dye notes that public welfare recipients lack resources necessary to
comply with mobility assumptions supported by Tiebout. In fact, the low-income are the
least mobile constituency members (Dye 1990: 19). Dye contends state welfare policy is
more a function of aggregate wealth within a state than pursuit of individual public good
preferences (1990: 18). Geospatial models used to assess welfare policy among states
have been further developed to analyze low-income migration patterns due to better
economic opportunity versus better welfare benefits (Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2003:
329). Outcomes from a 2003 study suggest that economic opportunities are a much
greater draw for low-income individuals than state welfare benefits (2003: 345).
Consequently, state efforts to spur economic growth and development appear to elicit
state competition more than social welfare policy.
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Research demonstrates like attributes of neighboring states, including similarities
in economic, geographic and demographic conditions, relative to distant states influences
policy diffusion (Mooney and Lee 1995: 605). Findings indicate that early abortion
reform, prior to Roe v. Wade, demonstrate significant regional diffusion patterns.
Research of an early twentieth century welfare program, Mothers‘ Aid, was initially
governed at the state level, but later served as the model for development of the federal
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program (Allard 2004). Outcomes
revealed statistically significant diffusion among states, with states implementing more
generous programs in response to programs of neighboring states. This research
highlights the importance of temporality in diffusion theory. While competition may be
influential for well-established programs, policy learning may be particularly influential
during early program adoption.
New social welfare programs are a response to surrounding political, economic
and social conditions, which mitigate the impact of competitive pressures. When
adopting new programs, therefore, states will turn to their neighbors for
innovations, program models perceived to be successful, and legitimacy for a new
social welfare initiative (Allard 2004: 522).
Research indicates policy learning and competition among states does occur and does so
in regional, geographic patterns.
Political scientists William Berry and Brady Baybeck (2005) investigate
competing hypotheses of horizontal diffusion, examining interstate competition versus
policy learning as determinants of state welfare benefits. Outcomes reveal state welfare
benefit decisions are predicated upon policy learning, by which contiguous states tend to
learn and establish welfare benefit levels relative to those established in neighboring
states (2005: 518). The policy learning/competition dynamic is premised upon the
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assumption that state policy making is influenced by geographic proximity. Two
spatially based models, the neighbor model and the fixed region-models, contend that
geographic proximity influences policy making (Berry and Berry 1999: 175).
Growing evidence refutes state competition as a significant determinant of state
welfare policy making (Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2003; Allard and Danziger 2000;
Hanson and Hartman 1994). Social learning theory contends that learning or emulation
occurs in a social context due to the observation of others (Jencks and Mayer 1990;
Bandura 1977)7. Political scientist Jack Walker‘s seminal work on policy diffusion
(1969) contends that social learning provides an expedient, rational means of policy
making. He further posits that patterns of diffusion are regional in nature. Initial
adopters are followed by adoption by neighbors resembling ―spreading ink-blots on a
map‖ (Walker 1973: 1187).
Interestingly, Karch (2007) finds limited evidence that state wealth, political
ideology and policies of contiguous states are significant predictors of policy adoption by
states (44). However, national policy did prove to be a statistically powerful predictor of
innovative policy adoption by the states (44). The research conducted by Karch (2007)
suggests that vertical diffusion (top down or bottom up) may be more influential in state
policy making than horizontal diffusion (the adoption of state policy influenced by
existing policies in other states). However, this research may not account for the
influence of temporality on outcomes. The twenty-eight states adopting medical savings
account programs did so between 1993 and 1997, a period of time before the federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPAA) legislation took
effect. In this regard, substantial state diffusion occurred prior to the federal mandate,
7

Albert Bandura is often credited for the genesis of social learning theory
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challenging vertical diffusion as a causal influence in the spread of state medical savings
accounts.

Policy Diffusion and Medicaid
Due to the variation in the adoption of Medicaid managed care, I propose state
programs are influenced by horizontal diffusion, specifically policy learning. The United
States Medicaid program encompasses both vertical and horizontal policy diffusion. The
Medicaid program possesses a dynamic statutory history, with the federal government
implementing budgetary and policy change at the national level. However, as a
federal/state partnership, the Medicaid program also provides states latitude to develop
innovative policy solutions and tailor state Medicaid programs which may then
disseminate to other states.
Political scientist Virginia Gray finds that diffusion patterns vary by policy area
and state fiscal status may distinguish innovative states from laggards (1973: 1182).
Analyzing survey data from state administrators reveals that influential forces in state
policy making varies by policy area (Light 1978: 147). Data indicate the state level
social service sector is influenced more by the national government than by other states.
Policy diffusion from the national government to the states is also influenced by state
dependence on federal fiscal support (Light 1978: 152). The more dependent a state on
federal funding, the more influential national policy appears to be at the state level.
Volden, Ting and Carpenter (2006) have developed models to help distinguish
policy diffusion through learning compared to simultaneous policy adoption. These
models use temporality and the adoption of policies beyond the centrist range to capture
policy learning across states compared to intrastate policy learning and adoption. This
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type of research possesses significant implications for federalism. Detection of policy
learning among states is consistent with principles of federalism in which states possess
autonomy to develop and adopt innovative policy solutions. Research efforts that focus
on intrastate policy mechanisms may fail to appreciate exogenous factors contributing to
state policy making efforts. Conversely, a lack of horizontal diffusion may implicate the
central government as a potential policy arena of choice for some issue areas. In other
words, constrained ability to draw upon the policy experiences of other states yields
greater dependence on the national government as a policy change agent (Volden, Ting,
and Carpenter 2006: 2).
While competition models inform our understanding of variance among
geographic areas (people move to areas with desirable policies), alternative perspectives
suggest migration contributes to ―convergence‖ among fiscal policies of geographic areas
(migration contributes toward increasing constituent homogeneity with fiscal policies
becoming more alike) (Annala 2003; Scully 1991). In this regard, convergence
contradicts Tiebout‘s competition theory which is premised upon geographic variation.
From Tiebout‘s perspective, people move to areas implementing preferred public
policies. Therefore, heterogeneity is reinforced by migration patterns. Convergence
proposes the opposite. Migration patterns facilitate the adoption of similar policies by
geographic units, contributing to the convergence of policy and an increasing
homogeneity among geographic units. The research did not find statistically significant
convergence of health and hospital expenditures; however, state welfare policies
converged at rates faster than all other fiscal variables (Annala 2003: 159).

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p.135
Further research assessing the convergence of state fiscal policy found that state
revenue growth, operationalized using growth in tax rates, and state economic growth,
assessed via gross state product, appears to be influenced more by neighboring states than
expenditure growth (Coughlin, Garrett, and Hernández-Murillo 2006). This relationship
exists regardless of similarities in demographic characteristics. Conversely, expenditure
growth was found to be associated with states sharing similar economic and demographic
characteristics. States continually have to balance the use of resources to support
allocational, developmental and redistributive policies. The ability to support the health
care needs of Medicaid enrollees in a more efficient manner facilitates use of state
resources for growth-oriented efforts. This is particularly relevant for state adoption of
Medicaid managed care programs.
State Medicaid programs are only partially funded by the federal government
through the FMAP. Substantial portions of states‘ budgets are used to support Medicaid
programmatic costs. While state spending appears to be influenced more by ―like‖ states
than by contiguous states; state growth appears to be influenced more by neighboring
states than by ―like‖ states. Declining revenues experienced in many states in recent
years has directly contributed to reductions in state Medicaid programs. While federal
stimulus funding prohibited states from tightening Medicaid eligibility criteria in 2009, a
key mechanism states use to reduce enrollment and program costs, states have cut in
other areas, such as lowering reimbursement rates or reducing services (Grovum 2010).
State revenues play an important role in state Medicaid programs. Theoretically,
Medicaid managed care provides a more cost-efficient mechanism to provide
comprehensive health care services to program enrollees. Using Medicaid managed care
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as a means to support program enrollment and preserve services for enrollees may have
direct consequences for state revenue growth, particularly during depressed economic
climates. Economic competition among neighboring states to drive revenue growth
directly influences resources available for state Medicaid programs.
Previous research found state wealth to be a significant factor in social welfare
spending (Lewin Group 2004a; Holahan and Pohl 2003). While wealthy states may
spend in a manner similar to other wealthy states, that wealth is influenced by economic
competition among neighboring states. The demand or need for social welfare programs
is not empirically associated with a greater use of redistributive programs (Sharp and
Maynard-Moody 1991: 947). Available resources for redistributive policies are directly
influenced by state economic growth. In this regard, states with lower economic growth
may possess fewer resources to support redistributive programs.
While the federal contribution helps to support state Medicaid programs, the
funding percentages (FMAP) is based upon state personal income and may be insufficient
to permit a state to adopt innovative programs or to reconcile disparity in state economic
growth. This federal-state Medicaid formula is especially critical when considering the
relationship between disability and poverty. A state with higher rates of poverty will
likely exhibit higher rates of disability and a greater demand for Medicaid. Combined
with lower economic growth, neighboring states exhibiting these characteristics will be
more dependent on federal contributions for state Medicaid programs than states
exhibiting greater economic growth. Appreciating the variation in economic growth
among states, lower growth states may possess fewer economic resources to implement
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alternative strategies, such as Medicaid managed care, which serves as a mechanism to
expand state programs. This relationship is illustrated in figure 4.
Figure 4. Spatial Relationships and State Policy
Allocational policies
(Budget neutral)
State revenues
(Spatially
dependent)

State Expenditures
(Aspatial: Influenced
by state wealth &
demographics)

Developmental policies
(Increases economic resources)

Redistributive policies
(Depletes economic resources)

FMAP
(Based on average per capita
income)

While state expenditures are influenced by income and demographic characteristics, state
revenues and economic growth are influenced by the economic growth of neighboring
states. States do compete with each other economically and research demonstrates that
revenue-producing policies, such as tax policies, are influenced by neighboring states
(Hernández-Murillo 2003). While states may not engage in a ―race to the bottom‖ in
regard to social welfare policy, economic growth between neighboring states may
ultimately influence state resources available for social welfare policies.
The Medicaid program represents an important case for analysis. As the federal
government shifts greater authority for the Medicaid program to the states, the
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importance of tailoring state Medicaid programs to meet the varied needs of
beneficiaries, particularly individuals with chronic illness and disability holds greater
significance. Assessing the presence or absence of interstate policy diffusion may
enhance our understanding of policy determinants influencing state Medicaid programs.
The presence of horizontal diffusion means the devolution of programmatic authority for
Medicaid from the federal government to the states will permit states to draw upon the
experiences of others to creatively develop policy solutions to state Medicaid issues. The
absence of horizontal policy diffusion means the shift of authority for Medicaid from the
federal government to the states may actually inhibit state response to the converging
environmental pressures confronting state Medicaid programs, particularly important for
states more dependent on federal welfare funding.
Policy diffusion serves as a mechanism by which policies reach state policy
agendas. Research finds that events at the national level significantly influence state
policy making, supporting the influence of vertical policy diffusion (Karch 2007). The
national spotlight on a unique state policy influences policies of other states (100-101).
As federal authority over the Medicaid program recedes, states are positioned to adapt to
these national changes in unique ways. The manner in which states respond is not
dictated by the federal government, but left open-ended, to the discretion of the states. It
is not national attention that is fueling change at the state level, but a retrenchment by the
federal government that is forcing states to pursue alternative state Medicaid policies.
Therefore, factors influencing the adoption of Medicaid managed care may be driven less
by vertical diffusion mechanisms, necessitating attention to the role of horizontal

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p.139
diffusion as an influential factor in the adoption of managed care by state Medicaid
programs.
The utility of spatial analytical methods as a tool to inform policy analysis is still
developing. Consequently, limited research has been conducted to evaluate the role of
spatial relationships in state Medicaid policy making. Spatial analysis is one mechanism
that may be used to detect differential outcomes of policy decisions. Analysis of
Medicaid decisions in Ohio indicate state-level policy changes will exert varied impact
among counties within the state. Outcomes reveal non-random clustering of beneficiaries
according to demographic characteristics. For example, policy decisions to reduce
Medicaid payment rates to long-term care facilities will differentially impact counties
with higher percentages of elderly beneficiaries (Greenbaum and Desai 2005: 15).
Spatial analysis and the use of spatial weighting provides an analytical approach to
examine the consequences of policy decisions that may be used to inform the policy
making process (Desai, Greenbaum, and Kim 2009).

Conclusion
Over time, state Medicaid programs vacillate between expansion and
retrenchment in concert with changes in economic climate. Additionally, policy
diffusion, both vertical diffusion and horizontal diffusion, provide opportunities for
change in state policy. The adoption of managed care in state Medicaid program
represents a significant paradigm shift from traditional, fee-for-service provision of
health care services and reimbursement mechanisms.
Innovative states, such as Pennsylvania and Florida, specifically targeted
Medicaid managed care programs for individuals with disability and chronic disease.
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States understand the importance of developing new approaches to care for beneficiaries
whose chronic conditions consume 70-80% of state Medicaid budgets. Other states, such
as South Carolina, are following suit, developing approaches to the provision of Medicaid
services that better support the needs of populations with special needs (Hurley and
Somers 2003: 85-86)
A number of exogenous forces may contribute to state policy making, including
policy-decisions made by other states. As a federal/state partnership, federalism is an
inherent component of Medicaid, linking geography to policy making as states tailor
policy to unique circumstances (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003). Assessing the presence
or absence of interstate policy diffusion may expand consideration for policy
determinants beyond socio-economic and political system characteristics. Spatial
analysis provides a mechanism to better understand state policy choices and the
differential effects of those decisions.
As policy change agents, states exert remarkable influence on the health of low
income constituents, particularly those individuals with chronic conditions and disability.
The adoption of alternative approaches to care, such as comprehensive managed care,
may be implemented in a manner that supports health outcomes as well as costefficiency. States must behave as ―prudent buyers‖ and serve as advocates on behalf of
Medicaid beneficiaries to assure standards for access, cost-efficiency and health
outcomes are salient characteristics of Medicaid managed care programs. While states
demonstrate remarkable variation in the adoption of Medicaid managed care, clearly
states, such as Pennsylvania, recognize the importance of balancing quality of care and
cost-efficiency.
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Chapter 6
Research Design and Results

What we have in the United States is not so much a healthcare system as a disease-care system
Senator Ted Kennedy, 1994 (Telegraph.co.uk 2009)

This research is motivated by the importance of understanding why some states
use comprehensive Medicaid managed care for enrollees with chronic illness and
disability more than others. Medicaid is one of the most costly programs for all state
budgets. As a redistributive program, Medicaid uses valuable financial resources to
support constituent health care needs, diverting resources from economically-driven
growth efforts. As a proven cost-reducing mechanism to provide health care services, it
would be expected that all states would use managed care, particularly for high-cost
program enrollees, such as those with chronic conditions and disability. Interestingly,
state variation in the use of Medicaid managed care for individuals with chronic illness
and disability exists, yet the reasons underlying this disparity are poorly understood.
What contributes to the remarkable variation in the use of Medicaid managed care
among the states? Sustaining and improving health through the efficient provision of
care, particularly for enrollees with chronic illness and disability who incur higher health
care costs, means greater cost savings for state budgets. The use of panel regression
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analyses used in this study is intended to more fully explain the adoption of
comprehensive Medicaid managed care as a result of redistributive and developmental
policy determinants; and, demographic factors influencing program demand. A better
understanding of factors influencing variance in the use of Medicaid managed care at the
state level is underdeveloped, important in the lives of program enrollees, and particularly
relevant in regard to fluctuating economic climates.
Financial and economic characteristics, including state Medicaid expenditures,
provide an indicator of fiscal resources used to support constituency health care needs.
Peterson claims state wealth is a key factor in redistributive policy making, with
wealthier states expending greater resources on social welfare programs (Peterson 1981).
A second redistributive factor in state Medicaid programs is the federal contribution to
state Medicaid programs, known as the federal medical assistance percentage or FMAP.
FMAP is a substantial source of income for state Medicaid programs. The FMAP is
calculated upon state per capita income relative to the national average. Federal
contributions are lower to states with higher per capita income and higher to states with
lower per capita income (Wachino, Schneider, and Rousseau 2004: 3). However, total
federal contributions are influenced by state Medicaid spending (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2004a). States with lower FMAP contributions, yet higher Medicaid
expenditures, receive more federal dollars than states with higher FMAP percentages and
smaller Medicaid budgets. In other words, states that spend more on state Medicaid
programs receive more federal dollars.
Political system characteristics provide another indicator that may be used to
assess the influence of redistributive policy making, as evidenced by ideological
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tendencies toward greater or lesser support for social welfare programs (Hwang and Gray
1991; Plotnick and Winters 1985). Ideology was found to significantly influence social
welfare policy, more than education and transportation policy. In particular, more liberal
political ideology, measured as the political part of the governor and party control of the
state legislature, was associated with increased support for social welfare policy
compared to more conservative political perspectives (Hwang and Gray 1991).
While the Medicaid program is a key component of the health care safety net,
Medicaid also possesses substantial economic considerations for state economies.
Peterson frames developmental policies as those supporting economic growth, influenced
by supply and demand and creating policies which enhance competitiveness of a
geographic area (1981). State growth in personal income is a crucial marker of state
economic activity and will be used in this study to capture developmental characteristics
of state growth. State estimates of personal incomes serve as an important indicator to
assess state economic status and often used to inform budgetary planning (Bureau of
Economic Analysis 2009: I-3). This study uses the change in state personal income
(1999-2000, 2002-2003 and 2005-2006) to capture economic characteristics over time.
State economic growth directly influences fiscal resources to expend on redistributive
programs.
A panel regression analysis, examining data from the fifty states in years 2000,
2003 and 2006 will examine why some states use comprehensive Medicaid managed care
for high cost enrollees with chronic conditions and disability, and others do not. The
ability to discern influential redistributive or developmental policy determinants may
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inform the use of Medicaid managed care for populations with special needs. This study
will explore the following hypotheses:
H1: States with greater relative wealth, those with lower FMAP, will have a
higher percentage of comprehensive state Medicaid managed care programs for
individuals with disability.
H2: More politically liberal states will have a higher percentage of comprehensive
state Medicaid managed care programs for individuals with disability as a means
to support and expand state redistributive efforts via Medicaid policy.
H3: States with higher growth rates in personal income will have a higher
percentage of comprehensive state Medicaid managed care programs for
individuals with disability
The analysis of redistributive and developmental policy determinants provides a
mechanism to explore the role of socio-economic and political system factors in state
Medicaid policy making. As states increasingly gain autonomy over state Medicaid
programs, fiscal challenges confronting state budgets possess greater implications for
state welfare programs. While state Medicaid programs are a crucial mechanism
supporting the health of vulnerable populations, program integrity is tethered to
vacillating political and economic climates.
In addition to factors associated with redistributive and developmental policy, I
propose policy diffusion is an important consideration in the examination of policy
determinants. While literature demonstrates that states learn from the experience of
neighbors when developing social welfare policy, states are in competition with one
another from an economic perspective. Hence, a ―race to the bottom‖ may not explain
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diffusion of state welfare policy; however, efforts to enhance economic growth resulting
in competition among neighboring states may implicate approaches to state welfare
policy making. Research demonstrates that economic growth is a more appealing draw
for low-income individuals compared to state welfare programs (Berry, Fording, and
Hanson 2003). In this regard, economic opportunity provides a mechanism to reduce
demand for public welfare programs by growing the private welfare sector through
economic development.
Literature reveals economic competition among contiguous states influence
revenue growth (Coughlin, Garrett, and Hernández-Murillo 2006), a key determinant of
state resources available for redistributive policy making. Appreciating that contiguous
states compete economically, it is plausible that neighboring states would implement
more economically efficient approaches to social programs, as a means to maximize
economic growth. The examination of spatial autocorrelation provides a systematic
approach to detect non-random patterns, identifying statistically significant associations
in a variable of interest relative to location. I therefore propose the following hypothesis:
H 4: States with Medicaid managed care programs for enrollees with disability
will demonstrate spatial associations.
States with lower rates of Medicaid managed care, demonstrating a lack of expansion,
may be influenced by neighboring states, as well. Examining spatial patterns of states
with limited use Medicaid managed care may assist in examining a ―non-event.‖ In other
words, spatial patterns demonstrate neighboring states with like enrollment levels
whether they are higher enrollment levels or lower enrollment levels.
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Since the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the federal government has been
delegating greater authority to the states to implement and expand Medicaid managed
care initiatives without mandating federal waivers (Public Law 105-33 1997). Greater
autonomy combined with the prospects of enhanced cost-efficiency in the provision of
Medicaid services would logically appear enticing to all states. However, one factor that
may inhibit the diffusion process is that managed care requires a price-competitive
market. Price competition assumes participation by an adequate number of providers to
support negotiated pricing among competitors (Enthoven 1993: 29). As the federal
government continues to relinquish control for Medicaid to the states, more rural states
may be poorly positioned to adopt more efficient health care mechanisms, such as
managed care. Fewer providers may inhibit price competition upon which managed care
is premised.

Data: Selection and Measurement
Panel time-series regression analyses will be used to examine socio-economic,
policy system and policy diffusion determinants influencing the use of managed care in
state Medicaid programs. Variables representing policy determinants include the federal
medical assistance percentage (FMAP) and Medicaid expenditures as a percent of total
expenditures by state as redistributive factors; and, growth in personal income as an
indicator of state wealth, a latent variable signifying economic growth resulting from
developmental policy-making. Political system characteristics will be measured using
state ideology scores. Higher ideology scores indicate more liberal states. More liberal
state ideology scores would be associated with a propensity toward redistributive policies
(Plotnick & Winters, 1978; Hwang & Gray, 1991), such as those associated with
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Medicaid. In addition, two demographic variables, percent uninsured and percent of
people with disability were included in the structural model to capture characteristics of
the population served by the Medicaid program. Both the uninsured rate and the percent
of people with disability indicate demand for state Medicaid programs.
This panel study of the fifty states will use data for years 2000, 2003 and 2006,
with one exception. The observation for state Medicaid spending as a percent of total
state spending is missing for Wyoming in 2000; data for 2002 were substituted. The
dependent variable is the percentage of a state's Medicaid managed care programs
providing comprehensive benefits for adults with disabilities. The data dictionary for the
variables in the model may be found in Appendix B. The statistical model to examine the
dependent variable is:
Dependent variable

= B1 + B2FMAPit(Redistributive) +
B3Medicaid Expenditures it(Redistributive) +
B4Ideologyit(Redistributive) +
B5Income Growthit(Developmental) +
B6Percent uninsuredit(Demographic) +
B7State disability it(Demographic) + error

In this model i represents the state, t represents the year (Gujarati 2003: 647-648).

Validity and Reliability of the Study Design
This study explores relationships among socio-economic, political and policy
diffusion determinates to better understand state adoption of Medicaid managed care.
Bound by balanced budget requirements, state policies must continually weigh
developmental and redistributive policy choices. Studies examining social welfare policy
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have similarly included analysis of both socio-economic and policy system variables
(Plotnick and Winters 1985; Barrilleaux and Miller 1988; Hwang and Gray 1991). This
study also draws upon policy diffusion literature as a means to expand the analysis of
policy determinants. From the early work of economist Charles Tiebout (1956) and
political scientist Jack Walker (1969) to more recent work by political scientist Andrew
Karch (2007) and Scott Minkoff (2008), policy diffusion explores conditions by which
policies spread from one state to another, through learning or competition, an exogenous
force beyond intrastate factors.
The Lewin Group study (2004a) investigated the influence of state wealth on
social welfare programs over time. The fifty-state analysis included the following:
independent variables: state economic indicators, rates of poverty and unemployment as
indicators of demand for social welfare, federal funding by state, as well as dummy
variables for state and time effects. In a study investigating influential forces on U.S.
health care safety net providers, the Institute of Medicine examined price competition,
measured as the concentration of health care providers; the demand for the safety net,
operationalized as state uninsured rate; and, state wealth and tax base (Lewin and Altman
2000: 81-91).
The influence of spatial relationships public welfare policy making has been
examined in varied ways. Political scientists William Berry and Brady Baybeck (2005)
investigate competing hypotheses regarding interstate competition versus policy learning
in the determination of state welfare benefit levels. Outcomes reveal state welfare benefit
decisions are predicated upon policy learning, by which contiguous states tend to
influence benefit levels of each other (2005: 518). Volden, Ting and
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Carpenter (2006) developed analytical models to help discern policy diffusion through
learning across governments versus within governments (game theoretic learning versus
decision theoretic learning). Karch uses a statistical proxy to assess geospatial
relationships, by calculating the percentage of neighboring states who have implemented
a specified policy in the prior year (2007: 220). While he finds significant relationships
for vertical diffusion versus horizontal diffusion, the statistical model used will not detect
negative spatial autocorrelation. In other words, the model will not detect spatial patterns
in which states with lower rates of enrollment in Medicaid managed care cluster together.
This would be analogous to detection of a non-event, the absence of adopting Medicaid
managed care, may in fact demonstrate spatial relationships.

Analyses
A panel regression model including six independent variables was created to
assess policy and demographic factors influencing state Medicaid managed care
programs for adults with disability. The model specifically assesses the regressors on the
percentage of state Medicaid managed care programs for adults with disability. Analyses
were conducted using Stata 10.0 statistical software package using a balanced panel
design.
Panel regression models require consideration for the presence of latent or
unobserved factors, factors that are time-invariant in nature (Wooldridge 2002). The
selection of a panel regression model is dependent upon the treatment of these
unobserved factors. Fixed effects models assume there may be correlation between
observed and unobserved factors (252). In this regard, the unobserved, time invariant
factors are associated with observable regressors. While fixed effects panel models are
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considered a robust model, including unobservable factors with observable regressors
inhibits the ability to detect the influence of time-invariant factors in the model (266).
The fixed effects model essentially treats unobserved factors as dummy variables in the
model. Inclusion of time invariant regressors in a fixed effects model would create
perfectly collinear relationships with the dummy variables (Kohler and Kreuter 2009:
245). Hence, the fixed effects model cannot include time invariant regressors and is
appropriate to detect change within an entity over time (within effects model). In this
study, a fixed effects model examines the influence of predictor variables within a state
over time
In comparison, random effect panel models assume no correlation between the
observed regressors and unobserved factors. This model places error for the unobserved
factors in the error term of the model. The random effects model therefore permits the
inclusion of time invariant regressors and examines change within and between entities.
In other words, random effects models identify the influence of regressors, independent
variables, between the states and within the states over time (Torres-Reyna 2009).
The Hausman test is used to determine efficiency of the fixed effects model
compared to the random effects model. A statistically significant Hausman test indicates
a statistically significant relationship between unobserved factors and regressors in the
model. This significant relationship violates an assumption of the random effects model,
that unobserved errors are independent of the regressors and therefore supports use of the
fixed effects model (Wooldridge 2002: 257; 288).
In addition, histograms of the variables in the panel regression model indicates a
positively skewed distribution of the proposed dependent variable, the percentage of state
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Medicaid managed care programs for individuals with disability. This is also confirmed
with the sktest demonstrating statistical significance (skewness, 0.00; kurtosis, 0.226).
Practically speaking, states cluster at the low end of the range indicating fewer states
exhibit higher rates of comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs specifically for
enrollees with disability. This distributional distortion may influence the model estimates
and will need to be addressed in the statistical model.
The Hausman test for the panel regression model assessing the influence of
policy, economic and socio-demographic factors on the dependent variable was
insignificant (chi2= 8.47; p = 0.21), therefore a random effects model was used. Similar
to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models, a key assumption of panel
regression models is the presence of equal error variance or E=0. The presence of
unequal dispersion of residuals, heteroskedasticity, leads to inefficient estimators. The
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for the random effects model indicates
statistically significant presence of heteroskedasticity (chi2 =33.55; p = 0.00). To
address heteroskedasticity in the model the dependent variable was transformed into
logarithmic form (Kohler and Kreuter 2009: 221). Due to the number of states without
any comprehensive Medicaid managed care for individuals with disabilities, generating
the log of the dependent variable created seventy-six missing observations, a substantial
reduction in sample size.
Additional post-estimation diagnostics include assessing autocorrelation of the
unobserved factors with the model regressors. Due to gaps in the years included in this
study, a sequential time variable was established in which year 2000 is equal to a ―1,‖
year 2003 as ―2‖ and year 2006 as ―3.‖ The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the
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model with the transformed dependent variable revealed insignificant findings, thus the
research hypothesis indicating no presence of autocorrelation is accepted (.725; p = .405).
Tests for collinearity of the same model include the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for
models that examine a large number of time points relative to sample size. In other
words, models examining many time periods for a small number of units. However, this
diagnostic test may be distorted by samples with large N (Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006).
Alternatively, the Pesaran test of cross-sectional dependence (CD test) has been found to
be appropriate with samples characterized by few time periods and an asymptotic N
(490). The CD test revealed statistically significant collinearity (2.774; p = .006).
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test continued to reveal
heteroskedasticity (chi2 =19.10; p = 0.00) with the transformed dependent variable
therefore the model was run using robust standard errors. Results for the first model,
examining the influence of redistributive, developmental and demographic factors on the
percentage of state comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for people with
disability are presented in Table 1, below. Outcomes reveal a statistically significant
negative relationship for state rates of people with disability. This may be interpreted as
a one unit increase in state disability rates is associated with a reduction among the states
in the use of comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for people with disability
across the study time periods, holding all other variables constant. This model represents
only those states that use some degree of comprehensive Medicaid managed care for
people with disabilities. Therefore, of the states that have implemented comprehensive
Medicaid managed care for people with disabilities, those with higher rates of people
with disability have fewer comprehensive managed care programs.
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Table 1. Random effects panel regression model of redistributive, developmental and
demographic factors with robust standard errors
logpctcpro
Constant

5.026***
(0.70)

State Federal Medical Assistance

0.0082
(0.01)

State Medicaid expenditures

-0.010
(0.01)

State ideology scores

0.000
(0.00)

State growth in personal income

-0.004
(0.01)

Percentage of people without health insurance

-0.014
(0.03)

Percentage of people with disability

-0.070*
(0.03)

Observations

74

R-sq:

Within = 0.2191
Between = 0.0260
Overall = 0.0756

Note: The dependent variable is logarithmic form of the percentage of comprehensive
state Medicaid managed care programs for individuals with disability. Cell entries
are panel regression coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses).
*p<.05 (two-tailed) **p<.01 (two-tailed) ***p<.001(two-tailed)
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The Wald chi2 statistic for the model above is 17.17 (p=.01) indicating model fit. In
comparison, use of Tobit estimation to analyze the same model reveals a Wald chi2 of
10.98 (p=.09).
To avoid losing the observations of states that have not implemented
comprehensive Medicaid managed care for individuals with disabilities, in other words
states with values of ―zero,‖ a modified dependent variable was created by adding a ―1‖
to each observation. The log of the dependent variable was then included in the
analytical model, thereby retaining the full sample. Although the data are no longer
skewed (.537), the Breusch and Pagan test for heteroskedasticity continues to exhibit
statistical significance (chi2 =56.18; p = 0.00). In addition, tests for cross-sectional
dependence (CD test) and autocorrelation (Wooldridge) exhibit statistical significance, as
well (3.61, p=.000 and 6.36, p=.015, respectively). To correct for the presence of
hetereoskedastic, cross-sectionally dependent and autocorrelated standard errors, a PraisWinsten panel regression with corrected panels and corrected standard errors was
conducted (Hoechle 2007). Results are provided in Table 2.
Table 2. Prais-Winsten panel regression model of redistributive, developmental and
demographic factors with corrected panels and corrected standard errors
logpctcpro
Constant

4.336
(3.18)

State Federal Medical Assistance

-0.074
(0.04)

State Medicaid expenditures

0.005
(0.02)

State ideology scores

0.004
(0.01)
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State growth in personal income

0.059
(0.03)

Percentage of people without health insurance

0.102*
(0.05)

Percentage of people with disability

-0.004
(0.07)

Observations

150

R-sq:

0.1897

Note: The dependent variable is logarithmic form of the percentage of comprehensive
state Medicaid managed care programs for individuals with disability. Cell entries
are panel regression coefficients (corrected standard errors in parentheses).
*p<.05 (two-tailed) **p<.01 (two-tailed) ***p<.001(two-tailed)

Analysis of the full sample demonstrates positive association with rates of
uninsured; however, the frequency of true zeros in the dependent variable requires
consideration for alternative analytical models that may be better suited for corner
solution outcomes (Wooldridge 2002). Tobit models are particularly sensitive to
heteroskedasticity (520). Use of Tobit to analyze the model using the untransformed
dependent variable with jackknife standard errors demonstrates an F statistic of 2.08
(p=0.07). Research indicates the Poisson regression model may be a more appropriate
model for non-negative skewed dependent variables (Nichols 2010). A Poisson
regression model, analyzing the influence of redistributive, developmental and
demographic factors on the percentage of comprehensive state Medicaid managed care
programs for individuals with disability, using jackknife standard errors indicates
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improved model fit (F=2.64; p=0.03); although, no statistically significant relationships
were found.
Due to the skewed distribution of the dependent variable in the first model, a
second model was developed to address the use of comprehensive managed care in state
Medicaid programs from a slightly broader perspective. Instead of assessing
comprehensive Medicaid managed care specifically for people with disabilities, a broader
model using state enrollment rates in comprehensive Medicaid managed care will be
used. The same regressors were included in the second model. The Hausman test was
again found to be insignificant (chi2= 4.40; significance level of 0.62) therefore a random
effects model was used. The sktest revealed borderline skewness (0.050), but significant
kurtosis (0.00). The Breusch and Pagan test for heteroskedasticity exhibits statistical
significance (chi2 =99.58; p = 0.00). The CD test reveals collinearity among the model
regressors (3.194, p = 0.001) and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation was also
statistically significant (42.08, p = 0.00). The dependent variable was modified by
adding one, to retain the full sample size, and transformed into logarithmic form in the
model. Tests for non-normal and autocorrelated errors were statistically significant,
(75.50, p=0.00 and10.78, p=0.00, respectively). The CD test for cross-sectional
dependence demonstrated insignificant outcomes (1.04, p=0.30). A robust random
effects model with standard errors was used.

Results are presented in Table 3, below.
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Table 3. Random effects panel regression model of redistributive, developmental and
demographic factors with robust standard errors
logpctcmc
Constant

6.15***
(1.36)

State Federal Medical Assistance

-0.075***
(0.03)

State Medicaid expenditures

-0.011
(0.02)

State ideology scores

0.020
(0.01)

State growth in personal income

0.000
(0.03)

Percentage of people without health insurance

0.023
(0.03)

Percentage of people with disability

-0.032
(0.05)

Observations

150

R-sq:

Within = 0.0073
Between = 0.3395
Overall = 0.2949

Note: The dependent variable is log of the percentage of state Medicaid enrollees in
comprehensive managed care programs. Cell entries are panel regression coefficients
(robust standard errors in parentheses).
*p<.05 (two-tailed) **p<.01 (two-tailed) ***p<.001(two-tailed)
The second model reveals a statistically significant negative relationship between
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage and the percentage of state Medicaid enrollees in
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comprehensive managed care programs. This may be interpreted as states with higher
FMAP rate (states with lower per capita income) are associated with lower rates of
enrollment in Medicaid managed care programs. The dependent variable in this model is
less skewed (24% of the dependent variable values are ―0‖). The F statistic indicates
appropriate model fit (F=3.50; p=.01). In comparison, analysis of the untransformed
dependent variable using a Poisson model yields an F statistic of 0.41 (p=0.87). An
additional analysis of the percent enrollment in comprehensive Medicaid managed care
using a Tobit model and the untransformed dependent variable is presented in Table 4,
below.

Table 4. Tobit panel regression model of redistributive, developmental and demographic
factors with jackknife standard errors
pctcmc
Constant

65.06*
(28.81)

State Federal Medical Assistance

-0.832
(0.51)

State Medicaid expenditures

-0.229
(0.44)

State ideology scores

0.468*
(0.21)

State growth in personal income

0.306
(0.37)

Percentage of people without health insurance

0.291
(0.69)

Percentage of people with disability

-0.320
(0.85)

Observations

150
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Note: The dependent variable is the percentage of state Medicaid enrollees in
comprehensive managed care programs. Cell entries are panel Tobit regression
coefficients (jackknife standard errors in parentheses).
*p<.05 (two-tailed) **p<.01 (two-tailed) ***p<.001(two-tailed)

The Tobit model reveals a statistically significant relationship between ideology and the
enrollment in comprehensive state Medicaid managed care programs. While the
direction of the coefficients in the OLS panel regression and Tobit panel regression
models may be compared, the magnitude of the co-efficient effect sizes are not equivalent
(Wooldridge 2002). Literature indicates the use of Tobit for models in which the
dependent variable possesses a number of true zero values is not recommended
(Siegelman and Zeng 1999: 170). In addition, the F statistic for the Tobit model is 2.07
(p=0.07).
Lastly, a third model was developed to further assess the influence of
redistributive, developmental and demographic factors on an even broader dependent
variable, the percentage of the state population enrolled in Medicaid. The dependent
variable for the three analytical models is defined as:
Model 1: the dependent variable is the percentage of comprehensive state
Medicaid managed care programs for individuals with disability
Model 2: the dependent variable is the percentage of state Medicaid
enrollees in comprehensive managed care programs
Model 3: the dependent variable is the percentage of the state population
enrolled in Medicaid

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p.160
Each model uses the same independent variables. Broadening the dependent variable
provides an interesting opportunity to assess variance in the use of Medicaid managed
care for people with disability relative to more prevalent state Medicaid programs in use
across the country.
The Hausman test for the third model was statistically significant in this model
violating assumptions of independence between observed and unobserved factors;
therefore a fixed effects model was used. The sktest revealed significant skewness
(0.012) and insignificant kurtosis (0.933). The modified Wald test for fixed effects
model is significant for heteroskedasticity (96944.30, p=0.00). The dependent variable
was transformed into logarithmic form; however, the full sample was retained since all
states administer a Medicaid program. Tests for heteroskedasticity continued to be
significant even with use of a transformed dependent variable (0.00, p=0.00). The
Wooldridge revealed significant autocorrelation (27.00, p = 0.00) in the model; however,
the CD test for collinearity was insignificant (1.6, p = 0.100). The model was rerun using
robust standard errors. Results are presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Fixed effects panel regression model of redistributive, distributive and
demographic factors with robust standard errors
logpctmen
Constant

1.278***
(0.30)

State Federal Medical Assistance Percentage

0.004
(0.00)

State Medicaid expenditures

0.011***
(0.00)

State ideology scores

0.006***
(0.00)
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State growth in personal income

-0.006
(0.0)

Percentage of people without health insurance

0.003
(0.01)

Percentage of people with disability

0.024***
(0.01)

Observations

150

R-sq:

Within = 0.4745
Between = 0.3104
Overall = 0.3259

Note: The dependent variable is the logarithmic form of the percentage the state
population enrolled in Medicaid. Cell entries are panel regression coefficients (robust
standard errors in parentheses).
*p<.05 (two-tailed) **p<.01 (two-tailed) ***p<.001(two-tailed)
In the third model, variables representing state Medicaid spending, ideology and state
disability rates exhibit statistically significant positive relationships with the dependent
variable. These outcomes may be interpreted as follows:
A one unit increase in state Medicaid expenditures, as a percentage of total state
expenditures, is associated with an increase in the percentage of the state
population enrolled in Medicaid over time, holding all other variables constant.
A one unit increase in a state ideology scores, a movement toward more liberal
ideology, is associated with an increase in the percentage of the state population
enrolled in Medicaid over time, holding all other variables constant.
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A one unit increase in state percentage of population with disability is associated
with an increase in the percentage of the state population enrolled in Medicaid
over time, holding all other variables constant.

Spatial Patterns
Geographic patterns among states relative to state Medicaid managed care
programs indicate the presence of spatial autocorrelation. The panel regression dataset
was reshaped into wide format to assess geographic patterns for each time period
included in the study. ArcGIS was used to join attribute data of each the contiguous
forty-eight states, excluding Washington D.C., to a state shape file, downloaded from the
U.S. Census Bureau (2009). An Albers Equal Area Conic projection was established.
The local Moran‘s I statistic or LISA statistic describes the weighted correlation
between the value of a variable for one location with the average value of the neighbors
on the same variable (Anselin 2003: 61). While the LISA statistic identifies specific
geographic areas of autocorrelation, the global autocorrelation statistic, Moran‘s I,
calculates autocorrelation for all observations under study (Anselin 1996). Moran values
range from -1 to 1 with 0 indicating no spatial autocorrelation. Geoda software was used
to calculate the univariate LISA statistic assessing spatial patterns of comprehensive
Medicaid managed care programs for enrollees with disability relative to neighboring
states. The LISA statistic permits the ability to assess the strength of spatial patterns at
the unit of observation, in this study, the state (Anselin 2003: 99).
The Moran‘s was calculated upon queen contiguity, meaning autocorrelation was
weighted using common sides and vertices. Queen contiguity was selected to capture
maximal contiguity of shared borders between states. LISA statistics were computed
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using 999 permutations, meaning the test statistic was calculated following an established
number of possible permutations for each observation (102). Significance of the LISA
statistic was set at p = .01 meaning statistically significant spatial patterns must be
present at the more stringent significance level compared to the default setting of p = .05
(102).
Assessing the global Moran‘s I for the percent of Medicaid managed care
programs for enrollees with disability yields moderate to low correlations for all three
time periods: 2000 data = 0.270, 2003 data =.302 and 2006 data = .136. The global
statistic was also calculated using a broader dependent variable, the percentage of
comprehensive managed care enrollees out of total Medicaid enrollees by state. The
global Moran‘s I statistic for the 2000 data using the broader dependent variable is .438.
In this regard, Delaware demonstrates a moderate correlation with its neighbors in the
enrollment of Medicaid beneficiaries in comprehensive managed care programs while
Montana and Mississippi exhibit moderate correlations with neighbors relative to low
enrollment in comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs. The global Moran‘s I
statistic for the 2003 data is .464. Delaware continues to demonstrate moderate
correlations with neighboring states with respect to higher rates of comprehensive
Medicaid managed care enrollment, while Montana, Wyoming, Mississippi and Georgia
exhibit lower rates of comprehensive Medicaid managed care enrollment. The global
Moran‘s I statistic for the 2006 data is .396. Using 2003 data, local spatial
autocorrelation of the percentage of comprehensive Medicaid managed care program for
enrollees with disability and the percentage of Medicaid enrollees in Medicaid managed
care programs is presented in Appendix C and D, respectively. These maps visually
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identify patterns of association among the states. A state and its contiguous neighbors
possessing similarly high (or low) values for a variable of interest demonstrate positive
spatial autocorrelation. A state with a high value of a variable of interest and contiguous
neighbors with low values of the same variable (or a state with a low value and
contiguous neighbors with high values) indicate negative spatial autocorrelation. A
discussion of the study outcomes and conclusions is presented in the final chapter.
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Chapter 7
Discussion and Conclusions

We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking
we used when we created them
Albert Einstein
(Church 2007)

Medicaid fills a critical void for vulnerable populations, especially for those with
chronic conditions and disability who are underserved in the employment-based health
insurance market. As a theoretical model, managed care is intended to reduce
complications from chronic conditions, shifting the focus from traditional tertiary
paradigms, which focus on specialized care following diagnosis, toward more costeffective primary approaches to care; care that strives to sustain or improve health.
Strategies to better meet the health care needs of Medicaid enrollees, particularly those
with chronic illness and disability is particularly important as states confront increasing
demand and significant fluctuations in the economic climate. The findings from this
study highlight the need to consider demographic, redistributive and policy system
indicators that influence state Medicaid programs. Further research to determine the
influence of neighboring states on the adoption of Medicaid managed care is needed.
Demographic factors influence not only the adoption of comprehensive Medicaid
managed care for enrollees with disability, but overall enrollment in state Medicaid
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programs. Specifically, state disability rates significantly influence state Medicaid
programs in varied ways. Of the states implementing comprehensive managed care
programs for Medicaid enrollees with disability, those states with higher disability rates
offer fewer programs. States with fewer high-cost Medicaid enrollees implement
alternative care strategies, such as managed care. Considering all states with and without
comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for enrollees with disability, no
statistically significant outcomes were found.
Redistributive factors also play a significant role in state Medicaid programs. The
FMAP negatively influences state enrollment rates in comprehensive managed programs.
As a redistributive mechanism, the FMAP is used as a proxy for state wealth, a factor that
may influence the adoption of alternative Medicaid programming. The negative
influence of the FMAP on managed care enrollment is cause for concern about the
effectiveness of FMAP in supporting innovations in the Medicaid programs of states with
lower per capita incomes.
The enrollment rate of state Medicaid programs is significantly influenced by
redistributive and demographic policy indicators. More liberal political ideology and
higher state spending on Medicaid influence higher enrollment rates in state Medicaid
programs. In addition, states with higher rates of populations with disability also
experience higher enrollment in state Medicaid programs.
As a cost-containment strategy, it would be expected that all states would be
interested in curbing Medicaid expenditures. However, outcomes from this study
demonstrate significant variations in state Medicaid programs across the country. As the
federal government shifts program authority to the states, the variation among states may
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increase. In addition, Medicaid policies are particularly sensitive to economic volatility
and subject to fiscal scrutiny at federal and state levels. Consideration for policy
indicators influencing state policy-making may be particularly relevant for supporting the
diverse needs of program enrollees.
This study uses panel regression analyses to better understand policy determinants
influencing state Medicaid programs, particularly the use of comprehensive managed
care for enrollees with chronic illness and disability. Through policy decisions, state
Medicaid programs determine program eligibility, services provided and reimbursement
rates to health care providers, influencing access and quality of care for program
enrollees. Innovative approaches to the care of chronic conditions require a policy
mechanism flexible enough to accommodate change. State Medicaid programs possess
that flexibility. Research to better understand influential forces in state Medicaid policy
making contributes to more informed assessment of policy solutions and the opportunity
to enhance quality of life for program enrollees.
The positively skewed distribution of the proposed dependent variable, the
percentage of comprehensive state Medicaid managed care programs for people with
disability, indicates a limited number of state programs actually include enrollees with
special needs in comprehensive managed care health programs. Consequently, the
methodological challenges of the skewed distribution necessitated consideration of more
broadly defined outcome measures, specifically the percentage of state Medicaid
enrollees in comprehensive managed care programs and the percentage of the state
population in state Medicaid programs.
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The outcomes for the statistical models using each of the three dependent
variables are discussed next. The first model, analyzing the percentage of state
comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for enrollees with disability, revealed a
statistically significant negative relationship with percentage of state population with
disability. To address the presence of heteroskedasticity, the log transformation of the
dependent variable omitted all states with ―0‖ values. This means outcomes only pertain
to those states that do enroll individuals with disability into comprehensive Medicaid
managed care programs. With this in mind, the analysis reveals that states with higher
disability rates exhibit fewer programs for individuals with disability. Although counterintuitive at first glance, states with a smaller percentage of population with disabilities
may exert less demand, less pressure on the system, resulting in increased opportunity for
programmatic change. In addition, these outcomes indicate that Medicaid enrollees with
disability are not provided the same access to Medicaid programs as other program
enrollees.
To analyze the entire sample, a ―one‖ was added to the dependent variable values,
then the log transformation of the dependent variable was used in the analytical model.
While no statistically significant relationships were found in the Poisson model analyzing
the influence of redistributive, developmental and demographic factors on the percentage
of comprehensive state Medicaid managed care programs for individuals with disability;
state disability rate was found to be statistically significant using a sub-set of
observations with non-zero values. State disability rate appears to negatively influence
the number of comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for the same population
among states that already offer these programs.
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These outcomes are particularly relevant in light of the shrinking employer-based
private welfare sector and an aging population that may contribute to greater demand on
state welfare programs. Individuals with disability possess higher health care
expenditures. Excluding this population from Medicaid managed care fails to capitalize
on strategies that may provide comprehensive health care services needed by this
population, in a manner that is more cost-efficient compared to fee-for-service strategies.
As the private sector scales back employer-sponsored health insurance and an aging
population pressures social welfare programs such as Medicaid, more efficient means to
support the health care needs of program beneficiaries is needed.
The research hypotheses predicting the influence of redistributive (FMAP and
liberal ideology) and developmental (growth rates of personal income) policy indicators
on the use of comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for people with
disabilities must be rejected. In this regard, demographic factors including state disability
and uninsurance rate are more influential in state rates of comprehensive Medicaid
managed care programs for people with disability than policy factors.
The second panel model broadened the dependent variable to assess policy and
demographic indicators on the percent of state Medicaid enrollees in comprehensive
managed care programs. This dependent variable may or may not include enrollees with
disability. In this model the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage exhibits a
statistically significant, negative relationship with the outcome variable. This means
states with higher FMAP rates, those with lower per capita incomes, are associated with
lower rates of enrollees in comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs. Although
the dependent variable is broader in nature, this outcome is related to the first research
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hypothesis and consistent with the expectation that states with greater relative wealth,
using FMAP as a proxy for wealth, will have higher rates of Medicaid managed care
compared to poor states. Wealthier states may possess greater resources to implement
alternative Medicaid programs compared to poorer states.
A third panel model broadened the outcome variable even further, to assess the
influence of policy indicators and demographic variables on overall enrollment in state
Medicaid programs. This model exhibits three statistically significant, positive
outcomes: state Medicaid expenditures, state ideology scores and state rates of disability.
State Medicaid expenditures and state ideology scores were both characterized as
redistributive policy indicators. State Medicaid expenditures are an indication of the state
use of fiscal resources to support constituency health care needs. This model
demonstrates that states spending proportionately more on Medicaid exhibit higher rates
of Medicaid enrollment. This may be interpreted as a greater commitment to Medicaid as
a redistributive policy. Ideology score is also an indicator of the propensity toward
redistributive policy. This model demonstrates that more liberal states have higher rates
of Medicaid enrollment. Ideology appears to positively influence overall enrollment rates
in state Medicaid programs. While political system characteristics are not predictors of
the use of Medicaid managed care, these redistributive factors do influence overall
enrollment in state Medicaid programs.
The third model also demonstrates a statistically significant positive relationship
between state disability rate and Medicaid enrollment. While disability rate is negatively
associated in the use of comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for enrollees
with disability in the first model, the positive association detected in the third model,
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overall state Medicaid enrollment rate, is not unexpected. Literature supports the
bidirectional relationship between poverty and disability; disablement may contribute to
low income and low income may inhibit the use of health care services contributing to
disablement. Hence, the third model reveals that states with higher rates of individuals
with disability have increased demand for Medicaid and resultant higher rates of
enrollment.
The variance in the direction of statistical significance in state disability rates in
the first and third model merits further consideration. While disability rates demonstrate
increased demand for state Medicaid programs, states with the greatest demand are not
implementing more cost-efficient approaches to care. In fact, states with lower rates of
constituents with disability are those states implementing more cost-efficient managed
care programs. This study supports the incongruity between the demand for state
Medicaid programs and the approaches the states use to support the health care of state
Medicaid enrollees. States with greater demand and a need to implement more
efficacious approaches to care are not implementing such strategies. These outcomes
suggest that states exhibiting greater numbers of individuals with low-income and
disability may be least able to implement alternative approaches to care.
Use of federal waivers, particularly the 1115 waiver programs, permitted states to
implement Medicaid managed care programs as a means to expand program reach. As a
cost-containment mechanism, the adoption of Medicaid managed care is also believed to
help sustain program integrity during constrained economic climates. The negative
association of FMAP on enrollment in state comprehensive Medicaid managed care
programs alludes to the insufficient redistribution of resources to less wealthy states
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inhibiting the implementation of more efficacious programs such as, Medicaid managed
care.
Descriptive statistics were used to demonstrate patterns of spatial autocorrelation
among the states. Examining spatial relationships among states with respect to the
percent of comprehensive state Medicaid managed care programs for people with
disability yields only moderate correlation for the 2003 data and low correlation for the
2000 and 2006 data. In 2003, Delaware demonstrates a moderate correlation with
neighboring states (Maryland, Pennsylvania and New York). This means Delaware and
its contiguous neighbors; Maryland, Pennsylvania and New York, possess higher rates of
comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for individuals with disability.
Delaware and its neighbors share similar ideological perspectives, typically favoring
more liberal political positions. These states also possess lower FMAP rates. In fact,
Delaware, Maryland and New York are at the statutory floor of 50%. The FMAP is
inversely related to state per capita income; therefore, these are relatively wealthier states,
possibly with fiscal resources available to implement more innovative social welfare
programs, such as Medicaid managed care. State wealth may also be indicative of the
competitive economic activities of neighboring states, supporting the findings of spatial
autocorrelation.
Florida demonstrates a negative association with its neighbors, Alabama and
Georgia in 2003. Florida does offer comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for
enrollees with disability in contrast to Alabama and Georgia which do not. Florida
exhibits a lower FMAP rate compared to Alabama and Georgia and thus greater wealth
that may influence resources available for alternative approaches to care. Florida also
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exhibits more liberal political ideology scores, compared to neighboring states, a
characteristic of more support for social welfare programs.
Examining geographic patterns relative to enrollment rate in comprehensive state
Medicaid managed care programs for each time period revealed slightly stronger
associations. Spatial autocorrelation for all three time periods demonstrate moderate
associations with neighboring states. In 2000, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania and
New York possess higher rates of enrollment in comprehensive Medicaid managed care
programs. Conversely, Montana and its neighbors, Idaho, Wyoming, North Dakota and
South Dakota exhibit low enrollment rates in comprehensive Medicaid managed care
programs. Mississippi and its neighbors, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee and Alabama,
also demonstrate low enrollment rates in comprehensive Medicaid managed care
programs.
In 2003, Delaware continues to demonstrate a positive association with
neighboring states. Both Montana and Wyoming now exhibit low rates of enrollment in
comprehensive Medicaid managed care relative to neighboring states. Mississippi and
Georgia also exhibit low rates of enrollment in comprehensive Medicaid managed care
relative to neighboring states. As noted previously, Florida demonstrates negative spatial
autocorrelation , exhibiting higher rates of enrollment in Medicaid managed care relative
to neighboring states, including Georgia.
By 2006, Delaware no longer demonstrates an association with neighboring
states; however, New York and Pennsylvania demonstrate higher rates of enrollment in
comprehensive Medicaid managed care similar to neighboring states. Montana,
Wyoming and Mississippi continue to exhibit low rates of enrollment in Medicaid
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managed care with respect to their neighbors. These states tend to subscribe to more
conservative political ideology with less support for social welfare programs.
Detecting statistically significant relationships in the number of state Medicaid
managed programs for enrollees with disability is compromised by a large number of
states with ―0‖ values. In other words, a large number of states do not offer
comprehensive managed care programs to Medicaid enrollees with disability or simply
do not offer comprehensive managed care programs at all. Across all three time periods,
the percentage of states with ―0‖ values ranges from 43%-52% in the first model, the rate
of comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for enrollees with disability; and,
18%-25% in the second model, state enrollment rate in comprehensive Medicaid
managed care. Use of a dependent variable more sensitive to enrollment rates of
individuals with disability in state Medicaid managed care programs may substantially
influence spatial analyses.
Since the urbanization variable was omitted in the regression models due to
correlation with FMAP, maps of 2006 outcomes were developed to visualize state
enrollment rates in comprehensive Medicaid managed care relative to rates of
urbanization (Appendix E). As one might expect, Montana and Wyoming which exhibit
lower rates of Medicaid managed care enrollment are more rural in nature compared New
York and Pennsylvania. Although the panel regression analyses did find FMAP to be a
statistically significant policy indicator in state Medicaid managed care enrollment, the
appearance of variance based upon rates of urbanization depicted in the map illustrate the
need for future research.
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While the relationship between urbanization and Medicaid managed care is not
examined in this study, future work should appreciate the following:
Managed care plans account for 99% of enrolled workers throughout the United
States. Therefore urbanization does not appear to inhibit use of managed care in
the private welfare sector (Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research &
Educational Trust 2009: 63).
Some states have used their purchasing power to mandate managed care
organizations include Medicaid enrollees
Considering the prevalence of managed care in the private sector in both urban and rural
states, further research will be needed to better understand factors associated with the
public sector that influence the use of managed care for Medicaid enrollees. Improved
understanding of the public sector, particularly Medicaid policy making, possesses
implications for policy approaches and policy solutions under consideration. State
Medicaid policy making could utilize purchasing power to influence service delivery,
serving as ―prudent buyers‖ and good stewards of public funds.
A map to visualize 2003 state rates of disability relative to use of comprehensive
Medicaid managed care for enrollees with disability was also developed (Appendix F).
This map displays higher rates of disability and low use of Medicaid managed care for
people with disability in Montana, Wyoming, Mississippi and Georgia; and, lower rates
of disability and higher rates of Medicaid managed care for enrollees with disability in
Delaware. This map provides a visual display of the statistically significant negative
relationship between disability and the use of Medicaid managed care for people with
disability detected in the panel regression model.
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Lastly, a map was developed to visualize associations between the FMAP, the rate
at which the federal government contributes to state Medicaid programs and state
disability rates in 2006 (Appendix G). It is interesting to consider the visual presentation
of the states at the FMAP statutory floor of 50% relative to states in the highest quantile
of the FMAP. While thirteen states possess FMAP at the statutory floor, three states
(Mississippi, Arkansas and West Virginia) possess FMAPs in the highest quantile. These
three states also exhibit state disability rates in the highest quantile while many of the
states at the statutory FMAP floor exhibit state disability rates in the lowest quantile.
Over time, FMAP has gradually declined. However, the statutory limit for FMAP may
inhibit reductions in federal funding to states at the floor and may be insufficient for
states most reliant on federal funds to adopt more efficacious strategies for their Medicaid
programs.
This study reveals that state disability rate significantly influences the use of
comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for people with disability in a negative
direction; a lower rate of state disability is associated with a higher rate of comprehensive
Medicaid managed care programs for enrollees with disability. Consequently, outcomes
also reveal disability significantly influences overall enrollment in state Medicaid
programs in a positive direction meaning that higher state rates of disability are associate
with higher rates of enrollment in state Medicaid programs. The FMAP is calculated
upon average state per capita income. The adequacy of the FMAP in supporting states
with the highest need has been questioned (Holahan 2003). Further research to examine
state disability rates as a potential factor for consideration in FMAP calculations will be
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needed. Appreciation for state disability rates may provide more adequate redistribution
of federal funds to state Medicaid programs.

Conclusions
The U.S. spends fifty-three percent more per capita on health care than the next
closest country, Switzerland, which provides universal care to all its citizens (Anderson et
al. 2005: 905). The unsustainable growth in health care costs coupled by increasing
numbers of under and uninsured individuals has culminated in political efforts to reform
the United States‘ health care system. Recent health care legislation begins to address
crucial issues important for the health of low-income populations with disability and
chronic conditions. Removing cost sharing for preventive services and acknowledging
the need to develop primary approaches to care are topics addressed by the new
legislation (Kaiser Family Foundation 2009). How these changes will be implemented in
state Medicaid programs and whether these approaches will address the unique health
care needs of Medicaid populations with disability and chronic illness is undetermined.
A better understanding of Medicaid policy-making and the resultant influence on people
with chronic illness and disability is needed and will continue to require further
examination with changes to the system.
While the 2010 health care legislation expands the population eligible for
Medicaid, reforms also include reductions in Medicaid spending, including reductions in
payment to disproportionate share hospitals, increased use of generic pharmaceuticals
and the elimination of payment for nosocomial conditions, those resulting from treatment
in a health care setting (ibid). These reforms broadly address paradigmatic changes in
health care and the influence on state Medicaid programs must be closely monitored. A
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better understanding of policy determinants influencing state Medicaid programs is
particularly important as states respond to broader system changes.
The health care needs of individuals with chronic conditions and disability extend
beyond diagnosis, necessitating intervention that maximizes and sustains functional
ability (Lewin and Altman 2000; Institute of Medicine 2000: 181). Theoretically,
managed care provides an organized approach to care that seeks to ameliorate the
fragmentation among health care services and providers characterizing traditional fee-forservice. The use of managed care case managers to integrate varied medical providers
and treatment approaches provides opportunities to influence current treatment paradigms
in a manner that better supports the health of individuals with chronic illness and
disability. Premised upon negotiated pricing, managed care was designed to encourage
competition among providers while promoting quality of care and the provision of
comprehensive services (Sutton and DeJong 1998).
A crucial factor that may influence the use of managed care for people with
chronic illness and disability is risk adjustment. By adjusting reimburse relative to the
severity of an individual‘s health condition, risk adjustment sensitizes reimbursement
strategies according to need. Health care providers serving individuals with greater needs
are reimbursed at higher rates relative to reimbursement for less intensive services.
Developing risk adjustment strategies for individuals with chronic illness and disability
requires appreciation of two factors: the identification of standards of care that best
support the needs of varied populations; and, mechanisms of data collection that captures
patient encounter and service use; and, the associated costs incurred across populations
necessary to inform development of risk adjustment strategies (Sutton and DeJong 1998).
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Without adequate risk adjustment, health plans and providers have financial
incentives to avoid and underserve individuals with disabilities. With adequate
risk adjustment, health plans especially are more likely to compete on price and
quality instead of price and risk (DeJong, Palsbo, and Phillip W. Beatty et al
2002).
Assessing health outcomes of Medicaid managed care is difficult. Managed care
strategies, such as prepayment mechanisms, no longer provide utilization data
traditionally captured under fee-for-service systems (United States General Accounting
Office 1996: 6). In other words, capturing frequency of service usage and cost intensity
is more difficult and less developed in prepayment reimbursement systems compared to
fee-for-service systems.
Risk adjustment strategies have been developed. In particular, a strategy
specifically designed for Medicaid enrollees with disability, the Chronic Illness and
Disability Payment System (CDPS) predicts variance in medical expenditures based upon
diagnosis (Kronick et al. 2000). New York and Pennsylvania, both of whom exhibit
statistically significant spatial relationships in the use of comprehensive Medicaid
managed care, are leading efforts to assess approaches to care for program enrollees with
chronic illness (Center for Health Care Strategies Inc. 2008).
The efficacy of using diagnostic based mechanisms as the foundation for risk
adjustment will require further research. Unlike acute illness, chronic conditions are not
cured, but managed (Institute for Health and Aging 1996: 11). Chronic care strategies
must appreciate the importance of rehabilitative serves and medical equipment in
sustaining functional levels of independence instead of a more narrowed perspective that
seeks to restore function following acute change in health status (DeJong, Palsbo, and
Phillip W. Beatty et al 2002). Assessment of survival without appropriate

Brandt, Diane, 2010, UMSL, p.180
acknowledgement of functional ability may constrain support for functional levels of
independence and quality of life. Individuals with chronic illness must be empowered
and educated to adopt healthy lifestyles and to make healthy choices that may buffer or
postpone potential debilitating effects of chronic conditions.
As a substantial purchaser of health care services, state Medicaid programs may
use purchasing power to effect standards of quality and service delivery. States possess
the latitude to tailor Medicaid programs to meet specific need. Both Pennsylvania and
Arizona utilize mandatory managed care enrollment for TANF and disabled
beneficiaries. ―Mandatory enrollment models enable health plans to focus on ―serving‖
rather than ‗selling‘‖ (Lewin Group 2005: 6). Minnesota mandates managed care
organizations include Medicaid populations and adjusts reimbursement rates for high-risk
enrollees (Holahan, Rangarajan, and Schirmer 1999). These innovative state approaches
permit the federal government to focus on the quality of care rather than the provision of
care. An editorial by Newt Gingrich and James Frogue (2005)states,
…instead of auditing the process by which they spend their federal Medicaid dollars, the
federal government would audit states based on demonstrated improvements in health
outcomes, childhood immunizations, or a closing of the gap in racial health disparities.
Washington‘s role would change from its current focus on oversight of process
compliance to auditor of results.

Expansion of Medicaid managed care, by promoting more integrated health care
strategies to sustain and enhance quality of life is particularly important for Medicaid
enrollees, a program for individuals with low-income who disproportionately possess
chronic illness and disability. ―Health is both a matter of how long one lives and how
well one lives (Ustun et al. 2003).‖
Current literature provides evidence of the varied ways Medicaid, as a component
of the state health care safety net, is changing under escalating socio-economic pressure.
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As states develop policy approaches in response to environmental pressures, policy
outcomes will influence millions of Medicaid enrollees. The diversity of health care
needs across the spectrum of Medicaid beneficiaries complicates Medicaid policy
making. Whether manifested by incremental change or broader reform, the future of
Medicaid policy may benefit from an increased understanding of forces influencing
policy-making and the examination of efficacy on health outcomes for the vulnerable
program enrollees. The well-known political scientist, Harold Laswell, described public
policy as ―who gets what, when and how.‖ These decisions are particularly important for
impoverished populations, such as those who rely on state Medicaid programs as the
primary means for access to health care.
This study clearly reveals the need for more refined data to assess the use of
comprehensive Medicaid managed care for enrollees with disability. Analysis of the
percentage of comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for enrollees with
disability only captures the use of alternative paradigmatic health strategies in a broad
sense. It does not capture the actual number of enrollees with disability in
comprehensive managed care programs by state or condition severity of that population.
Furthermore, assessing state enrollment rates in comprehensive Medicaid managed care
programs does not delineate enrollees with and without disability. A more sensitive
outcome measure is needed.
The ability to discern the influence of redistributive and developmental policy
indicators may require consideration for additional developmental factors that
operationalize state economic growth. While change in personal income is a key marker
indicating state economic activity, additional factors, including tax policy, may need to
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be considered. States cannot avoid consideration of developmental policy and the
resultant influence on resources available for redistributive policy making
Research is needed to further examine the potential influence of neighboring
states on the adoption of Medicaid managed care programs. The ability to discern state
relationships influenced by economic convergence versus policy diffusion is needed. As
mentioned earlier, the role of urbanization in influencing the use of managed care in the
public sector relative to use in the private sector requires further examination.
Continuing to research the use of managed care in state Medicaid programs over time
will be important. The Medicaid program is particularly susceptible to environmental
pressure, including economic and political change, hence longitudinal research will help
to assess trends and relationships of policy indicators influencing change over time. As a
program for the low-income populations, Medicaid is challenged with substantial
diversity and complexity of health care needs characterizing this vulnerable population.
This study does not assess the services offered by the managed care programs nor
the adequacy of the programs in meeting the complex needs of individuals with chronic
conditions and disability. Traditional fee-for-service Medicaid reimbursement strategies
encourage service utilization, deterring alternative approaches to care, even those well
supported by empirical evidence (Wagner et al. 2001). While research has compared
managed care with fee-for-service approaches, continued effort to examine the health
outcomes specifically of enrollees with disability with those in traditional fee-for-service
programs will be critical.
The statistical relationships detected in this study contribute to the understanding
of state Medicaid programs. This study supports the role of ideology, as an indicator of
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redistributive policy making, in providing access to health care for needy constituents. In
this regard, political forces serve as dynamic processes influencing the policy agenda and
policy outcomes within institutional frameworks, such as state Medicaid programs.
Disability emerged as a significant demographic variable, inversely influencing the use of
Medicaid managed care for enrollees with disability and positively influencing
enrollment in state Medicaid programs, as well. These factors merit consideration as
indicators particularly important in examining state Medicaid managed care programs.
Spatial analysis is needed to determine influence of neighboring states on state
Medicaid policy making. These relationships may shed light on influential forces
contributing to the adoption of new policies or retention of the status quo. Analysis of
geographic relationships is particularly relevant when examining state policy making.
Spatial analyses provide an opportunity to compliment aspatial methodology, enriching
approaches to better understand the varied use of Medicaid managed care among states.
In addition to the examination of socio-economic and political system variables,
economic competition among neighboring states ultimately influences economic
resources available for policy making. Studies indicate that Medicaid managed care
approaches can reduce costs anywhere from two percent to nineteen percent.
Comparisons among states reveal that per capita Medicaid expenditures decrease as state
use of prepayment mechanisms increase (Lewin Group 2005: 9). Over time, as states
become more familiar with managed care programs, savings tend to increase (Lewin
Group 2004a: 30). External forces, such as downturns in the national economy, may
certainly influence enrollment in state Medicaid programs. However, as states gain
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greater latitude to modify program design, the expansion of managed care among state
Medicaid programs may be influenced by policy-decisions of neighboring states.
Policy analysts should explore and embrace opportunities to discover how
conditions at the state level influence the care of Medicaid enrollees, particularly those
enrollees with chronic illness and disability. Longino and Murphy (1995) state the ability
to adequately address chronic illness requires a philosophical paradigm shift. Traditional
medical models of care focus on the detection and treatment of acute illness. Increasing
prevalence of chronic conditions will require alternative approaches to care as a means to
maximize functional levels of independence and support quality of life. Public bureaus
are entrenched in a web of politics and accountable to a variety of stakeholders; however,
state-level policy-making possesses the ability to influence paradigms of care by
establishing standards for service administration and health outcomes for program
enrollees.
State level policies provide the opportunity to integrate successful health care
strategies at the local level for persons with disabilities. ―The ultimate responsibility for
shaping national health systems lies with governments‖ (World Health Organization
2008: 82). As a program that provides health care access to substantial numbers of
individuals with low income and disabling conditions, Medicaid policy making
significantly influences the quality of life for program enrollees and influences health
system design in each state.
State Medicaid programs highlight the complexity of public policy making,
challenging states to balance unlimited demand and limited resources while tethered to a
contentious political arena. However, state policy making is more sensitive to the needs
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of residents and amenable to change compared to national policy making. The Medicaid
program permits state discretion in determining benefits for Medicaid recipients. State
governments possess the ability to re-shape and tailor policy strategies to meet the
changing needs of constituents.
A better understanding of state Medicaid policy-making possesses important
implications for program enrollees and state budgets. As a mechanism to control costs,
states are seeking ways to implement Medicaid programs in a more efficient manner.
The use of managed care is one approach to curb costs while theoretically, providing
health care in manner to improve and sustain health and well-being. While Medicaid
redistributes resources to those excluded in the private health insurance market, states
must balance the use of fiscal resources to support the health care needs of constituents
while simultaneously facilitating economic growth. It is important to deconstruct the
influence of state redistributive policy making relative to developmental policy making to
better understand factors influencing state Medicaid programs.
Literature has demonstrated the influence of state wealth and political ideology
(Barrilleaux and Miller 1988; Lewin Group 2004a; Hwang and Gray 1991; Buchanan,
Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt 1991; Plotnick and Winters 1985; Holahan and Pohl 2003) on
state Medicaid programs. However, this study takes a closer look at chronic illness and
disablement, characteristics particularly relevant for state Medicaid programs. Outcomes
from this study reveal that state disability rates influence not only the use of managed
care by state Medicaid programs, but the enrollment in state Medicaid programs, as well.
This important policy indicator looks beyond more overt policy characteristics such as
state wealth, to uncover more nuanced factors influencing the public welfare sector and
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the health and well-being of Medicaid enrollees. Appreciating the relationships between
chronic illness, disability, and low-income populations enhances the understanding and
emphasizes the importance of state Medicaid programs for vulnerable populations.
Ultimately, state Medicaid policies influence the health and well-being of
program enrollees. Traditional models of care assess health and disability according to
deviations in physical and mental status. The individual, however, tends to view health
according to quality of life and equal opportunities to participate in society. Strategies to
facilitate and support health must move beyond confined perspectives assessing causality
between symptoms and pathology and embrace the concept of health as a complex, multidimensional entity. Redistributive policies, such as Medicaid, facilitate or inhibit the use
of alternative strategies of care. These policy decisions ultimately play out in the lives of
vulnerable individuals, particularly Medicaid enrollees with chronic illness and disability.
In this regard, the policy analyst is challenged with a rather daunting task—developing an
in-depth understanding of policy issues and determining an efficacious policy solution.
After all, it is our policy decisions that define our priorities and shape our collective
identity as a society.
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Appendix A:
Table 1: Percent of Comprehensive Medicaid Managed Care Relative to State Medicaid
Enrollment
State

Percent of Comprehensive Medicaid
Managed Care Relative to State Medicaid
Enrollment

Alabama

0

Alaska

0

Arizona

90.5

Arkansas

0

California

51.4

Colorado

11

Connecticut

0

Delaware

69.5

Florida

35.7

Georgia

56.9

Hawaii

79.1

Idaho

0

Illinois

7.8

Indiana

66.1

Iowa

1.3

Kansas

47.7

Kentucky

19.8
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Louisiana

0

Maine

0

Maryland

69.1

Massachusetts

34.8

Michigan

64.2

Minnesota

62.4

Mississippi

0

Missouri

41.5

Montana

0

Nebraska

16.2

Nevada

47.1

New Hampshire

0

New Jersey

72.1

New Mexico

61.9

New York

64.2

North Carolina

0

North Dakota

0

Ohio

71.4

Oklahoma

0

Oregon

73.4

Pennsylvania

52.8

Rhode Island

61.9

South Carolina

26.8
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South Dakota

0

Tennessee

100

Texas

43.1

Utah

0

Vermont

91

Virginia

55.7

Washington

53.7

West Virginia

44.6

Wisconsin

52.1

Wyoming

0

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation (2010a)
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Appendix B.
Table 2. Data Dictionary for Panel and Spatial Regression Variables
Variable
Dependent
variable:
Percentage of
comprehensive State
Medicaid managed
care programs for
adults with disabilities
Dependent variable:

Variable Label

Percentage of State
Medicaid managed
care programs
providing
comprehensive
benefits for adults
with disabilities

Centers for
Medicare and
Medicaid Services
(2006, 2003, 2000)

pctcmc

Measured as the
percentage of
Medicaid
comprehensive
managed care
enrollees out of total
Medicaid enrollees
by state
Calculated using
state Medicaid
enrollment rates in
2000, 2003 and 2006
divided by state
population estimates
The FMAP formula
is calculated upon
average per capita
income by state
relative to the
national average.

Centers for
Medicare and
Medicaid Services
(2006a, 2003, 2000)

State Medicaid
expenditures as a
percent of total
expenditures

National Association
of State Budget
Officers, (2007,
2004, 2001)

pctmen

Percentage of the state
population enrolled in
Medicaid
Independent variable:

fmap

State Federal Medical
Assistance Percentage
(FMAP)

Independent variable:
State Medicaid
expenditures

Source

pctpro

State enrollment rates
in comprehensive
Medicaid managed
care

Dedependent variable:

Definition

mspertext

Ellis, Roberts,
Rousseau and
Schwartz (2008);
U.S. Census Bureau
(2008).
Data for 2000 and
2003 is from the
Department of
Health and Human
Services (2008).
Data for 2006 is
from the Kaiser
Family Foundation
(2007c)
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Variable

Variable Label

Definition

Source

Independent variable:
State growth in
personal income

perchin

Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2009)

Independent variable:

cideo

Change in personal
income by state from
1999-2000, 20022003, 2005-2006
State ideology scores
are computed by
averaging the
ideological position
of Congressional
members by district.
Higher scores equate
to more liberal
ideology.
Data for 2000 is the
two-year average for
1999-2000; data for
2003 is the two-year
average for 20022003; data for 2006
is the three-year
average of 20042006
Disability is
measured by the U.S.
Census Bureau
through survey
questions capturing
the prevalence of
chronic conditions
and resultant
limitations in activity

Citizen ideology, by
state

Independent variable:

pctunins

Percentage of people
without health
insurance coverage by
state

Independent variable:
Disability status of
non-institutionalized
civilian population,
age 5 and older, by
state,

pctdis

Berry, Ringquist,
Fording and Hanson
(1998); University
of Kentucky (2006)

2000: Mills (2001)
2003: DeNavasWalt, Proctor and
Mills (2004)
2006: DeNavasWalt, Proctor and
Mills (2007)

Waldrop and Stern
(2003)
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Appendix C:
Maps presented use Albers Equal Area Conic projection and queen contiguity weights.

A LISA cluster map of percent comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs for
people with disability, 2003

A LISA significance map of percent comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs
for people with disability, 2003
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Appendix D:
Maps presented use Albers Equal Area Conic projection and queen contiguity weights.

A LISA cluster map of percent Medicaid enrollment in comprehensive Medicaid
managed Care, 2003

A significance map of percent Medicaid enrollment in comprehensive Medicaid managed
Care, 2003
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Appendix G:

